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PREFACE 
The purpose of this thesis is to show the use of 
topology in mathematical logic. 
1. 
It is well known, through the work of H. Rasiowa and 
R. Sikorski, that Intuitionistic first order predicate 
calculus with equality has a very natural interpretation 
in terms of the lattice of open sets of a topological space~ 
The problem was to show that the usual Intuitionistic second 
order arithmetic gives such a topological model. 
In the first two chapters we give the topology required 
for later work and a brief discussion on Intuitionistic 
mathematics. In the topology section the emphasis is on 
the Baire Space as this is the most natural space in which 
to interpret second order arithmetic. The discussion on 
Intuitionistic mathematics gives an Intuitionistic viewpoint 
but concentrates on giving, where possible, Classical 
justification for Intuitionistic assumptions and theorems. 
Chapter Three is a brief description of Ra owa's and 
Sikorski' s work 'showing that Intuitionistic first order 
predicate calculus with equality has topological models. 
Chapter Four gives a model for Intuitionistic second 
order arithmetic which is due to J.R. Moschovakis and is an 
adaption of topological models for Intuitionistic analysis 
given by D. Scott. 
Chapter Five shows a second use of topology in 
mathematical logic. It deals with the topological approach 
of forcing due to G. Takeuti and c. ·Ryll-Nardzewski. The 
central idea is that by using the Baire Category Theorem we 
2. 
can show the existence of generic models without giving a 
constructive proof. 
Chapter One (except 1.2.9 and 1.3.7) and the proof of 
2.5.7 are taken from lectures given by R.A. Bull to a 1976 
Honours III Logic class. The details of Chapter Five were 
worked out with the help of R.A. Bull. 
Acknowledgements. 
I thank Dr R.A. Bull for his supervision, which kept 
me on the right path, and for undertaking the painstaking 
job of proof reading the typewritten script. Finally I 
thank Mrs Clime for the difficult task of typewriting this 
thesis. 
3. 
1. BAIRE SPACE 
1.1. THE TOPOLOGY OF BAIRE SPACE. 
1.1.1. Remark. We shall consider an Intui tionistic second 
order arithmetic which has added V-",:riables for functions. 
Since functions from N (the natural numbers) into N are 
just sequences, then to study models of second order 
arithmetic we need to know some of the properties of 
sequences. 
There are three reasons for looking at the Baire Space 
topology. Firstly we shall later show that the models of 
Intuitionistic logic are lattices of open sets of given 
topological spac~s and in our context a natural topological 
space to consider is the Baire Space. Secondly knowing 
something of the Baire Space topology shows us that when an 
Intuitionist describes v a3 xx (Cl, x) + 'I a3x3y\JS (ay = By + x (!3 ,x) ) 
as a continuity axiom, he is not pulling this term out of the. 
hat, but is linking it with the notion of continuity in 
topology. Thirdly, via Baire Space topology, we can give 
classical proofs for assumptions made by intuitionists which. 
they justify on other grounds. 
It must be stressed that Intuitionism did not develop as 
some extension of Classical mathematics as the above may 
suggest. Rather Brouwer attempted to create a new mathematics 
which is constructivist and so he justified his assumptions on 
philosophical grounds. I.twas only when people attempted to 
formalize Intuitionism that semantic interpretations such as 
topological models were developed. 
4. 
In this thesis we have substituted for any historical 
approach an approach summarized as 'there is a topological 
model; let us see how Intuitionistic second order arithmetic 
is interpreted in this model'. Thus for the most part we 
avoid a detailed philosophical discussion on the constructive 
content of intuitionism. 
1.1.2. Definitions. We use x, y, z, ... for non-negative 
integers (nnis) and N for the set of nnis. 
We have functions+, x and.!.., +, - , on nnis. · The first 
two have their usual definition, the last three are defined 
as follows: 
x 
. y = x - y iff x ;;;;i,, y df 
x .!.. y = df 0 iff x <y 
x+ = x + 1 x = x .!.. 1 df df 
We have finite sequences of nnis < x 0 , ••• x > including r 
the empty sequences < > . We use m, n for these, and if mis 
< x 0 ••• xr> then we write ms for xs' for each s with 
O ~ s ~ r. 
We define the functionlh on finite sequences as follows: 
for each m = <x 0 ••• x1 > ,lh< > =df O lh + m = r • 
We define a concatenation function* on finite sequences 
as follows: 
for each < x 0 
<xo ••• xryo •.. ys>. 
We define a 'tail function' tl on finite sequences as 
follows: 
for each m = < xo •.• xr>' tl m =df <x1 ••• xr> 
Le. <xo> * tl m = m. 
5. 
We define a relation~ on finite sequences as follows: 
for each <x 0 ••• xr>,<Yo· .. ys>,<xo .•. ·xr>~<Yo· ·· Ys>=df r ~s 
and <xo ... x > = <y0 ••• y >. Note that this relation is r r 
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, i.e. a partial-
ordering. < is defined in the obvious way, 
m < n = df m ·~ n and not rn "" n. 
We use a, B, y, ... for sequences of nnis and NN for 
the set of sequences. We define a function a from N into 
the set of finite sequences as follows: 
ao = < > . "&r+ = < aO.al • . . ar > for each a E NN, each r E N. 
Given a finite sequence m we write {m} for the set of 
sequences a such that a(lhm) = m i.e. {m} =df {a: a(lhm) = m}. 
{ <> } is NN. 
Given a finite sequence m and a sequence a, m * a is the 
sequence defined as follows: 
(m * a) r = mr for r E N, r ~ ( lhm) 
(m * a)( (1hm) + s) = as for s EN. 
1.1. 3. Remarks. We now ask what topology is' to be put on 
NN. The natural topology is the induced .product topology 
(with the discrete topology on N) • The subbasic open sets 
of this topology are of the form {a: ar = x}, for.some. 
r, x EN, so that the basic open sets are of the form 
{a : a:r:;- 1 = x 1 and . . . and arn = xn }', for some 
r 1 , ••• , rn, x 1, •• ·• , xn EN. 
Alternatively we may view this topology as the one whose 
basic open sets are {m} for any finite sequence m. This is 
easily seen by noting that for any m with m = < x·0 • • • x .> · ,. 
. r 
· {m} = { d : ao = xo · and • . . and ar = x }, which is a basic open 
r . 
set of the product topology; and for any 
6 . 
. {a . ar 1 = x and and ar = x } this equals . 0 •• r1 n :r n 
'{{a : aO = Xo and . . . and a(r 1-1) = x and ar 1 = x r 1-l r1 
x +land •.. and a(r -1) = xr _ 1 r l n n 
and ar =.x } : x 0 , ••• x 1 x +l , ... x 1 EN} n rn r 1 - "- r 1 r 11 -
which is the union of basic open sets of the form· {m} for 
some m. 
1.1. 4. Definition. 'rhis topology whose basic open sets 
are.{m} for some finite sequence m, is called the Baire 
Space topology. 
1.1.5. Proposition. The Baire Space has a countable basis. 
Proof. In view of the definition of the Baire Space 
topology we need only show that the set of finite sequences 
is countable. 
To each ordered pair<x,y> of nnis assign a nni (x,y) 
by (x,y) = ~[ (x + y) 2 + 3x + y]. By noting that 
(x,y) =[x!~J + x we can easily show that this assignment 
n=l 
from N XN into N is 1-1 and onto. 
To each finite sequence assign an nni in the following 
way. To<> assign O, to <x0 > assign (0, x 0 )+, for each 
r;;:., 1 to <xo •.. xr> assign (r, (xo, (x1, ... (x 1 , x) , ••. ))f'. r- r 
In view of the 1-1, onto assignment of (x,y) and the 1-1 
assignment of + from N onto N - {O}, and the 1-1, onto 
assignment of Oto<>, this assignment being the composition 
of those assignments is 1-1 and onto. 
7. 
1. l. 6. _E_!'oposi~i.011. Members of the countable base for the 
Baire Space are clopen. 
Proof. Ne need only show that for each {m} in the countable 
basis -{m} is open. 
a E- {m} impl.i.es a ( 1.hm) c:f., rn a,:\ C~, c. :.:.:: {Q { lhm) } 
implies a ( lhm) ::/= m and lh (;; ( lhm) ) = lhm 
implies not a ( lhm) <m and not m ~ 'a ( lhm) 
implies for some n, O'.E{n} and not n ~ m 
an.d not n < m. 
For some. n,aE{n} and not n < m and not n < m and 
a $ - {m} 
implies a E {m} 
implies for each n with {m} n {n} = cf>, a $ {n} 
implies for each n with not m < n and not n < m, 
a ${n} 
This contradicts the assumption, for some n,not n < m and not 
m <m and aE{n}. Hence,for somen,aE{n} and not n <m 
and not m < m implies a E..;. {m}. 
Therefore -{m} = U {{{n} : not' n < m and not m<n}:ri EN} 
which is open. 
1.1.7. Proposition. Each open set in the Ba~re Space 
topology is the union of countably many disjoint clopen.sets. 
Proof. In view of 1.1.5, 1.1.6 we need only show that each 
open set is the union of disjoint basis neighbourhoods. 
Let A be any open set and let N be the set of basis 
neighl:,ourhoods which are contained by A so that A = UN • 
Let M be the set of members {n} of N for which 
{m} EM· iff {m} EN and for each n, if n < m and {n} EN 
then n = m. 
8. 
Because for finite sequences m and n either {m} C {n} 
or.{m} ~·{n} or {m}n'{n} =¢,then for each distinct 
{m}, · {n} E M, not· {m} ~ {n} and not· {n} C · {m}; otherwise 
either n is not minimal or m is not minimal. Hence M is a 
set of disjoint neighbourhoods. 
For each a E A~ for some {n} E N, a E · {n}. Since there 
arelhn finite sequences m such that m < n, there is a 
least finite sequence m under< with m < n and {m} EN. 
Call this mo. 
mo is minimal under< because 
m < m0 and· {m} E M implies m < n and· {m} E N and m < m0 
implies m = m0 by choice of mo as the 
least such m. 
Therefore· {mo} E M and a E: {n} C · {m 0 }. Hence a E u M. 
Therefore 
AC UM CUN CA i.e. A= UM. 
1.1.8. Remark. The next few propositions tell us certain 
properties of the Baire Space that, as well as placing this 
space within the general scheme of topological spaces, are 
needed to prove results about models in Chapter Three. 
1.1.9. Definition. Let X be a topological space, x EX. 
The component C(x) of point x =df the union of all connected 
sets containing x : i.e. it is the maximal c©nnected set 
containing x. 
X is totally disconnected = df for each x EX, C ( x) = {x}. 
9 •. 
1.1.10. Remark. A more convenient formulat:i,on of totally 
disconnectedness is: for each distinct x, y EX, there 
exist disjoint open A and B with x EA, y EB, X = A UB. 
This is equivalent to the definition in 1~1.9 as is seen by: 
for each x E X C ( x) = {x} implies X is not connected 
implies there exir,t. disjoint open A~ B with X = A. UB. 
If x E A and y E B then the proof is finished. 
If x, y EA, say, then by the maximality of C(x), C(y), A is 
not connected 
implies there exist disjoint open (in the subspace 
A open implies there exist disjoint open (in the topology) 
If x E A 1 , y E B 1 then let the disjoint open sets be 
If x, y E A 1 , say, then by the maximality of C(x), C(y), k 1 
is not connected. We repeat the argument until eventually 
either {x}, {y} are open or there exist A , B · with 
n n · 
x E An' y E Bn. In the former case since closure of a 
connected set is connected then by the maximality of C(x), 
{x} is closed. Take the open sets to be {x}, X - {x}. In 
the latter case take the open sets to be 
An' B U B l ... UB 1 U B. n n-
For each distinct x, y EX there exist disjoint open 
A,B with x EA, y EB, X = A UB,and suppose there .is a y 
with C(y) ~ {y}. Then this 
implies there is an x ~ y E C (y) and there exist 
disjoint open A,B with x EA, y E B, x = A UB 
10. 
implies there exist disjoint open (in the subspace 
topology) 
C(y)nA, C{y)nB with x EC(y}nA, y EC(y)nB and 
implies C(y) is not connected.Contradiction. 
Note that any totally disconnected space is Hausdorff. 
1.1.11. Proposition. The Baire Space is totally disconnected. 
Proof. We need only show that given distinct sequences a,8 
there is a clopen set with a E A and f3 Ef: A. 
Let a,8 be distinct sequences, let r be the smallest 
nni with ar * Sr. The set {ar+} is clopen by 1.1.6 and 
a E {ar+ } and f3 EJ: {ar+ } since (ar+) r = ar * Sr. 
1.1.12. Proposition. The Baire Space is a complete metric 
space. 
Proof. Define a metric don the Baire Space as follows: 
d(a 1 B) =af o iff a= B d(a,B) =df 1+ iff r is the least 
nni with ar * Br. 
It is easy enough to show that d is a metric; the hardest 
part as always is to show the triangle property. 
Consider sequences ao;,, a 1 , ••• such that 
for each r, for some pr' for each 
d ( a , a ) < .!+ • p q r 
p, q with 
This means the least nni s with aps * aqs satisfies 
d ( a , a ) = l:.+ < l:.+ • p q s r 
r < s therefore + - + Thus and a r = a r p q 
Hence for each r, for some Pr' for each p and q, 
Pr~ and p :< q implies - + - + p apr = aqr r 
11. 
For each r, take p to be the least nni which satisfies 
. r 
this statement so that Po < p 1 < p 2 < ... and hence 
+ - + ..... + Therefore a O < a 1 < a 2 < ...• p O p I P2 . 
Define a sequence a by taking ar+ =df aprr+ for each 
r EN. This generates a sequence by the result of the 
previous paragraph and is well defined since 
ar+ = as+ implies lhar+ = lhas+ i.e. r = s. 
p < p implies ar+ = a r+ = a r+ so that 
r Pr p. 
- + - +. for each· r, for some p , · for each p, p < p implies ar = a r , 
. r r p 
where the least nni s with as~ as satisfies r < s so that· p . 
1 1 
= -+ < -+. s r Therefore for each r, for some p, for r 
. 1 
each p, pr< p implies d(a,ap) < r i.e. ao, a1,··· converge 
to a. Hence the Baire Space is complete. 
1.1.13. Definition. A topological space X has the Baire 
Property =df each set of the 1st category (meagre) is a 
boundary set (i.e. its complement is dense). 
1.1.14. Remark. This definition is equivalent to the more 
usual one: X has the Baire Property =df any intersection of 
a countable family of open dense subsets of Xis dense. 
For =>)let n.A. be any intersection of a countable 
l l 
family of open dense sets 
implies x-n.A. = U(X-A.) and for each i 
l l l 
int cl(X-A.) = X-cl int A.= X-X = ¢ 
l l 
implies x-n.A. = U(X-A.) and for each i, X-A. is 
. l l l l 
nowhere dense 
implies x~n.A, = U(X-A,) and U(x-A.) is meagre 
l 1 · l 1 
implies x-n.A. is a boundary set by supposition 
1 1 
implies n.A. is dense. 
l. l. 
12. 
For~) let A be meagre, i.e. A =U.A. for some countable 
1 1 
family of nowhere dense sets 
implies x-u. A. = n(x - A.) and for each i 
1 1 1 
cl int(X-A.) = X - int cl A. = X 
1 1 
implies x-U,A. = ncx-A.) and {int(X-A
1
.)} is a countable ]. 1 l. 
set of open dense sets 
implies X-U,A. = ncx-A.) is dense by supposition 1 ]. l. 
implies A= U.A. is a boundary set. 
1 1 
1.1.15. Proposition. Each complete metric space has the 
Baire Property. 
Proof.· Let X be a complete metric space and A= U.A., where ]. ]. 
the Ai are nowhere dense, i.e. A is meagre. Re.call that: 
a set is dense is equivalent to its intersection with each 
non-empty open set being non-empty. To show A is a boundary 
set we need show -A is dense, i.e. for each non-empty open 
set B -A nB -4= ¢. This is equivalent to; for each non-empty· 
open set B,not B ~ A. 
Given a non-empty open set B we firstly prove by 
induction on r that there exist sets cl B (xr' Er) 
(where B(xr' Er) is the open ball centre xr' radius Er) such 
that 
cl B (x 0 , E0 ) C Bn - cl A0 , cl B (x + , E + )C B (xr,E ) n - cl Ar+ r r - r 
for each r EN. 
Ao nowhere dense implies int cl A0 = ¢ 
B open so int B = B implies not B ~ cl A0 
implies there exists an x 0 , x0 E Bfl-cl A0 
13. 
Bn - cl A. 0 open implies there exists O <E 0 < 1 such that 
For each r E N, given B ( xr, Er), Ar+ nowhere dense 
implies int cl A+ = ¢ 
r 
implies not B(x, E )C cl Ar+ 
r r -
implies there exists an xr+, xr+ EB(xr' Er)n - cl Ar+ 
B(x, E )n - cl Ar+ open implies there is some 
r r 
cl B(x +, E +)C B(x, Er)n - cl A+• 
r r - r r 
For each r 0 EN, each r, s ~ r 0 ,xr' xs E cl B(x , E ) , ro ro 
so that for each 2 r, s ~ r O, d ( xr, x ) ,;;;;; 2 E 0 < -+ . s r · 
Therefore d(xr, xs) +O as r, s +oo. Since Xis a complete 
metric space there is some x E X with d (x, x ) +.O as r + 00 • 
r 
Each cl B ( xr, Er) is a closed set with xr, xr+ 1 , •. E cl B ( xr,Er) . 
Suppose x E 
implies x E 
implies x Ef= 
implies x Ef= 
A,then 
cl A 
r 
B (x ~ , 
r 
Th us x E cl B ( x , E ) C B . 
r r -
x E A for some r 
r 
E w) n - cl A 
r r 
cl B(x, E ) . Contradiction. 
r r 
Therefore x Ef= A and hence not B t: A. 
1.1.16 .. Proposition. The Baire Space has the Baire Property. 
1.1.17. Remarks. Even though the Baire Space is complete 
metric it is not compact since {<n >: n EN} is an open 
cover which has no finite subcover. 
Because any number between O and l can be represented 
as a continuted fraction a 1 + 
1
a~\ LL + a 3 \ + .• , it can be 
14. 
shown via the function which sends a 1 + ~ + ~~\ + •• 
to the sequence <a 1 a2 a 3 ••• >, that the siet of irrational~ 
between O and 1 (and so all irrationals) with the usual 
subspace topology is homeomorphic to the Baire Space. 
1.2. CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONALS ON BAIRE SPACE 
1.2.1. Remark. Continuous functionals of the type 
NN +N, NN +NN are to be used for the domain of the model of 
Intuitionistic second order arithmetic that we shall later 
construct. We now characterize such functionals in terms of 
functionals defined on the Baire Space neighbourhood basis, 
which will be seen to be an interpretation of Brouwer 
operations. 
1.2.2. Definition. A function E from finite sequences into 
N is a neighbourhood function (nbdfn) =df for each sequence a, 
there are some x, y EN with 
E (az) = 0 for z < y E (az) = x+ for z ~ y. 
Each neighbourhood function E determines a functional 
;r..E f N ' t . ' b \I' rom N in o N given y: 
""E"' \I' v, = df x iff for some y, E(ay) = + x . 
Each neighbourhood function E determines a functional 
11/E f N . t N • b T rom N in o N given y: 
iff for some z, E (< y >* az) = + x • 
1.2.3. Remark. As mentioned in 1.1.2 the set .of finite 
sequences is a partially ordered set which ha.s the following 
diagram 
15. 
\// 
< 1 o o> < 1 o 1> _ • 
\// 
<10> <11> <12> 
\// 
<- 2 0 > <2 1> <2 2 > •• 
""\/ \\/ 
<1> <2> 
~/ 
The 'branches' of the diagram are chains,i.e. for each m, n 
either m ~ n or n ~ m. Hence given a branch B of this 
diagram,a nbdfn E maps members of B, whose length is less 
than some y+, to O, and maps members .of B, whose length is 
greater than or equal toy+, to x+, for some x. Hence a. 
nbdfn sends part of the branch to O, t,he rest to a constant 
number. Therefore if a E {n} and En = E x+ then <JJ a= x,and 
if aE{<y>* n} and E(<y> * h) then <JJE(a)(.Y) = x. 
1. 2. 4. Proposition. If NN has the Baire Space topology and 
N . 
N the discrete topology then a functional <JJ : N +N is 
continuous iff 
(x) (a) [ <Da = x => (Em) (a E {m} & ( B) (BE {m} =><DB= x))] , 
where we use ' ( a) ' for 'for each a' , ·' (EB) ' for 'there is 
some B' , '=>' for 'implies', ' & ' for 'and' • 
Proof. ¢ continuous implies (x EN) (<JJ- 1[ {x}] is open) 
implies (x EN) ( {a : <Da = x} is a union 
of basis neighbourhoods) 
implies (x EN) ({a : <Da = x} is covered by 
basis neighbourhoods which are 
containe~ by it) 
16. 
implies (x EN) ( {a : if>a = x} is covered by basis 
neighbourhoods which are contained by it) 
implies (x EN) (a) [<Ila= x '* (Em) (aE{m}&{m}~{ru ~Ci• x}) I 
implies ( x) ( ct) [ wa = x => (Em) ( aE'::{m} & ( B) ( BE{m} *<I>B = x) ) ] • 
(x) (a) [<Pct= x ~ (Em) (a E {m} & (B) (BE: {m} '*<I>B = x)) 1 
implies (A) (a) [ if>ct EA=> (Em) (ctE{m}&(B) (BE{m} '*<I>B EA)> 1 
[ since <!>ct EA=> (Ex EA) (<!>ct =x) and so (Ex EA) (if>B=x) 
implies (A) (a) [ <I>ctEA => (Em) (aE{m}&{m}~{a: <I>a EA})] 
implies (A .::N) ( {ct : if>a EA} is covered by basis 
neighbourhoods which are contained by it) 
implies (A ,::N) ( {a : <!>a EA} is a union of basis 
neighbourhoods) 
implies (A~N) (<I>- 1[A] is open) i •. e. <I> is continuous. 
1.2.5. Proposition. For each nbdfn E, <I>E is continuous. 
Proof. Given x EN, a E NN such that <!>Ea= x, by definition, 
for some y, E (ay) + = x • Considering this ay, we have 
a E. {ay} and for each B, BE {ay} implies By= ay 
implies E(Sy) = E(ay) = x+ 
implies <I>EB = x. 
1.2.6. Proposition. For each continuous functional 
<I> : NN -+N, there is a nbdfn E with <I> = <I>E. 
Proof. For each finite sequence m define a functional <I> 
.m 
from NN into N by <!>ma = df <I> (m * ct) for each a E NN. 
Lemma. If for each x EN there is a nbdfn Em*<x> with 
then there is a nbdfn Em with <P 
m 
1 7. 
Proof. Define Em by Em <>=df O :Em(<x>*n) = Em*<x>n 
' . . df 
for each x, n. 
For each a, Em(az) = Em(<ao> * Bz-) where Br = a.r• for each r 
iff z· < y aO 
= x"'+O iff z- ;;;;i, y 
..,, . aO 
. Em*<.ao> [for some xao' Yao since is a nbdfn]. 
Hence there is some xaO' y;0 such that Em(az) = O iff z <y;0 , 
iff z ;;;;i. y +, i.e. Em is a nbdfn. 
aO 
For each sequence <.x;> * a, 
<I>m (<x> * a) = <I> (m*<x> * a) by definition 
by definition 
by supposition 
= (Em*<x> (ay) )'" for some y, by 
definition 
= (Em (<x> * ay) )"' for some y, by 
definition 
= (Em(<x> * ay+) )- for some y• 
Em 
<I> c<x> * a) by definition.· 
Em 
Hence <I> = <I> • 
m 
<> Now assuming that there is no nbdfn E such that 
<I><> 
E<> 
=~=<I> , a contradiction can be obtained. By 
induction we define a sequence a such that for each r EN 
- Ear 
there is no nbdfn Ear with <I>ar - <I> 
For r = 0, our supposition is that there is no nbdfn 
<> E<> 
E such that <I>< > = <I> 
18. 
For each r, assume there is some finite sequence m with 
m Em lhm = r such that there is no nbdfn E with <I>m = qi By 
the lemma there is. some x EN such that there is no nbdfn 
r 
m*<x > Em*<xr> 
E r with <I>m*<x > = .<I> • 
r 
Define a by taking a(r) =df x 
r 
for each r. 
<I> is continuous implies there is some finite sequence m with 
a E {m} such that <I>f3 = <I>a for each f3 E {m}. 
For each y E NN, = <I> y since a E: {m} implies alhm = m 
m 
= <I> (m*Y) = <I>a since m*Y E {m} 
and <I> is continuous. 
Thus <I>- is a constant functional with Ci.lhm 
a1hm a1hm + 
<I>- = <I>E where E n = (<l>a) for each n. 
alhm 
This contradicts the property which a had by construction, 
that for each r EN there is no nbdfn Ear with <I>- = <I>Ear. 
ar 
<> Therefore there is a nbdfn E = E such that 
<I>= <I><> = <I> 
E<> 
1.2.7. Remarks. The proof of 1.2.6 is due to G. Kreisel 
and A. S. Troelstra and appears in [ 111 . 
Combining 1.2.5, 1.2.6 we have each continuous functional 
<I> : NN -+ N is continuous. iff <I> = <I>E for some nbdfn E. It is 
important to note that while 1.2.5 is intuitionistically 
provable, 1.2.6, since it uses the principle of excluded 
middle, is extremely classical and there is no intuitionistic 
proof of it. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the 
Intuitionists hold that this equivalence (and even something 
19. 
stronger: that each functional is continuous) is true and 
justify it on other grounds. 
We have the analogues of 1. 2 •. 5, 1. 2. 6 for the higher 
order functionals from NN into NN. We now prove these noting 
that we can easily prove as in the manner of 1.2.4 that 
'JI : NN +NN is continuous iff 
(n) (a) [ 'l'a E {n} => (Em) (a E {m} & (B) (BE {m} =>'JIBE {n}))] 
1.2.8. Proposition. For each nbdfn E, 'l!E is continuous. 
Proof. Given finite· sequence n, a E NN, 
for each i ~ lhn 
implies E ( i *az. ) = (hit for some z. I for each 
l l 
Let z = max z, and m = az 
i~lhn l 
BE {m} implies Bz, = l 
-az. 
l 
"i ~ lhn. 
Hence .a E {m}, and 
for each i ~ lhn 
implies i*Bz. = i*az. l . 1 for each i ~ lhn 
implies E(i*Szi) = E(i*az.,) 1 = (ni) + for each 
implies 'l!E ( B) ( i) = ni for each i ~ lhn 
i ~lhn 
implies 'l'E ( B) E {n} , i.e. ·E 'I! is continuous. 
1.2.9. Proposition. For each continuous functional 
N N · E 
'l' : N + N , there is a nbdfn E such that 'I! = 'I! • 
Proof. For each finite sequence n define a functional 'l' by 
. n 
'Jin (a) (y) =df 'l'(tln*<y>*a) (n.O) where n =<nO>*tln, for each a, y. 
Lemma. If for each x E N there is ·a nbdfn En*<x> such that 
En 
, then there is a nbdfn En such that \!'n = 'l' 
20. 
for each x, m. 
For each a, En (az) = En (<aO> * Sz-) where Br= ar+ for each r 
J.• ff < z y aO 
= x + iff z :::;;,, y 
o:0 - aO 
[ for some xaO, y aO since En *<ao> is a nbdfn] • 
Therefore for some xaO, y a+O' En (az) = 0 iff z <y ;O, En (~z) = x~O 
iff z ~ y ; 0 • Hence En is a nbdfn •. 
For each a, y, '¥En (a) (y) = (En (<y> * az) r for some z 
by definition 
n*<y> - • 
= (E (az)) for some z by definition 
= (En*<y>(<aO> * tl(a) z-) )- for some z 
[where tl(a) (z) .= tl(az+ )] 
n*<y> 
= '¥E (tl(a)) (aO) by definition 
= '¥n*<y> (tl (a)) (aO) by supposition 
= '¥(tl((n*<y>) *<ao> *tl(a))((n*<y>)O) by definition 
= '¥ (tln * <:y> * a) (no) 
[since tl(n*<y>) =tl(n)*<y>, a=<ao>*tl(a), 
(n*<..y>)O = nO] 
= '¥n (a) (y). 
Hence 'l'n ='¥En. 
'¥ = 
Assuming there is no nbdfn E = E< > such that 
E<> 
'¥< > = '¥ a contradiction is obtained. By induction 
we define a sequence a such that, for each r EN, there is no 
nbdfn Ear with'¥-
ar 
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<> For r=O, our supposition is that there is no nbdfn E · 
such that '¥< > = 'I' E<> 
For each r, we assume there is some finite sequence n 
with lhn = r such that there is no nbdfn En with IJ' = IJ'En 
n 
By the lemma there is some xr such that there is no nbdfn 
*< > En*~r> 
En Xr with IJ'n*<x > - IJ' 
r 
Define. a by taking a(r) -df xr for each r. 
Lemma. The functional cp : NN -+N with ¢{y) = IJ'(y) (aO) is 
continuous. 
Proof. Given y, x, <Ii(y) = x implies IJ'(y) (aO) = x 
implies there is some n = IJ'y(aO)+ such that 
IJ'y E {n}. 
Since IJ' is continuous, there is some m such that y E {ml- and 
13 E {m} implies IJ'l3 E {n}. 
With this {m}, 13 E {m} implies IJ'B E {n} 
implies IJ'B(aOt = IJ'y(aO)+ 
implies IJ'B(aO) = x i.e. 4)(6)= x. 
Thus by 1. 2. 6 cp = cpE for. some nbdfn E. 
Defining .B by Sr = ar+ for each r, since cp{B) = w for some w, 
using¢= ¢Ewe have E(Sz) = w+ for some z. 
With this z, for each Y and y, 
by definition 
= ¢(tl(az+)*<y>*y) by definition 
= ¢E ( 8 z * <:y > * y ) 
[ since Br = ar+ for each r and ¢ = ¢E for 
some El 
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= w 
[since ~Eis continuous and ~E(B) =wand 
Sz * <y> * y E {Sz}]. 
Therefore ~az+ is constant. Moreover if E- + is defined by 
az 
- + Eaz 
n, then 1- = 1 
az 
This 
- + 
Eaz (n) = E(Sz) for each 
contradicts the property 1- had by construction, that for 
ar 
-
each r, there is no nbdfn Ear with 1-
ar 
Therefore there is a nbdfn E< > = E such that 
E<> 
= 1 •. 
1. 2. 10. Remarks. This classical proof of 1. 2. 9 which is due 
to R.A. Bull, does not appear in the literature, nor is it 
hinted at in [ 11]. Yet it is only a modification of 1.2.6, 
us in g 1. 2 • 6 • 
Furthermore what 1. 2. 9 states is provable for the 
Intuitionists under the same assumptions that makes 1.2.6 
provable for them. So we would expect G. Kreisel and 
A. S. Troelstra to use 1. 2. 9 to give a classical interpretation 
to 1E. 
1.3. A PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION FOR FINITE SEQUENCES. 
1.3.1. Remarks. In this section we will derive a principle 
of induction for finite sequences which enables us to 
redefine nbdfns without referring to infinite sequences. 
Ordinary induction for integers has the following form: 
if Ax is any statement about x, for each x EN, then 
(AO & (x) (Ax=*Ax+)) =*(x)Ax. 
We can derive from this an alternative version: 
( x) ( ( y) ( x > y "'* Ay) "'* Ax) "'* ( x) Ax. 
2 3. 
In this form we see that given x, if everything 'related' 
to x (in this case> is the relation) satisfying A implies 
x satisfies A, then A is satisfied by all x. It is not at 
all obvious,but when we use the relation,x = y+ in place of 
x >yin the above schema,we have something equivalent to 
the usual formulation of induction. 
From considerations such as these we might generalize 
to allow any relation at all, to give a principle of induction 
on R called transfinite induction TI ( R') 
(x) ( (y) (xRy =>Ay) => Ax) => (x) Ax . 
However this may not hold for just any R. A condition on R 
for which TI(R) holds is that of wel1-foundedness 
(WF ( R) ) : ( a) (Ex)"' ( ax) R (ax+) • This con.di tion prevents infinite. 
R chains e.g. (a 0 )R(ai), (ai)R(a 2 ) , ••• Indeed both relations 
x > y, x =.y+ can be easily seen to be well-founded. 
Thus we have a general principle of induction 
WF (R) =>TI (R), which in particular implies the ordinary 
principle of induction. We shall use this general principle 
of induction to derive a principle of induction .. for finite 
sequences. 
1.3.2. Remarks. In the proof of 1.1.5 we a$signed, 1-1 
and onto, nnis to finite sequences. So at the one time we 
can regard an nni .as both an nni and a sequence which is 
assigned that nni. This 'blurring' technique is widely used 
in the following work. 
Suppose that Ax is a statement about x, for each x EN, 
such that (a) (Ey}A(ay) and (m) (n)[Am=>A(m*n)] so that 
(a) (Ey) (z) [ y ~ z =>A{az)] @. 
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Then A determines a relation on finite sequences with 
mRn =af (Ex)(m*<x>= n) & "'An. 
If f3 is a sequence such that (Ex) (§y*<'.:x> = BY+) & "' A (SY+) , 
(Ex) (BY+ * <x> = SY++) & "' A (Sy++) , ..• , for some y, then f3 
would not satisfy condition@ on A. Hence the relation R 
satisfies the 'well foundedness' condition 
(6) (y) (Ez) ("' B(Y + z)RS(Y + z)+). 
1.3.3. Proposition. For the relation R defined above, 
WF ( R) • 
Proof. Given a, the values ax are nnis assigned to certain 
finite sequences. If there is some r with not 
(Ex) ( ar * <x> = ar+) then (Ex) "" ( ax) R (ax+) . 
If for each r E N, (Ex) ( ar * <x> = ar+ ) then al is not 
the empty sequence and ar+ =al* <x 1> *···* <xr>, for 
soJ:T[e x 1 , ••• , x EN, for each r EN. 
r 
In this case define 
a sequence f3 by, f30 =df (al)O, •.• , f3(lhal)- =df (al) (lhal)-, 
f3(r + (lhal)-) =df (ar+) (r+(lhal)-) for each r EN. 
With this, al = 8 ( lhal), ar+ = 8 ( ( lhal) +r) for each r E N. 
So applying the 'well-foundedness' condition of 1.3.2 with 
lh al for y, x+ for z, "' ( ax) R ( ax+ ) • 
1. 3 • 4 • Remarks • Showing that R satisfies the 'well-
foundedness' condition and that WF(R) is due to A.Q. Abraham 
I 
from an idea of R.A. Bu],1. 
The proof of 1.3~5 from WF(R) ~ TI(R) of W.A. Howard 
and G •. Kreisel in [7] appears unintelligible and the }?roof 
of this given by Van Dalen in [20] is incorrect. 
1.3.5. Proposition. [ (a} (Ey)A(~y)&(m) (n) (Am•(m*n)) 
& (m) (Am =>Bm) & (m) ( (x) B (m*<x>) =>Bm)] => (m) Bm. 
Proof. We have seen in 1.3.2, 1.3.3 that given 
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(a) (Ey)A(ay) and (m) (n) (Am =>A(m*n)) we can define a relation 
R by mRn =df (Ex) (m * <x> == n) & -An such that WF(R). 
TI (R) is (m) ( (n) ( ( (Ex) (m*<x> = n) & "'An) =>Bn) => Bm) => (m) Bm .• 
Supposing (m) (Am=> Bm) and (m) ( ( x) B (m * <x>) =>Bm) , for qi ven m 
( n) ( ( (Ex) ( m * <x> = n) & "'An) => Bn) 
· implies (n) ( ( (Ex) (m*<x> = n) & "'An) =>Bn) 
and (n)(( (Ex) (m*<x> = n) & An) =>Bn) 
[ since (m) (Am =>Bm) and (p =>r) => ( (q & p) =>r).] 
implies (n) ( (Ex) (m * <x> == n) =>Bn) 
[since (((p &."'q) =>r) & ((p&q) =>r)) =>(p=>r)] 
implies (n) (x) (rn * <x> = n =>Bn) 
[ since (Ex) Ax => P i ff ( x) ( Ax => P ) ] 
implies Brn 
[ since (rn) ( ( x) B (rn * <x>) => Brn) and rn * <:x:> = m * <x>] • 
Therefore the induction step for TI(R) holds, so that (rn)Bm, 
1.3.6. Remarks. This principle of induction for finite 
sequences is known as bar induction (BI) and is due to 
Brouwer. BI, here, has the'conclusion (rn)Bm. This can be 
weakened to B< > and yet remain as strong a principle. For 
(m) Brn =>B< > is trivial. To derive the general conclusion 
(rn) Bm from the specific B< >, note by recursion theory it can 
be shown that if g = fn =df (x) ( (x <lhn =>g(x). = nx) 
& (x~lhn =>g(x) = f(x-lhn))) then (n) (f) (Eg) (g = fn)' - @ .. 
Then by CD and (a) (Ey)Aay we can show that for each c, 
( a) (Ey) A ( c * ay) • Tri vi ally. we can show 
26. 
(m) (n) (A(c *m) '*A(c *m *n)), (m) (A(c *m) '*B(c *m)), 
(m) ( (x) B (c * m * <x>) '*B (c * m)) from the other hypotheses of 
BI. Hence, by BI we can conclude for each c, B ( c * < >), 
i.e. ( c) Be or by change of variables (m) Bm. 
We now show that from BI we can conclude WI(R) '*TI(R), 
for any relation R, and hence for our particular relation, 
so that BI and WI(R) =:>TI(R) are equivalent. The proof is due 
to W.A. Howard and G. Kreisel in [7]. 
1. 3. 7. Proposition. BI implies WF(R) =>TI (R) for any R. 
Proof. Let R be any relation, assume WF(R) 
i.e. {a)(Ex) "'(ax)R(ax+). 
Then we have (a) (Ex) ""'(y ~x) (ay) R(ay+) 
Suppose ( x) ( (y) ( xRy '* Ay) '* Ax) 
i.e. the induction step for TI(R). 
Q). 
@. 
Define Bn = df (y < lhn -=-1) (nyRny+) for lhn ~ 2 and Bn is true 
for lhn <2, · 
Pn = df "' Bn , Qn = d f ( lhn = O & ( y) Ay) 
or ( lhn * 0 & [ Bn '* (y) (n ( lhn .!.. 1) Ry '* Ay) ] ) • 
( a) (Ex) Pax ::df ( a) (Ex) "' (y < lhax .!.. 1 )( ax) yR ( ax) y+ 
= ( a) (Ex) ,._, (y < x) ( ayR ay+) which holds by (D 
[ since lhax = x+ and for y < ui-x -=-1, (ay) y = ay, 
(&x)y+ = ay]. 
Given m, n, Pm implies "' (y < lhm -=-1) (myRmy+) 
implies (Ey < lhm -=-1) "' (myRmy+ ) 
implies (Ey < lhm*n .!.. l) "' (myRmy+ ) 
[ since lhm*n > lhm and for y < lhm -=-1, (m*n) y = my] 
implies "' (y < lhm*n .!.. l) (myRmy+) 
implies P (m*n), i.e. (m) (n) (Pm '*P (m*n)). 
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Given m, Pm implies Pm and either lhm = 0 or lhm rf=. O; 
Pm and lhm = O implies Pm and Bm 
[since Bm is true for lhm < 2] 
implies Qm 
[ since Bm =df "' Pm. and (p => ( "'P =*q))] 
Pm and lhm rf=. 0 implies lhm rf=. O and"' Bm 
implies lhm rf=. O and Bm => ( (y) (m ( lhm.!..l) Ry =>Ay)) 
[ since (p=>(-p~)) and using modus ponens] 
implies ( lhm = O & (y) Ay) 
or (lhm #=O & [ Bm => ( (y) (m(lhm.!..l) Ry =>Ay)]) 
l since p => (p vq)] 
implies Qm 
i.e. (m) (Pm =>Qm) • 
by definition; 
Given m, (x)Q(m *<x>) implies (x)Q(m *<x>) and either lhm = 0 
or lhm rf=. O. ( x) Q (m * <x>) and lhm = 0 
implies lhm = 0 and (x)Q<x> 
implies Ihm= 0 and 
(x) (B<x> =>(y) (<x> lh<x> .:..1 RY. =>Qy)) 
[since lh<x>rf=.O] 
implies lhm = 0 and (x)B<.x>=> (x) (y)'(xRy =>Ay) 
[ since (x) (Ax =>Bx)=> ( (x) Ax=> (x) Bx) 
and lh<x> .!.. l · = 0] 
implies lhm == 0 and ( x) B<x> => ( x) Ax 
[by @1 
implies lhm = 0 ~nd (x)Ax 
[ since for each x, lh<x> <2 and so 
B<x> is true] 
implies ( lhm = 0 & ( x) Ax) or 
(lhm rf=.O & [ Bm => (y) (m( lhm .!.. l) Ry =>Ay)]) . 
2 8. 
(x) Q (m * <x>) and lhm -=!-= O 
implies lhm. -=l-=O and (x) (B (m*<x>)-+ (y) (m*<x>( lhm*<x> .!.. l) Ry.,.Ay)) 
. [ since lhm * <x> -=!-= 0] 
implies lhm -=!-= O and (x) (B (m * <x>) => (y) (xRy =>Ay)) 
[ since m * <x>( lhm * <x>.:.. 1) = x] 
implies lhm -=!-= 0 and (x) (B (m * <x>) =>Ax) 
[by @1 
implies lhm-=!-= O and 
(x) ((y <lhm-=-1) ((m*<x>)yR(m*<x>)y+ &mlhm-=-lRx =>Ax) 
implies lhm-=!-= O and 
(x) ( (y < lhm.:.. 1) (myRmy+ & mlhm.:.. lRx) => Ax) 
implies lhm-=!-= 0 and 
( x) ( (y < lhm .:_ 1) myRmy+ => (mlhm .:.. 1 Rx => Ax) ) 
implies lhm -=!-= 0 and 
(y < lhm.:.. 1) myRmy+ => ( x) (mlhm.:.. 1 Rx=> Ax) ) 
implies lhm * 0 and Bm => (x) (mlhm .:..1 Rx =>Ax) 
implies lhm * O and Bm => (y) (mlhm .:_ 1 Ry => Ay) 
implies (lhm = 0 & (y)Ay) or 
( lhm -=!-= 0 & [ Bm => ( y) ( m lhm .:.. 1 Ry => Ay ) ] ) 
implies Qm. I.e. (m) ( ( x) Q (m * <x>) =>Qm} • 
Thus the four hypotheses of BI are satisfied so we can con-
clude (either indirectly or directly by 1. 3.6) Q<>, 
i.e. (y)Ay or (x)Ax. 
1.3.8. Remarks. Recall that a nbdfn E was defined as 
(a) (Ex) (Ey) (z) ( (z <y '*Eaz = O} & (z ~ y =>Eaz = x+)). 
When we replace az by the nni assigned to it, E becomes a 
sequence which we denote here by€. 
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Let Nfn be the class of sequences£ such that 
( a) (Ex) (Ey) ( £ (ay) = x+) CD and 
(m)(n)(x) [em= x+ ~e(m*n) = x+l @. 
Obviously Nfn contains all sequences which we associated with 
nbdfns. The converse is true as the following argument shows: 
Suppose given a, for some x, y, e(ay) = x+ • Then there .is 
a least y' say y I I such that £ (ay) = x+. Suppose z <y I and 
£ (az) =I= 0. Then if £ (az) = w+ then by 0 
x+ = e(ay') = £(az*m) = £(az) = w+, for suitable mwith 
y' = z * m. Hence w+ = x+ and so y' is not the leas.t y such 
that e(ay) = x+. Contradiction. 
It follows from (D and (v that ( a) (Ey) ( £ (ay) =I= 0) and 
that (m) (n) [ em =I= O ~£ (m * n) =I= O]. Thus the first two 
hypotheses of BI of the statement tn =I= 0 are satisfied. 
Define, analogously to ¢min 1.2.6, am as follows: 
amn = df a·(i:n * n) • Usinq these considerations we have the 
following. 
1.3.9. Proposition. BI implies Nfn is the least class 
sequences such that (Ex) (y) ( EY = X+) ~ E E P <D and 
(s< > = 0 & ( x) ( £ <x> E P ) ) ~ £ E P (D. 
p 
Proof. If £ is a sequence such that· (Ex) (y) ( ey = x+) then 
obviously eENfn.· If E is a sequence with E<> = O and 
(x) (E<.x> E.Nfn) then by the following argument (similar to 
that for Em, Em*<x> in 1.2.6), EE Nfn. 
of 
For each sequence a, E (az) = E (<-00> * S z- ) where Sr = ar+ for each r 
0 iff z < y 
aO 
iff z .. ;;;,, y aO 
for some xaO, y aO since (x) ( s<.x> E Nfn) • 
· 30. 
It follows that e:m = x+ => e: (m * n) = x+, taking any sequence a 
with a E {m * n}. Thus e: E Nfn so that Nfn is a class of 
sequences that satisfies G) and @. 
Given a class P of sequences which satisfies these 
conditions, we use BI on the statements e:x ~ 0, e:x E P about 
x, to show Nfn C P. We have seen in 1.3.8 that if e: E Nfn 
then t.he statement EX =I= 0 satisfies the first two hypotheses 
of BI. 
For a third hypothesis for BI, for each m, 
Em =I= 0 implies for each n, E (m * n) = Em =I= 0 since E E Nfn 
implies for each n, Em n = Em =I= 0 
implies for some x., for each n, E n = x+ m 
take x to be 
implies Em E p by(j). 
For the fourth hypothesis for BI, for each m, either 
Em = 0 or Em =I= 0 • 
Em =I= 0 
Em = 0 
implies Em E Pas above 
implies (x) (Em*<x> E P)=> Em E p 
[by p => (q =>p) and modus ponens]. 
implies if (x) (Em*<x> EP) then E <> = m 
and ( x) ( Em* <x> E P ) 
implies if (x) (Em*<x> E P) then Em E P 
[ since Em< > = Em and @ ] . 
Thus (m} ( (x) (Em*<x> EP)=> Em E P). 
0 ) 
Therefore by BI we have (m) (E E P) and so in particular 
. m 
e: = E< > EP as required. 
Em-
1.3.10. Remark. The proof of 1.3.9 is due to A.S. Troelstra 
in [ 18] . 
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2. INTUITIONISTIC 2ND ORDER ARITHMETIC . 
2 .1. LOGIC. 
2. l. 1. Remark. In considering logic before arithmetic we 
are at odds with the Intuitionists on two grounds. Firstly, 
though they concede logic is 'elementary in the sense that 
formalizing the idea of proof gives rise to different 
structures, logic is not elementary in that these structures 
are impredicative: having formalized the idea of proof, the 
questions that this formalizing was meant to answer, ·being 
tied up in the formalizing, are left unanswered. Secondly,. 
Intuitionists regard their mathematics as constructive: 
that is, they start with simple constructions like natural 
numbers and build up more complex concepts by 'reflecting' 
on the properties of the constructions that are implicit in 
these concepts. In this sense statements in mathematics are 
not proved by applying logical rules previously agreed upon, 
but by applying constructions. 
2.1.2. Remark. Constructions, then, are for the Intuition~ 
ists, the objects of mathematical research so that proofs 
are considered to be constructions. Notions are deducible 
properties of constructions. Three assumptions about 
notions are: if a and bare constructions then 'a is 
applicable to b' is a notion; if c is any construction and 
A is any statement, 'c is a proof of A' is a notion; if N(x 
is a notion with free variable x then 'a is a proof of N(x}, 
for all x' is a notion. The last two assumptions are 
justified as follows: if we are in.doubt as to whether a 
proves A then a does not prove A; we can mechanically 
check whether 'a is a proof of N(x) for all x'. 
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2 .1. 3. Remark. With these informal ideas of construction 
and notion the Intuitionists have given formal theories of 
constructions, e.g. G. Kreisel in Mathematical Logic in 
Lectures on modern mathematics III ed T.L. Saaty New York, 
1965 p.95-195. These result in the following informal 
re-interpretation of the logical symbols: 
A proof of AV B is given by presenting a proof of A or 
a proof of B. 
A proof of A" B is given by presenting a proof of A and 
a proof of B. 
A proof of A+ B is given by a construction which transforms 
any given proof of A into a proof of B, together with a 
proof of this fact. 
A proof of-,A is given by a proof of A +l where 1 is some 
false statement like O = 1. 
A proof of 3 x Ax is given by presenting a construction c 
and a proof of Ac. 
A proof of v'x Ax is given by presenting a construction 
which to each object a, associates a proof Ac and a proof 
of this fact. 
2.1.4. Remark. This leaves open the question of how proofs 
of atomic statements are given. For logic,Kreisel, in 
footnote 17 on p.159 in A survey of proof theory II in 
Proceedings of the second Scandanavian logic symposium, Oslo 
ed J.E. Fenstad,Amsterdam, North Holland 1971, points out 
this involves considering interpretations in all possible 
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domains, whereas for arithmetic, for example, such proofs 
can be indicated e.g. the natural nUI[lbers are constructions 
obtained by juxtaposing units; 1, 11, 111, - etc. Hence, 
for Intuitionists, arithmetic is more basic than logic. 
2.1.5. Remark. We give the following formal axiomatic 
system which yelds only those formulas which are provable 
by a formal scheme as mentioned in 2.1.3. This will be the 
1st order system that our model will satisfy. 
bis substitutable in A =af x does not occur free in A 
within the scope of ~ y, 3 y for each y which occurs in b. 
sxb (A) =df A iff b is not substitutable for x in A. 
S~(A) =df the formula obtained from A by replacing each 
free occurrence of x by an occurrence of b iff bis 
substitutable for x in A. 
·For the propositional calculus the axiom schemas are 
((A-+ B) -+ ( (B-+ C) -+ (A+ C))) 
((A-+C)-+ ((B-+C)-+ ((AVB) +C))) 
((C-+A)-+ ((C-+B)-+ (C +(AAB)))) 
( ( (A I\ B) + C) + (A -+ (B + C) ) ) 
(A+ (AV B)) 
( (A I\ B) + A) 
(B-+ (AvB)) 
((AI\B) -+B) 
(·(A+ (B-+C))-+ ((AA_B) +C)) 
{ (AA ,A) + B) ( (A+ (AA ,A)) -+"1A). 
For the predicate calculus the axiom schemas are 
'r/xA -+ Sa (A) 
x S~ (A) + 3 xA~ 
The system is closed under the rules 
if A -+B then A -+Vy'B where y does not occur free in A 
if A -+B then ;JyA -+B where y does not occur free in B 
if A and A +B then B. 
2.1.6. Remark. As can be seen these differ from the axiom 
schemas of classical logic only in that intuitionistic logic 
is without A\/ ,A. Hence intui tionistic logic retains the 
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strong implication of classical logic but weakens the 
negation of classical logic. In view of the easily derived 
schemas A+ (B + A) and ,A+ (A+ B) : informally if something 
is true then anything at all will imply it and if something 
is f_alse then it implies anything at all; it can be argued 
that intuitionistic logic is not as constructive as is made 
out by the Intuitionists. However, it is not our task to 
sort out this argument. 
2.2. SPECIES, MAPPINGS AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
(LAWLIKE) SEQUENCES. 
2.2.1. Remark. Species may be regarded as the intuition-
istic analogue of classical sets. Given a well-defined 
collection of mathematical objects, the well-defined 
properties of these collections are species. That a 
property P, associated with a collection A, is well-defined 
is at least meant to·entail that we know what it means for 
Px to hold for x EA, even if we do not know if Px holds. 
Thus species are not constructions in t_he sense that their 
elements are constructively given. Rather they are the 
results of applying a certain comprehension principle. 
Predicative applications of this comprehension 
principle involve quantifications over elements of a basic 
collection only. So that Intuitionists see little objection 
against accepting all predicative applications of this 
comprehension principle. For us this means all arithmetical 
predicates of natural numbers define species. 
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Impredicative applications of this comprehension 
principle, which involve quantification over all subspecies 
of a basic collection, only concern us when we come to 
define Kin 2.3. But to define K we need only a weak type 
of :i.mpredicativity~ namely, a single generalized inductive 
definition. 
In terms of the theory of constructions mentioned in 
2.1.2, species correspond to notions which are themselves 
. con.structions. 
2.2.2. Remarks. Even though species have been defined 
intensionally, Intuitionists retain an extensional equality 
between species, namely the usual classical relation 
X = Y =df (x) (x EX iff x E Y). 
Species are determined by applications of a comprehension 
principle,and so an element of a collection of mathematical 
objects is an 'element' of a property and hence a species, 
if it has or might have been defined independently of the 
property. Therefore different applications of this 
comprehension principle will give rise to different species 
which nevertheless have the same elements. Thus Intuitionists 
recognize this 'weaker' equality but do not regard it as 
primary as in classical set theory. 
2.2.3. Definition. Let X and Y be species. 
X is inhabited = df (Ex) ( x EX) 
Xis empty = df "'-' (Ex) (x E X) 
y is detachable in X =df 
(x EX) (x EY or x fY) 
xis discrete =df 
(xEX) (yEX) (x = y or x * yf. 
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2.2.4. Remarks. Note that not (Xis empty) does not imply 
X is inhabited, since ,,A+ A is invalid intui tionistic logic. 
Intui tionists are interested when ,,Px + Px is valid and in 
this case such a predicate or relation Pis said to be 
stable. To 'stabalize' equality, the Intuitionists introduce 
the apartne·ss relation # on species as follows: 
for each x, y, z EX, X a species, 
ix#y iff x=y, x#y iffy#x, x#y iff x#z ory#z. 
The usual set theoretic operations e.g. X UY, X x Y have 
their analogues in the theory of species. These analogues 
are defined analogously. 
2.2.5. Definition. A mapping¢ from a species X into a 
species Y is a process which assigns to each x EX an 
element ¢x E Y such that 
x = x' implies cpx = cpx' G) 
We write¢: X+Y or¢ E (X)Y or cpEYx. 
A mapping ¢ is bi-unique ( 1-·1) = df for each x, x' E X, 
cpx = cpx' implies x = x'. 
¢ is weakly bi-unique =df for each x, x' EX, x :i:x' implies 
cpx -4' <j,x' . 
If¢ E (X)Y and X, Y have apartness relations#, #' then 
¢ is strongly bi-unique =af for each x, xEX, x#x' implies 
<j>x # cpx' • 
2.2.6. Remark. Note that contrary to classical mathematics 
the motion of mapping is defined intensionally. The condition 
® is essential in case the equality relation in @ is not 
intensional. For in this case, for example when the elements 
of X and Y are species, it must be shown that the extensional 
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equality relation is preserved by the mapping. 
If the equality relation on Y is stable then a weakly 
bi-unique mapping is bi~unique. A bi-unique mapping has an 
inverse denoted ¢-l E (¢[X] )X. If X has an apartness 
. relation, ¢ .is bi-unique and ¢[X] = Y, then¢ induces an 
apartness relation on Yin the obvious way. 
Notions such as homomorphism can be defined in the same 
way as the classical notions are defined. 
2.2.7. Remark. For intuitionistic second order arithmetic 
the most important types of mappings are those whose form 
is (N) N or ( (N) N) N or ( (N) N) ( (N}N) . Those of the first form 
are special cases of the more general class (N)X where Xis 
a species. These are called sequences. 
The simplest example of a sequence is that of lawlike 
or constructive sequence. These are sequences which are 
completely fixed in advance by a law e.g. primitive recursive 
functions. More correctly they are sequences given by an 
algorithm together with a proof of the applicability.of the 
algorithm to all natural numbers. In this sense they h.ave 
a complete description. 
Lawlike sequences are intensionally equal iff they are 
given in the same way, so that extensional equality 
(x) ( ax = ct' x) for ct, ct' sequences, does not imply intens·ional 
equality. 
Becaµse of their simplicity, existence of lawlike 
sequences. is closely connected with choice principles. For 
example, if we .have a proof of (x) (Ey)A(x,y), where x, y 
range over N and A is a sta.tement about complete objects and 
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A is extensional (i.e. x = x' implies Ax= Ax'), then this. 
proof must contain a complete description of how to associate 
a y to a given x. Thus there exists a lawlike sequence u 
with (x)A(x, ax) i.e. (x) (Ey)A(x,y) '* (Ea) (x)A(x, ax) holds. 
2.3. LAWLESS SEQUENCES OF NATURAL NUMBERS. 
2.3.1. Remarks. Another notion of sequence, opposite to 
lawlike, is lawless. Informally these are sequences such 
that after constructing any initial segment we are able to 
choose freely any natural number to extend this segment. 
That is, there is no restriction on the choices at any 
time; this can be compared with the successive throws of a 
die. They have, then, a most incomplete description. More-
over the only dependence between two lawless sequences is 
intensional equality, so we cannot have such relations as 
ax= 2Bx. 
We shall carry over the notation about sequences used 
in Chapter One and continue to make no distinction between 
an nni and the sequence assigned to it. Further we use= to 
indicate intensional equality and= to indicate extensional 
equality, and =df as usual to indicate introduction by 
definition (which amounts to intensional equality). 
2. 3.2. Axiom. LSl (x) (Ea) (a E {x}) 
2.3.3. Remark. LSl states that any initial segment can be 
extended to a lawless sequence, which fits in with our 
informal interpretation. As a consequence, there are 
infinitely many extensions of an initial segment x,namely 
x * B, for any lawless B. As an example consider an initial 
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segment x extended by a throw of a die. 
2. 3. 4. Axiom. LS2 ( a) ( (3) ( a = (3 or a 't (3) 
2.3.5. Remark. Two lawless sequences are intensionally 
equal if they are given by the same generating process. 
Therefore we know before we generate any initial segment of 
a or (3 whether we use the same generating process or not, 
i.e. whether a and (3 are the same sequence or not. 
2. 3. 6. Axiom. LS 3 i (a, a O , ••• , ak) & A (a, a O , ••• , ak) 
* ( Ep) ( a E {n } & ( (3 E {n } ) ( .i ( (3, a O , ••• , ak) * A ( (3, a O , ••• ak) ) ) 
where i(a, ao,•••I ak) =df (a .i ao & ... & a i ak) and A is 
an extensional statement about x. 
2.3.7. Remark. We argue for LS3 as follows. Given 
i(a, a 0 , ••• ,~k) and A(a, a~, .... , ak)' because a is lawless 
and i(a, a 0 , ••• , ak), nothing about a 0 , ••• , ak helps to· 
generate a,so that A(a, a 0 , ••• ,ak) holds because 
(Ex)A(ax, a 0 , ••• ,ak) holds. Hence if (3 is lawless and 
i(B, a 0 , ••• , ak) and 8 E {ax} then A(f3, a 0 , ••• ,ak) holds. 
We need the condition i (a, a O .' ••• , ak ), otherwis~ we 
obtain a contradiction by applying LS3 to A(a, y) =af a= y 
and then replace y with a. 
2.3.8. Proposition. For each lawless a, 8, a_ f3 iff 
(x) (ax = sx). 
Proof. Left to right is obvious. From right to left we 
argue by contradiction. ·a i f3 and (x) (ax= (3x) and LS3 
implies (En) (a E {n} & {y E {n}) (y 1- f3 * (x) (yx = (3x))). 
LSl implies there is a y 1 with y 1 E {n * < (3 ( lhn) + 1 >}. 
Y1 j. S and y 1 E {n} implies (x) ( y 1x = Sx), a contradiction. 
Hence "" a 'f. B so by LS2 a = B. 
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2.3.9. Remark. As a corollary of 2.3.8 we have a= B or 
a =I= S, which is surprising con.sidering the lawless of 
a and s. 
As a special case of LS3 we have 
Aa=? (En) (a E{n} & (B E{n})AB), from which we can easily 
derive the weak continuity property for natural numbers: 
WC-N ( a) (Ex) A ( a, x) =? ( a) (Ex) (Ey) ( B) (Sy = ay *A ( B, x)) • 
This is called a continuity property since, as mentioned 
before, if A(a, x) is the statement <I:>a = x for functional 
<Ii: NN +N with the Baire Space topology on NN and the 
discrete topology on N, then WC-N says <Ii is continuous. 
2.3.10. Remark. As a consequence of LS3 (by applying LS3 
to suitable statements about lawless sequences) we have the 
following properties of lawless sequences: 
(D (a)'"" ,...., (Ex) ( ax = O) @ (a) --(EB) (x) (Bx = ax+ 1) 
@ ,...., (Ea) (Ea) ( a = a) where a is a law like sequence. 
~ shows that lawless sequences are not closed under even 
trivial relationships. In fact they are only closed under 
identity relations or mappings. @ shows that lawless 
sequences are provably non-lawlike. 
For these two reasons they are not directly useful for 
studying second-order arithmetic. However they are used to 
show the completeness of intuitionistic logic and are used 
to refute classically valid statements. Furthermore 
A. S. Troelstra in [ 19] has used them to construct a model 
for choice sequences but this is not our model. 
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2.4. CONTINUITY AND BROUWER OPERATIONS 
2.4.1. Remarks. In this section we want to consider 
functionals, specifically certain continuous functionals, 
from NN into N and NN into NN. We are not, until the last 
two remarks, concerned as to ~hat type of sequence we are 
talking about, as these results will hold for all sequences. 
The way we introduce these continuous functionals is 
through Brouwer operations which we shall see can be 
intepreted as nbdfns on Baire Space. 
Intuitively a continuous functional <I>: NN +N can be 
thought of as an operator which determines the value for a 
given argument on just an initial segment of the argument, cf. 
(a) (x) (<I>a = x => (En) (a E {n} & (S) (SE {n} =><I>(3 = x))). Hence 
we try to replace the functional <I> with an operator which is 
defined.on finite sequences,i.e. Baire Space neighbourhoods. 
In this next definition, we use the notion of function 
abstraction (commonly called Church's ·;\-operator). Whereas 
quantifiers attach to formulas ·to produce formulas, function 
abstractiop attaches to terms to produce terms. Suppose 
' •.• ~ .•. ' stands for term containing 'x' as a free variable~ 
11x( .•• x ••• ) is the function whose value for each argument 
Xis .. ox ..• . 
2.4.2. Definition. We inductively define a class K of 
constructive or lawlike functions as follows, writing Ka· 
for a E K, a<x>P for a (<x> * n). 
K2 a <> = O .& (x) K ( 11n • a<x>n) =>Ka. 
and K is the least such class. 
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Alternatively if we define AK(Q, a) as follows: 
~(Q,a) =af (Ey) (a= Ax·y+) or (a<>= O & (x)Q( An•a<x>n)) 
for each class Q; then Kl, K~ for Q is AK (Q, a)=> Qa and the 
minimality of K is K3 ( a) (AK (Q, a) => Qa) => ( a) (Ka =>Qa) • · 
Elements of K will be denoted by e, f, with or without 
subscripts, and are called Brouwer operation·s. 
2.4.3. Remark. From the inductive definition of K we can 
derive the principle of induction over unsecured sequences: 
(a EK) [ ( (n) (an =I= o=> Qn) & (n) ( (y)Q(n * <y>) =>Qn)) => QO] G>. 
Define Aa =df (m)[[(n)(an =l=o=>Q(m*n)) & (n)((y)Q(m*n*<y>) 
=> Q (m*n))] => Qm]. 
We shall show (a EK)Aa. For a = AX. y+ Aa is immediate. 
Assume (i) a<> and (x) A( An· a<x)P), 
( ii ) ( n ) ( an =I= 0 => Q ( m *n ) ) , 
(iii) (n) ((y)Q(m*n*<y>)=> Q(m*n)). 
From (ii) it follows that 
(iv) (x) (n) (a<x:>11 =I= 0 =>Q(m*<x>*n). 
From (iii) it follows that 
(v) (x) (n) ( (y)Q(m*<x>*n*<y>)=> Q(m*<x>*n)), 
then by (i), (iv), (v) it follows that (x)Q(m*<x>). 
Applying (iii) with n = 0 gives Qm. 
Therefore by K3, (a EK) Aa, so as a particular case we have G>. 
2. 4. 4. Proposition. (e EK) (a) (Ex) (eax =I= 0) (D 
(e EK) (m) (n) (em =I= O =>e(m*n) = en) @. 
Proof. By the inductive definition of K, for example Q). 
Define Q as follows, Qe = df ( a) (Ex) (eax =I= 0) • 
Obviously Q(An•y+) holds. Given e suppose e<> = 0 and 
(y) CQ (An· e<y)Jl) • 
Given a with a= <ao>*a', by assumption Q(An•e<ao>n). 
It follows that (Ey) (e<ao> a' y =I= 0) • Therefore 
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(Ey) (eay+ =I= 0) • Hence Qe holds so that (e EK) (~ ( a ,e) => Qe) ~ 
So by K3 (e EK)Qe. 
2.4.5. Proposition. (a) (E! x) (Ey) (eay = x+). 
Proof. from 2.4.4. 
2.4.6. Definition. By 2.4.5 we can unambiguously define a 
functional ¢e : NN + N as follows, ¢e ( a) = df x iff (Ey) (eay = x"'). 
In short we wri_te e (a) for ¢e (a), K* = {e (a) : e EK}. df 
2. 4. 7. Remark. In 1. 3 we showed that BI =>K = Nfn. 
Intuitionistically,by a very similar argument,we can show 
BI =>K = {e : (a) (Ex) (eax =I= 0) & (m) (n) (em =l=O =>e (m*n) =l=O)}. 
It is not difficult to see that Nfn is just 
{e : (a) (Ex) (eax =l=O) & (m) (n) (em =1=.0 =>e (m*n) =l=O)} so that 
we can interpret the Brouwer operations as nbdfns and the 
1e' s as <I>E' s. 
2.4.8. Proposition. (a) (E!f3).(f3x = y iff (Ez) (e<x>az = y+)). 
Proof. By using the inductive definition of K as in 2.4.3, 
2.4.4. 
2.4.9. Definition. Using 2:4.8 we can unambiguously define 
functionals ¢e : NN +NN as follows: 
q,e (a) =af f3 iff (Sx = y. iff (Ez) (e<x;az = y+ ) ) • In short 
we write ela for 'l'e(a), K** =df {ela: eEK}. 
2.4.10. Remarks. We can define 'l'e equivalently by: 
'l'e (a) (y) =af x iff (Ez) (e<;y>az = x+). 
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. e' ~· As was remarked in 1. 2 , the 11) s , If s are continuous. 
However we cannot use the proof of 1.2.6 to show that all 
continuous functionals from NN into Nor NN are of the form 
e e ~ or If for some e. We now give an assumption on lawless 
sequences which allows us to show something stronger: 
N N 
namely that all functionals from~ into Nor N are of the 
e e form¢ or If for some e. We do this by strengthening WC-N. 
2.4.11. Axiom. LS4 (a 0 ) ••• (ap}(#(a 0 , ••• , ap) 
=> (Ex) A ( a O , • • • , ap , x) ) => (Ee ) ( a O ) • • • ( ap) ( # ( a O , • • • , ap) 
tj, A ( a O , ••• , ap , e ( Ax . < a O x . . . ap x>) ) ) 
2.4.12. Remark. A special case of LS4 is the principle of 
bar continuity BC-N, (a) (Ex)A(a,x) tj, (Ee) (a)A{a, e (a)), 
from which with A(a,x) =df ¢a = x, we have (Ee) (a) [¢a= e {a)] 
for each ¢. 
2.5. CHOICE SEQUENCES. 
2.5.l. Remark. Between the notion of lawlike and lawless 
sequences is the notion of choice sequence. Informally a 
choice sequence is a sequence for which an initial segment 
is known and for which the following terms though unknown 
are known to lie within certain bounds which may be decreas-
ing. This process may be considered as generating pairs 
<x, R> of a natural number and a condition which restricts 
future values. Hence the condition is extensional. Moreover 
as the conditions may become more restrictive we have some 
relations between conditions expressing this restrictiveness. 
Thus the notions of lawlike and lawless sequences may be 
regarded as limiting cases of choice sequences: on the one 
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hand choice sequences with the most restrictive conditions 
(bounds which are equal) and on the other choice sequences 
with no conditions. 
These informal ideas, when formalized, give rise to 
several.notions of choice sequence. We shall consider 
choice sequences generated by continuous operations which 
are due to A.S. Troelstra in [ 18] • 
• 5.2. Remark. The motivation for Troelstra's notion of 
choice sequence is the following: when speaking about an 
arbitrary number we often specify xis such that for some 
y, x = f(y), and perhaps later specify y is such that for 
some z, y = ,g(z), where f and g are lawlike functions. 
So a choice sequence a is a sequence of pairs 
<<xn, Rn >n>, where xn is a natural number and Rn is an 
element of a class R which contains all conditions of the 
form R =df Aa · (a = f 0 a 0 & ao = r 1a1 & ••• & an-l = rnan), 
where the a,a
1
. are choice sequences and the r.s are 
·1 
N · N 
continuous operators from N into N. Moreover the~ in 
the members of a choice sequence satisfy the following 
relation C : if ~ = Aa • (a= f o a 0 & ••• & an-l = r nan) then 
~+l =df Aa · (a= r 0 a 0 & ••• & an-l = rnan & an= rn+lan+l 
However this is too simple an idea, for a choice 
sequence may depend on more than one other sequence at any 
time. We can easily extend the class R to allow for this. by 
including all conditions of the form: 
m 
& Clo = 
i=l 
m m 
r. ( AX • ( a. 1x, ( a. 2 x, ... l 1 1. (a. 1 ,a. } ... ))) & 1.m. - 1.m. 1. 1. 
46. 
& & a. . = r .. ( .\x. ( a .. 1x, ( a .. 2 x, .. (a. . 1 , a. . } . • ) )} • • · 1 i=l j=l 1.J l.J 1.J 1.J 1.Jmi- l.Jmi 
where (,) is the pairing function of 1.1.'1, But such 
conditions merely obscure in a mess of symbols the principle 
behind choice sequences generated by continuous operations, 
so we ·confine ourselves to looking at choice sequences with 
simpler conditions which in any case can in principle be 
extended to choice sequences with the complicated conditions. 
From this description of choice sequences we have this 
important fact. 
2.5.3. Proposition. Choice sequences are closed under 
continuous operations. 
Proof. Suppose a= <<ax, R~~>with R~ =af Aa. [a= f 0 aol, 
R ~ = d f A a . [ a = r O a o & a o = r 1 a 1 & ••• & a P = r p+ 1 a p+ 1] etc , 
and suppose S = ra where r is continuous. 
Then f3 = df <<So, R~ > , ... > with R~ = df AS • [ S = r a & a = r o a o ] . 
Then R~ ER, since r is continuous, and we can extend S by 
any R with C(R~, R). Thus Sis a choice sequence. 
2.5.4. Remark. We can get a relationship, for extensional 
statements X about chdice sequences(i.e. if xa and a= S 
then Xf3), between choice sequences, namely 
xa iff (Er) (ES) (a= rs} & (S)X(fBJ, which is called 
intensional continuity. 
Right to left is trivial. If we can assert xa then 
this must be on account of some initial segment of a, say 
<<x 0 , R~ >, ..• , <x , Ra >>. n n 
S Cl -uppose Rn -df 
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If 
an+l is completely undetermined then it is arbitrary, as is 
{f3)X(r 1 ••• rn+l f3) since Xis extensional. If an+l is 
determined up to <v 0 , ••• , v > then we can consider x 
an+l = .r n+2an+2, where an+2 is any arbitrary sequence and 
rn+2 is defined by 
(a) {y) ( (y ::;;;;; x => r n+ 2 (a) (y) = vy) & (y > x => r n+ 2 (a) (y) = ay)) 
So a= f 1 ••• rn+2an+ 2 . Hence (f3)X(f1 •·· rn+2 a). 
2.5.5. Remark. The principle of extensional continuity is 
what for lawless sequences we called WC -N, 
i.e. (a) (Ex) X(a,x) => (a) (Ex) (Ey) (13) (;y = BY =>X(S,Y)). For 
the various notions of choice sequence this has been 
justified by the principle of intensional continuity. 
Through considering this principle, A.S. Troelstra in [18] 
developed an abstraction operator from which he is able to 
prove WC - N for our notion of choice sequence. This 
abstraction operator does away with the condition part of 
choice sequences. Given a choice sequence 
a= <<xn' R~ >n>, Abstr a =df <<xn' u>n>, where u is the 
universal condition >..a • a = a. Thus we forget the manner 
in which a is generated. Hence we cannot argue a= Abstr a. 
For any term t, it is effectively verifiable that 
at= (Abstr a)t, but we cannot assert ax= (Abstr a)x and 
then use the rule of generalization to give 
(x) (ax - (Abstr a)x) I for this would imply a - Abstr Cl· 
This breakdown in the rule of generalization means that 
attempts to formalize Abstr a are fraught with difficulties. 
Furthermore it is not surprising that such an unusual operator 
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as Abstr allows us to derive WC-N, since even Intuitionists 
will agree that a contradiction will imply anything at all. 
But for another reason, not connected with an attempt to 
formalize such Abstraction operators, we find any just-
ification of WC-N hard to accept. This is that it can be 
shown intuitionistically that WC-N and AC-NF((x) (E6)A(x,6) q 
(Ea) (x}A(x,ax) where ax(y) =df a(x,y), (,) the pairing 
function) and BI imply BC-N, which as we remarked before 
implies that all functionals from NN into N are continuous -
a classically invalid result. 
2.5.6. Remark. Recall from 2.4.12 that BC-N is 
(a) (Ex)A(a,x) q (Ee) (a)A(a,e (a)). While this does not hold 
in classical mathematics we will show that a special case 
of BC-N called special bar continuity .does hold. Previously 
we have not spoken much of choice principles. In Chapter One 
we used a choice principle and the law of excluded middle to 
show 1. 2. 6; this is a st.andard classical technique, which, 
since the law of excluded middle does not hold, is 
inapplicable to intuitionistic mathematics. For this reason 
choice principles are not as useful for Intuitionists. 
The simplest choice principle for sequences is AC-NN 
(x) (Ey)A(x,y) *(Ea) (x)A(x,ax), which is classically 
equivalent to WF(R) qTI(R) and equivalent to BI. However 
even AC-NF (mentioned in 2.5.4) does not imply BI, so that 
interesting results come from an application of both these 
principles. 
For the next proposition, which is due to G. Kreisel 
and A.S. Troelstra in [11], we are using SBC for 
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(a)(Ex)A(ax) =>(EEENfn) (n)(En =I= 0 => (B)(BE{n}=>A(B(en)"'))). 
We show that SBC is classically derivable from BI and AC-NF. 
2.5.7. Proposition. BI & AC-NF=> SBC. 
Proof. We suppose (a) (Ex)A(ax) and use BI with the 'barring• 
statement (Ex) (S) [ B E {m} => A (Bx)] and the 'inducting' statement 
(EEm ENfn) (B) [BE {m} => (n) [ Emn =l=O =>[BE {n} '*A(B (Emn)-)]]] 
about m. Then 
(a) (Ex)A(ax) implies (a) (Ex) (B) [BE {ax} "*A(Sx)] 
[ since B E {ax} implies Bx = ax] 
implies (a) (Ex) (Ey) (S) [BE {ax} "*'A(Sy)] 
[ take y to be x] • 
Since for each m, n, B E {m*n} implies B E {m} we have 
(m) (n) ((Ex) (B) (BE {m} "*A(Sx)) '* (Ex) (B) (BE {m*n} "*A(Sx)) ). 
These are the first and second hypotheses for BI. 
Suppose given m, (Ex) (B) (BE {m} '*A(Sx)). 
Define a sequence Em as follows: 
£mn = 0 iff lhn < lhm df 
Emn = x+ iff lhn ~ lhm,where xis the least df 
x such that ( B >· ( B E- { m} =l>A(Bx)). 
For each a, Em(ay) = x + where ( lhmf. y = 
For each m*' £~' + implies lhm' ~ lhm n, x, = x 
implies lh(m'*n). ~· lhm 
implies Em(m'*n) = x+ • 
Therefore £m E Nfn and 
(Ex) (B) (BE {m} "*A(Sx)) 
implies (Ex) (B)[ BE {m} => (n) (Emn =l=O => (t::mn = x+ & A(Sx)))] 
imp 1 i es (Ex) ( B )[ B E { m} '* ( n ) ( £ mn =I= 0 => A ( S ( £ mn ) - ) ) ] 
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[since x does not occur in the statement and 
B E {n} is redundant] . 
Thus we have (m) [ (Ex) (B) (f3 E {m} =*A(Sx) )'* 
(EEm ENfn) (S) (SE: {m} '* (n) (Emn :;e;O=*(f3 E {n}*A(B (Emn)-)))) , 
and this is the third hypothesis of BI. 
Let us denote the 'inducting' statement by (EEm ENfn) Bm. 
For the fourth hypothesis of BI, we suppose for given m that 
. m*<x> ( x ) (E E E Nfn) B (m*<x>), which by AC-NF implies 
(E o) ( x) ( 8 x EN fn & B I x), where B' x is B (m*<x>), with 8 x replacing 
m*<x> 
£ Define a sequence Em as follows: 
e.:mn =af O iff lhn ~lhm; e.:mn= ozn iff lhn >lhm,where z =n(lhm). 
This Em satisfi~s the condition~ for being in Nfn as follows: 
F0r each a,y ;;..i, (lhm)+ implies Em(ay) = o (ay) 
z 
where z = (ay) (lhm) = a(lhm) 
m - -implies £ (ay) = oa(lhm) (ciy) ENfn. 
For each m', n, x, 
£mm' = x+ implies lhm' >lhm and 8 m' = x+, where z = m' (lhn) 
z 
implies lhm' >lhm and Em(m'*n) = 8 (m'*n) 
z' 
where z' = (m*n) (lhm) 
[since lh(m'*n) ;;..i, lhm' > lhm] 
implies Em(m'*n) = 8 (m'*n) 
z 
[since if lhm' >Ihm then (m'*n) (lhm) =m' (lhm)] 
implies Em(m'*n) = 8 (m'*n) 
z 
[ since 8 E Nfn] • 
z . 
+ 
= x 
Now we have the conclusion of the fourth hypothesis for BI, 
for each f3 with B E {m} and for each n, 
€mn =f: 0 and SE {n} 
implies lhn > lhm and €mn = 8 n =f: 0, where z = n ( lhm) 
z 
implies m < n and €mn = ozn =f: O,where z = n(lhm) 
[ since SE {m} and lhm < lhn and SE {n}] 
implies m*<z> < n and €mn = 8 n =f: O and S E {n} 
z 
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implies m 
€ n = ozn and (SE {m*<z>} and 8 n =f:O z and S E {n}) 
implies m 8 n and A(S (o n)-) E n = 
z z 
[ since we know that 8 
z 
satisfies B' x which is 
( S ) (S E { m } => ( n ) ( 8 xn =f: 0::::} (S E { n } =}A ( B ( 8 xn ) - ) ) ) ) 
and we have the three antecedents] 
- m implies A(S (E n)-). 
Therefore we have for this Em E Nfn, 
m - m (S) (SE {m} => (n) ( (E n =f:O & s E {n}) =>A(S (E n)-))) 
which is equivalent to 
(S) (SE {m} => (n) ( (Emn =f: 0 =>(SE {n} =>A(S (Emn)-)))). 
Hence (m) (EEm ENfn) (S) (SE {m} => (n) (Emn =f:O=>(S E {n}=>A(B (Emn)- )))) 
by BI. So in particular with m = <>, 
(EE<> ENfn) {S) (SE {<>}=>(n) (E<>n=f:o=>(SE{n}=>A(S(E<>n)-)))). 
Thus since E<>= E and (S) (8 E {<>}) we have 
(Ee: E N fn) (n) ( En =f: 0 => ( 13) ( S E {n} => A ( S (En) - ) ) ) • 
2.5.8. Remark. It can be shown intuitionistically that 
2.5.7 holds, where we substitute e EK for EE Nfn in SBC. 
The proof .is very similar to that of 2.5.7. AC-NF is used 
to construct an e which b:Y a similar met.hoe ·is shown to 
be an element of K. 
We next show that SBC together with the inductive 
definition of K implies BI, so that we have the classical 
e~uivalence of WF(R)~TI(R) i BI and SCB & Kin the presence of 
AC-NF. 
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The proof is due to G. Kreisel and A.S. Troelstra in [ 111. 
2.5.9. Proposition. SBC & K => BI. 
Proof. From SBC and the hypothesis (a) (Ex)A(ax) of BI we 
conclude 
(Ee) (n) (en-::/= 0 => (a) (a E {n} => A(a(enf } ) ) CD. 
If lhn > (en)- then n = a(enf*m for any a E {n} and for 
some m. So by the hypothesis (m) (n) (Am *A(m*n)) of BI we 
have from (!) , 
en -::/= 0 => An. 
Hence by the hypothesis (m) (Am '*Bm) of BI we have 
en -::/= O => Bn. 
:If lhn < (enf then a(enf = n *m for any aE {n} and some m. 
So by the hypothesis (m) (Am '*Bm) of BI we have 
en -::/= O * ( a) ( a E {n } * B ( a (en) - ) ) 
so that en-::/= 0 * (a)(a E {n} * (m)B(n *m)) 
* ( xi) ..• (xlhm) B (n *<xi> * ... * <xlhm>) . 
So using hypothesis (m) ( (y) B (m * <y>) *Bm) lhm times we get 
en -::/= 0 * Bn. 
Hence (n) (en -::/= 0 => Bn). @. 
@ , the hypothesis (m) ( (y) B (m * <y>) =>Bm) of BI and the 
principle of induction over unsecured sequences implies B<' >. 
As we saw in 1. 3.6 the BI with conclusion B<> is 
equivalent to the BI with conclusion (m)Bm, so BI holds. 
2.5.10. Remark. The formal system for choice sequences for 
which we shall give a topological model is a modification of 
the Kleene-Vesley system. Apart from the logical axiom 
schemas for the 1st and 2nd order logic and the usual 
\) 
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arithmetic axiom schemas, the other axiom schemas are BI!, 
AC-NF and a special case of Brouwer's Principle for functions, 
namely, 
GJ(a) (E!l3)A(a,B)"*(ET) (a) ((x) (E!y) (-r(<x>*ay)> O) & 
(. f3 ) ( ( x) ( Ey) ( T ( <x>* ay) = B ( x) + 1 => A (a, B) ) ) 
This schema with (E!B) replaced by (EB) has been shown by 
s.c. Kleene in [ 10] to imply Brouwer's Principle for numbers 
which we call BC-N. 
So while we have atte
1
mpted to give a classical just-
ification for BI and so BI!, through its equivalence with 
WF ( R) => TI ( R) and more importantly with SBC and I<, in view of 
2. 4.12 we can give no justification for©. The most we can 
do is say G) is a restricted generalization of SBC which is 
classically valid,and in the simpler case of lawless sequences 
of the end of 2.4 we found BC-N held. 
3. TOPOLOGICAL MODELS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 
J.0.1. Remark. In this chapter we shall show why 
intuitionistic logic gives rise to topological models. 
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In the first three sections we shall give the necessary 
characterization and represe11tation theorems for topological 
Boolean algebras and psendo-Boolean algebras which will be 
used in the fourth section to show that intuitionist first 
order logic with equality has topological models. 
3.1. BOOLEAN ALGEBRAS. 
3.1.1. Remarks. Recall that an ordering in a set A is a 
lattice ·Ordering when for each a,b EA, lub(a,b) = a Ub, 
glb (a,b) = a nb exist. Such an ordered set is called a 
lattice, and a Ub the join of a and b,a nb the meet of a 
and b. A subset A' of lattice A is a sublattice iff it is 
closed under join and meet. A function from lattice A into 
lattice B which preserves join and meet is called a lattice 
homomorphism. We then define lattice mono-, epi- and 
isomorphisms in the usual way. Note that as the join and 
meet are uniquely determined by the lattice ordering, a 
bijective mapping h is an isomorphism iff (h (a) ..;;;h (b) iff a ..;;;b). 
Recall that a lattice is distributive iff for all a,b EA,. 
a n ( b U c) = ( a n b ) U ( a n c) and a U ( b n c) = ( a U b ) n ( a U c) . 
In fact in view of ~uality arguments we need only see that one 
of these conditions is satisfied. 
Recall that if a lattice A has a least element O and a 
greatest element 1 , then we can define n-complement and 
U-complement as follows: c EA is then-complement of 
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a EA =af c is the greatest element with an c = O. c EA 
is the U-complement of a EA =af c is the least element with 
a U c = 1 • The complement of a E A is defined as the element 
wh~ch is simultaneously then-complement and U-complement of 
a. 
A distributive lattice such that each element has a 
complement is called a Boolean algebra. 
3.1.2. Definition. A non-empty set 'i/ of elements of a 
lattice A is a filter of A =df for each a,b E A, a nb E 'i/ 
iff a E 'i/ and b E 'i/. This condition is equivalent to 
(a,b E 'i/ implies a nb E 'il) and (a E 'i7 and a ~ b implies b E 'il). 
The. dual notion of a filter is that of ideal denoted by~. 
A filter is maximal in A = it is proper and not a df 
proper subset of any proper filter in A. 
A filter is prime in A = df it is proper and a Ub E 'i7 
implies either a E 'i7 orb E 'i7 • 
3.1.3. Remark. Given any non-empty subset A' of a lattice 
A, the filter that is the intersection of all filters 
containing A' is called the filter generated by set A'. 
If A has 1 then the hypothesis that A' is non-empty can be 
dropped. 
Via this idea we can show that every non-degenerate 
lattice (i.e. contains more than one element) having 0(1) 
has a maximal filter (ideal). Furthermore it can be shown 
that for distributive lattices each maximal filter is prime. 
By duality the result also holds for ideals. This can be 
strengthened for Boolean algebras to 'i7 is maximal iff 'i/ is 
prime. 
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Given a Boolean algebra A and a filter Vin A we can 
define· an equivalence relation on A by a ""b iff a U -b E v 
and b U -a E V,where - denotes complementation. Then A/v, 
the set of equivalence classes under"", is a Boolean algebra 
and the mapping cf> : A ont°> A/V given by (/i (a} = [ a]...., is called 
the natural homomorphism. From this we also have Vis 
maximal iff A/Vis the two-element Boolean algebra. 
3.1.4. ~nark. It is easy to see that each lattice 
isomorphic to a set lattice (lattice of subsets.of a set 
where join and meet are union and intersection, respectively) 
is distributive since a set lattice is distributive. The 
next result due to A. Stone shows that the converse holds, 
i.e. each distributive lattice is isomorphic to a set lattice. 
Let P(A) denote the set of all prime filters of A, 
h(a) the set of all filters VE P{A) such that a EV, P (A) 
the class of all sets h(a) with a EA. 
3.1.5. ProEosition. A a distributive lattice implies his 
an isomorphism of A onto P(A). 
Proof. We assume the following lemma which is proved by 
applying Zorn's lemma; for each a,b EA, a distributive 
lattice, b ~ a does not hold implies there is some prime 
filter V such_ that a f V and b Ev. 
If a,b EA, a* b, then one of a~ b, a> b does not 
hold. By the lemma there is a prime filter which belongs to 
exactly one of the sets h(a), h(b). Thus h(a) * h{b) so h 
is 1-1. 
If V E h (a Ub) then a Ub E V. Since V is prime either 
a EV orb Ev. Hence either v E h(a) or VE h(b), so 
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V E h (a) U h (b), where U denotes set union. Conversely if 
'iJ E h(a)U h(b) then either a E 'iJ orb E 'i/. Hence, since 
(a E V and a < b implies b E 'i/) implies (a E v and b E A 
implies au b E 'i/), we have either a U b E 'iJ or a U b E 'iJ , 
i.e. a U b E V so V E h (a Ub). 
V E h ( a n b) if f a n b E 'iJ if f ;:;, c v and b E v i £ f v E h (a) 
and 'iJ E h(b) iff VE h(a) n h(b1 where n is intersection. 
Hence his a homomorphism. 
Clearly h maps A onto P(A). 
3.1.6. Remarks. h, P(A), P(A) are called the Stone 
isomorphism, the Stone Space, the Stone lattice of A, 
respectively. If we regard P(A) as a subbasis then it is 
easy to show that P(A) is a topological space. 
It can be shown that for a distribu~ive lat~ice A, P(A) 
is a T 0 -space, and if A has 1 then P(A) is compact. This can 
be strengthened for Boolean algebras to P(A) is T 2 and 
P(A) is the class of clopen sets of P(A). 
If we call a set lattice, which is closed with respect 
to set complementation, a field of sets then 3.1.5 shows that 
any Boolean algebra A is isomorphic to a field of sets, or 
more exactly P (A) is a field of subsets of P(A) and his 
an isomorphism from A onto P (A). 
3.1.7. Remark. If A is a Boolean algebra, Tan infinite 
-UA A, 
set and a - tET at then h(a) = UtET h(at) (where v· is 
join in A, U is union in P(A)) just in case Tis finite. 
The one way is obvious, the other follows from the compact-
ness of P(A) and the 'clopenness' of P (A). Because each 
h(a) is closed in compact space P (A), h(a) is compact. 
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Hence, since each h (a) is a member of the subbasis P (A) it is 
openr for each h(a) = UtE'l' h(at) for some finite T by the 
compactness of h(a). Hence h(a) - h(L\ET at), 
A 
i.e. a = U tE'l' at for some finite T. 
Our next result shows that we ~;:in "ltrengthen 
h (a) ::iutET h (at) when T is infinite. 
3.1.8. Proposition. Let A be a Boolean algebra, h the Stone 
A isomorphism. If a= UtET at then h(a) - UtET h(at) is a 
closed,nowhere dense subset of P(A). By duality we have the 
corresponding statement for nA, n., 
Proof. Let H = h(a)- UtET h(at). Then since each element 
of P (A) is clopen,H is closed. 
Suppose His not nowhere dense. Then H contains a non-
empty open set and so there is an element a 0 EA such that 
h(a 0 )CH and a 0 ~ O. In view of 3.1.1, since h(a 0 )Ch(a) then 
a 0 ~ a. So a ~ a - a 0 < a. Conversely h (a )C h(a) - h (at) 
for each t ET. Hence h(at)Ch(a) - h(a 0 ) = h(a - a 0 ) for 
each t ET. So in view of 3.1.~ at< a - a 0 for each t ET. 
This contradicts a= Ut~T at. 
3.1.9. Definition. Let A be a Boolean algebra and Q be a 
set of infinite joins and meets in A. A Boolean homomorphism 
from A into Bis a Q-homomorphism =af it preserves all infinite 
joins and meets in Q. 
3.1.10. Remark. Any isomorphism is necessarily a 0-homomor-
phism, so h regarded as a mapping from A into P (A) is a 
Q-homomorphism and in fact an-isomorphism. However, h 
regarded as a mapping from A into the field of all subsets of 
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P(A), B(P(A)), whilst it is a monomorphism it is not a 
0-monomorphism except in some trivial cases. 
It is important, then, to know under what condition 
does there exist a Cl-monomorphisrn h O from A into the field 
of all subsets of P(A). 1'he next definition aJlows us to 
make such a condition. 
3. 1. 11. Definition. Let A be a Boole An a lgebnL h rna::dmal 
filter 'v in A is a 0..-filter -df the natural homomorphism from 
A onto A/'v is a 0-homomorphism. We modify the notation of 
3.1.4; P0 (A) is the set of Cl-filters i.n A; ho. and Pa.(A) are 
defined similarly. 
3.1.12. Remark. Equivalently a maximal and hence prime 
filter is a 0-filter iff for each s ES' a E 'v implies 
' s 
there is a t E T' with a t E 'v, and for each s E S" b E 'v S S, 'S· 
implies there is a t E T" with b s s,t E 'v, where Cl is the set 
{as = uA E s '} u {bs A E S"}. tET' a s,t s = ntET" a s,t s 
s s 
By definition P0 (A) is a subset of P(A) and 
h0 (a) = h(a) n Pn(A). Thus hn is a homomorphism from A into 
the field of all subsets of P0 (A), namely onto the field 
P0 (A). 
It is easy to see that ho. is a fl-homomorphism from A 
into B(P0,(A)). 
3.1.13. Proposition. The following conditions are equivalent: 
(i) every nonzero a E A belongs to a Q-filter; 
(ii) ha is a 0.-monomorphism from A into B(Pa(A)); 
(iii) there is Q-homomorphism ho from A into B(X) (the field 
of all subsets of a topological space X), for some X. 
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Proof. (i) implies h 0 (a) *¢for a.* O. It is easy to see 
that h A-+ B is a monomorphism iff (h (a) = 0 8 iff a = OA), 
so this implies ho is a Q-homomorphism in view of 3.1.12, 
i.e. (i) implies (ii). 
(ii) implies (iii) trivially. 
If (iii) holds and a * 0 then h 0 (a) * ¢· Hence there is 
an x 0 Eh 0 (a). So since the set 'v of all b E A such that 
x 0 Eh(b) is a 0.-filter and a E 'v then (i) holds, i.e. (iii) 
implies ( i) . 
_3_._l_._1_4_.~_P_r_o.....,,position. 
A 
O =·{as= utET' as,t: 
s 
If the set 
s ES'} U{bs = nt~" bs,t: s ES"} 
s 
of infinite joins and meets is at most countable, then the 
set of all filters which are not 0-filter is meagre in 
P(A), and every non-zero element a EA belongs to a Q-filter. 
Proof. This is due to H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski in [ 13). 
By the definition of Q-filters, a maximal filter 'vis 
not a 0-filter iff it belongs to one of the sets 
for s ES", where his the Stone isomorphism and u, n as 
usual denote union, intersection. 
In view of 3.1.8 each of these sets is nowhere dense. 
Hence the set M of all maximal filters which are not 
0.-filters is meagre in P(A) since 0. is countable. 
If a* QA' then h(a) is open non-empty set of a compact 
T2 space P(A). It can be shown (the argument is 
similar to that of complete metric as ~- allows us to form 
a decreasing sequence of closed sets which are separate from 
any meagre set and which by compactness is non-empty) 
that any compact T2 space has the Baire Property~ Thus 
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P(A)-,.1 is dense, so that h(a)-M is non-empty, i.e. there is 
a 0-filter .V such that a EV. 
3. 1.15. Remark. . A is a compleb,: Boo; ean algebra ( cBa) = df 
for each non-empty set S, nAsv UAS exist. 
If A is a cBa,. 0 is the set of all infinite joins and 
meets in A, then p O (A) is the field B(Po.(A)) of all sl,lbsets 
-· 
of P0 (A). In f c:1.ct, each one point set v where v E Pa (A) 
is then the image of A v}. for each av = n {a : a E Hence 
PCPo.(A) we have P = ho (a) I where a = Lf{av : v E p}. 
3. 1.16. Remark. Each Boolean algebra A is isomorphi'c .to 
a subalgebra of a cBa. For example the Stone:isom'orPhism 
maps A into B(P(A) which is complete. However, ip general 
this isomorphism does not preserve infinite joins and meets. 
We now give a monomorphism of A into a cBa which does 
preserve infinite joins and meets. 
Let .us say a set ACX, X a topological space, satisfies 
the Baire Condition iff there is an open set G with A-G, 
G-A meagre. It is easy to see that for a given topological 
space, the class of sets satisfying the Baire condition 
forms a field of subsets of X. Moreover this field contains 
all open subsets and closures of all open sets since cl;\ - A 
is nowhere dense for A open. 
Consider the Stone Space P(A) for Boolean algebra.A. 
Let B be the 'field of all sets AC P (A) satisfying the Baire 
Condition. Let 11 be the ideal of .all sets A CP(A) which are 
meagre. The Boolean algebra A.* = · B/11 is called the minimal 
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extension of A. 'I'he mapping h* : A+ A* defined by 
h*(a) ~ lh(a) I for a EA, where his the Stone isomorphism 
of A onto P(A) and I I denotes the equivalence classes in 
B/~, is a homomorphism, which can be shown to be 1-1. 
h* is called the canonical monomorphism of A into A*. 
We next show that A* is a cBa and h* preserves all infinite 
joins and meets. The proof of this and the fact that this 
embedding of A satisfies a certain nice universal condition 
is due to R. Sikorski in (13]. 
3.1.17. Proposition. A* is a cBa and h* preserves all 
infinite joins and meets. 
Proof. For each A EB there is an open set GE P(A) such 
that IAI = IGI iff the Baire Condition holds for A. 
Hence (!) each element of A* is of the form I GI for 
some open GE P(A). Obviously for any indexed set' {Gt}tET 
of open subsets of P(A), 
I Gt I ~ I UtET Gt I for each t ET • 
If Gopen, IGI EA* is such that IGtl ~ IGI for each tET, 
then we can show Gt C clG for· each t using the Baire Condition 
and the properties of nowhere dense sets. Hence 
ut:E:T Gt S. clG, so that I utET Gtl ~ I clGI = I GI u I clG - GI , 
and I clG - GI is the zero of A* since clG - G is nowhere 
dense. 
which exists. 
(D and @ imply A* is complete. 
Using 3.1.8 we have lh(a) - UtET h(at) I is the zero of 
A*, so noting that lh(a} I= lh(a) - UtET h(at} I uA*lutET h(at) I 
we have h* preserves infinite joins. Using this and the 
infinite de Morgan Laws gives h* preserves infinite meets. 
3.2. TOPOLOGICAL BOOLEAN ALGEBRAS. 
3. 2 .1. Definition. A topological Bonlean. algebra (tBa) = df 
a Boolean algebra A with an operation I : A +A given by: 
for each a,b EA, (i) I (a nb) = la nib (ii) la~ a 
(iii) 11 a = I a (iv) 11, = 1. The operation I is called an 
interior operation. 
3.2.2. Remark. If Xis a topological space and A is a field 
of subsets of X such that I A E A for each A E A., where I is 
the interior operator int of topology, then A is a tBa 
which is called a topological field of subsets of X. In 
particular B (X) , the field of· all subsets of a topologie'al 
space x, is a topological field. Moreover B(X) is a cBa. 
Since (i) - (iv) are just the axioms of int, I has 
roughly the same properties as int. For instance we call 
I a the interior of a; a is open =af I a = a; define an 
operator C =af -1- so that Ca is the closure of a; a is 
closed =af Ca= a. 
A topological subalgebra of a topological Boolean 
algebra is a Boolean subalgebra closed under I. 
3.2.3. Definition. A class B of open elements of a tBa A 
is a basis of A =af each open element of A is the join of 
some elements in B. 
A class 8 0 of open elements of a tBa A is a subbasis 
the class B, comprising 0,1 and all finite meets 
of elements in BO , is a basis of A. 
() 4. 
~.-Pr()position. For every class 8 0 of elements of a 
cBa A, there is exactly one interior operation I in A such 
that 80 is a subbasis of the tBa A with interior operation I. 
Proof. 
( :L) Existence. Let B be the cJ ,,, s cc,mprislng O, 1 and all 
finite meets of elements in B0 • For each A EA let IA be 
the join of all elements BE B such that B ~ A. This exists 
since A is a cBa. Properties (ii)-(iv) follow immediately 
from this definition of I. Since for each Bi, B2 EB, 
B1 n B2 EB, then IAnlA' = U{BEB :B<A}nU{B' EB :B' <A'} 
= U{B EB and B' EB: B <A and B' <A'} 
[ since cBa~ have infinite 
distributive laws] 
<U{BnB' EB :BnB'<AnA'} 
< 1 (A nA'). 
Since Ut(at nbt) < Utat n Ut bt then I (A nA') <IA n1 A', 
i.e. (i) holds. Therefore Bis a basis of tBa A and so 
B0 is a subbasis. 
(ii) Uniqueness. If I is an interior operation in A such 
that B0 is a subbasis of {A,I }, then B defined above is a 
basis. Consequently the open element IA is the join of all 
elements BE B such that B < IA. But elements in Bare 
open so that B E B implies B ~ I A iff B < A. Thus I A is 
the join of all elements BE B such that B < A. Hence I 
coincides with the I defined above. 
3.2.5. Proposition. Let 8 0 be a subalgebra of a tBa B. 
Every interior operation I O in 8 0 can be extended to an 
interior operation I in Bin such a way that open elements 
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of B0 constitute a basis for B. 
Proof. This is due to J.C.C. McKinsey and A. Tarski. 
By 3.2.4 there is an interior operation I in B such 
that the class G0 of all open elements in 8 0 is a subbasis 
of B. Since the class G0 contains O, ·w E ~ a.nd b 1 nb 2 E G0 
for each b 1 , b 2 EG 0 , then G0 is a basis of the tBa B. 
By definition la is the join of all b E G0 such that 
b ~ a. Conversely I 0 a is the greatest element b E G0 such 
that b ~ a,since b~ a iff b ~ la·for b open. Hence la= I 0a. 
3.2.6. Remark. A function h of a tBa A into a tBa Bis 
a topological Boolean homomorphism =df it preserves the 
Boolean operations n, u, - and the interior operation I. 
We analogously define topological Boolean epi-, mono-, 
isomorphism. 
It is obvious that a topological isomorphism regarded 
just as a topological map from A into B (i.e. regarding 
A, Bas topological spaces ignoring their Ba structure) is 
a homeomorphism. We now consider under what conditions will 
a mapping from topological space X into topological space Y 
'induce a topological Boolean homomorphism. 
3. 2. 7. Proposi tioh. Given a function <j) : X-+ Y, X, Y topological 
spaces, then the rule h(B) = cp- 1 [B] for each BCY defines a 
Boolean homomorphism from B(Y) into B(X). 
Proof. 
F:unc't'.i:on B = c E B (Y) implies h (B) = cp-1( BJ ~ {x Ex : <j) (x)E B} 
,:; {x EX: cp(x)E C} 
=cp- 1[C] =h(C). 
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Moreover if range ¢ ':/=. Y then for some B, ¢- 1 [BJ = ¢ ( the empty 
set) and since ¢ E B(X) then 4>-1 maps B(Y) into B(X). 
Homomorphism ¢- 1 preserves all the set theoretical 
operations which are the Boolean operations for B(Y), B(X). 
3.2.8. Remarks. We now show some equivalent definitions 
for the topological notions of continuous and open functions 
which use the interior operator definition of topology 
rather than the open set definition. 
If X, Y are topological spaces, then ¢ : X + Y is con-
tinuous iff for each B c Y, ¢- 1[int BJ c int ¢- 1 [BJ. 
¢ continuous implies for each B open in Y, ¢- 1 [BJ is open 
in X. In particular for each B CY, int Bis open in Y so 
¢- 1[int BJ is open in X, i.e. ¢- 1[int BJ = int ~- 1[int BJ. 
int BC B implies ¢- 1 [int BJ S ¢- 1 [BJ so that 
int ¢- 1 [int B] S int ¢- 1 [BJ. Thus ¢- 1 [int BJ c int ¢- 1 [BJ. 
Suppose B is open in Y so that int B = B. By d.ef ini tion 
int ¢- 1 [BJ S ¢- 1 [BJ. By supposition 
-1 -1 -1 -1 · -1 ¢ [B] = ¢ [int B] c int¢ [BJ, i.e. ¢ [B] =int¢ [B] so 
that ¢- 1 [B) is open in X, i.e. ¢ is continuous. 
If X and Y are topological spaces, then ¢ : X + Y is open 
iff for each A c Y, ¢ ( int A) _s int cp (A) . ¢ open implies 
¢(int A) = int ¢(int A). int A _s A implies ¢(int A) S ¢(A). 
Hence int ¢(int A) C int ¢(A), so ¢(int A) _s int ¢(A). A 
open implies int A= A. By supposition ¢(A)= ¢(int A) s_int¢(A). 
Hence since int ¢(A) S ¢(A) we have ¢(A) is open, i.e. ¢ is 
open. 
3.2.9. Proposition. The Boolean homomorphism of 3.2.7 is 
topological iff ¢ is a continuous open function. 
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Proof. This is due to A. Wallace. As remarked before we 
can identify the topological interior operator int and I, 
in view of their similar properties. We must show that 
h(IB) ~ lh(B) for each B c Y. 
By the first part of 3.2.8 we have¢ is continuous 
iff ¢-1 [1B] ::1 ¢- 1 [B] for each B c Y. 
iff h(IB) C lh(B) for each B c Y. 
I.e.¢ is continuous 
From the second part of 
3. 2. 8 it is easy to show ¢ is open if f I ¢'- 1 [ B] _s ¢- 1 [ I B] 
for each BS Y, i.e. ¢ is open iff lh(B) c h(IB) for each 
BC Y. Combining these two results gives the proposition. 
3.2.10. Proposition. For each tBa A there exists a 
complete tBa (ctBa) A* and a topological monomorphism h,of 
A into A* such that h preserves all infinite joins and meets 
in A, and the elements h (a) where a is open in A are a basis 
for A*. 
Proof. This is due to H.. Rasiowa in [13]. 
Leth be the canonical Boolean monomorphism of A into 
its minimal extension A* as in 3.1.16. h preserves all 
infinite meets and joins in A. In 3.2.5 let B0 = h(A) and 
B = A*. The monomorphism h induces an interior operation in 
h(A) via the interior operation I in A as follows: 
lh(a) =af h(la) for a EA. This is well-defined since 
h : A+ h (A) is an isomorphism. By 3. 2. 5 we can extend this 
interior operation to A*, so that A* is a ctBa and his the 
required topological monomorphism. 
3.2.11. Proposition. For each tBa A there exists a 
topological space X and a topological monomorphism h,of 
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A into B(X). In addition we assume that the cardinal of X 
is~ 2m where mis the cardinal of A, and that 
{h(a): a is open in A} is a basis for X. Moreover, given 
any countable set O of infinite j6ins and meets we can always 
assume that h is a 0.-monomorphism of A into B(X). 
Proof. The 1st part is due to J.C. c. McKinsey and A. Tarski, 
the 2nd part to H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski. 
By 3.1.13, 3.1.14 we may assmne X = P0 (A) and his 
h 0 . Hence his a Boolean a-homomorphism of A onto a field 
80 of subsets of X. We define an interior operation in B0 
as in 3.2.10, i.e. lh(a) = h(la) for a EA. 
By 3.2.5 we extend this to the cBa B(X). Hence X 
becomes a topological space with basis 
{h(a): a is open in A}. 
The cardinal of Xis estimated as follows: 2m is the 
cardinal of the power set of A. Since every prime filter is 
a subset of A the cardinal of the set of all maximal prime 
filters is ~ 2m. 
3.3. PSEUDO-BOOLEAN ALGEBRAS. 
3 1. Remarks. The definition of n-complement (also known 
as the pseudo-complement) can be generalized. An element 
c is the pseudo-complement of a relative to b =df c is the 
greatest element such that an c ~ b (denoted by a~ b). 
Equivalently, for each x EA, x ~(a~ b) iff an x ~ b. 
A lattice A is said to be relatively pseudo-complemented 
=df a~ b exists for each a,b EA. It is easy to see that 
such a lattice has the unit element 1, but in general such 
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lattices do not have the zero element O. 
A relatively pseudo-complemented lattice with zero 
element is called a pseudo-Boolean algebra (pBa). 
If we define a => b = -a df u b then it is easy to see 
that each Ba is a pBa. We can show pBas are distributive 
lattices. Moreover just as for Bas, given filters V or 
ideals 6, we can define quotient pBas A/V, A/6, for pBa A, 
and the natural homomorphism from A onto A/V, A/6. Also 
maximal filters in pBas are equivalent to filters which, 
for each a EA, contain exactly one of a, a ·-o (=df -a, the 
pseudo-complement of a). 
3.3.2. Remark. For any tBa B, G(B) =df the set of all 
open elements in B. Since the join and meet of two open 
elements is open, G(B) is a sublattice of B. We next show 
that G(B) is a pBa. 
3.3.3. Proposition. The lattice G(B) of all open elements 
in a tBa Bis a pBa. Moreover if •A' -A denote relative 
pseudo-complement and pseudo-complement in lattice A, then 
a=>G(B)b = I (a=> 8b) G) and -G(B)a = I (- 8a) @ for each 
a,b E G(B). 
Proof. To show G(B) is a pBa we need to show for each 
a,b E G(B), a => b exists, and that G(B) has a zero element. 
We do this by establishing (y. and (y . 
For each a,b,x e G(B), an x ~ b iff x ~ (a• 8b), 
since =>8 is the relative complement in B.and G(B) c B. 
Since x is open, x ~ (a=> 8b) iff x ~ I (a• 8b), 
i.e. a nx ~ b iff x ~ I (a "*ab). But for each a,b,x E G(B), 
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a n x < b if f x < a =+G(B)b. Hence CD holds. 
-G(B)a = a => G ( B) 0 G ( B), and OG ( B) does exist and equals df 
OB. By CT) we have 
-G(B)a = I (a =>BOB) = df I (- 8a). 
.3.4. Remark. If a and bare clopen in B then, since Bis 
a Ba and so a '.'* 8b = - 9a U b, a ""'G ( :1) b and ·- G ( 0 ) a are clopen 
in B. 
If B = B(X) for some topological space X, we write G(X) 
instead of G(B(X)). 
We define pseudo-Boolean homomorphism in the obvious way. 
The next proposition is due to J.C.C. McKinsey and 
A. Tarski and gives a very exact relationship between pBas 
and tBas. 
3.3.5. Proposi.!J.on. For every pBa A, there exists a tBa B 
such that A= G(B). 
Proof. We first show the following lemma. 
Lemma. For each distributive lattice A with the zero and 
unit element, there exists a Ba B such that 
(i) A is a sublattice of Band 08 = OA, 1 8 = 1A' 
(ii) for each element b E B, b = (a 1 => 8a;) n ..• n(an => 8an' ) for 
some a 1 , a 1 ' , • • • a a' n' n 
EA. 
Proof. We have shown in 3.1.5 that each distributive lattice 
is isomorphic to a set lattice, so it suffices to prove this 
lemma for the case when A is a lattice of subsets of a space 
X; i.e. join and meet are union and intersection, 
Moreover given a Ba A, a non-empty set A0 ~ A, the 
Bqolean subalgebra A' generated by A0 is the set of all 
m n. 
elements of the form n u 1 a .. , where for each i, j 
i=l j=l 1J 
either a .. E A 0 or - a .. E A0 • Further i_f OA' 1A E A0 , 1J 1J 
then A' is the set of all elements of the form 
m 
n. 1 (-Aa. Ub. ), where a., b. E A0 • This holds since any 1= 1 1 1 1 
-a1 U ••• U-a Ub 1 U ••• Ub = -a Ub, where r s 
a = a1 n ... na for r =fa 0, a = 1A for r = o, where a.E Ao; r 1 
b = b1 u ... Ub for s =fa o, b = DA for s = 0, where b,E Ao s 1 
Hence this holds for B (X), for the X of the first 
paragraph of this proof. Since a=> Ab =df -Aa Ub for Ba A, 
we have (i) and (ii) holding for the Ba generated by our 
set lattice A. 
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As we have previously remarked, a pBa is a distributive 
lattice which has zero and unit elements. Given our pBa A, 
let B be the Ba satisfying (i) and (ii) in the above lemma. 
We define an interior operation on Bas follows: 
lb = (a 1 =>Aai' )n ... n(a =>Aa') df n n 
well defined an (a=>Aa') < a' implies a=> a'<- a Ua' = a =>IF' A B , 
i.e. a=> a' A .;;;; a => 8 a ' G} and an(a=>Aa') ~a' follows from, for 
each x EA, an x < b iff x < (a=>Ab). Thus 
(a 1 => 8 a 1
1 )n 
(a 1 => 8 a 1' )n 
implies by© 
implies 
implies 
n(a =>Ba' 
n n 
(a1 => 8a1' )n 
( a 1 => Aa 1' )n 
(a1 => Aa1' )n 
[ since for each 
< a=> a' iff 
. B 
n(a =>Ba' n n <(a=> 8a 1 ) 
n(a =>Aa' n a< a.• 
n n 
n(a => a' 
n A n < a=> a' A 
x EA, a nx<b iff x <a=> Ab]. 
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implies (a 1 "*Aa 1' )n ... n(an=>Aan' )=(b 1 =>A.b 1' )n ... n(bm=>Abn: ), 
i.e. I is well-defined. 
I interior p}2_eration. Property 3.2.l (i) follows immediately 
from the definition of I. Property 3.2.1 (ii) follows from 
a =>A a' ~ a "*ea'. Since obviously I b 1:- Pi. c:ach b E B and 
I a = a for each a E A, we h.::tve property 3.2 .1 (iii). I a = a 
for ea.ch a EA implies property 3.2.1 (iv). 
Moreover lb EA for each b EB and la~ a for each a EA 
imply A ""' G(B). 'I'he relative pseudo-complement and pseudo-
complement in A coincide with those induced in G(B) by the 
interior operation as in 3.3.3, since if they exist they 
are uniquely determined by the join and meet. 
3.3.6. Remark. It is easy to prove the following condition 
also holds for 3.3.5. If A is finite, then Bis finite. If 
the cardinal of A is m ~ H0 then the cardinal of B is m. 
The next propositions are the analogues of 3.2.10, 
3.2.11. 
3.3.7. Proposition. For each pBa A there exists a cpBa A* 
and a rnonomorphism of A into A* preserving all infinite 
joins and meets in A. 
Proof. We assume the following lemma which is easily proved. 
Lemma. Ba tBa, A=G(B), at EA for each t ET, implies 
(i) UtAET at exists iff ut8ET at exists and then they are 
equal, 
(ii) if nt8ET at exists then ntAET at exists and 
I n B t ET at O 
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By 3.3.5 given pBa A we may assume A= G(B) for tBa B. 
By 3.2.10 there.exists a ctBa B* and a topological 
monomorphism h of B into B*, preserving all infinite joins 
and meets in B,and the elements h(a) for each a EB form an 
open basis for B*. 
By the lemma, since B* is complete,G(B*) is a complete 
lattice. Since in 3.3.5 la= a for each a EA, lb EA for 
each b EA, then the restriction of a topological homo-
morphism h from Ba B into B', to G ( B), is a pseudo- Boolean 
homomorphism of G(B) into G(B'). Hence h restricted to A is 
a pseudo-Boolean monomorphism of A into A*(= G(B*)). Using 
the lemma we can show h preserves all infinite joins and 
meets in A. 
3.3.8. Definition. Let A be a pBa and 
A 
q = {as=UtET as,t: s ES} be a given set of infinite 
s 
joins in A. Let X be a topological space. A pseudo-Boolean 
homomorphism of A into G(X) is a (q, n)-homomorphism =df 
(D h (as) = UG (X) h (a t) for each s E s, and tET s, 
s 
@ h (b) = I n~ ':,~ h (bt) for each indexed set {bt : t E T} such 
that b = ntAET bt exists. As usual uG(X), nG(X) denote 
union, intersection. 
3.3.9. Proposition. For each pBa A there is a topological 
space X and a pseudo-Boolean homomorphism h of A into G(X). 
In addition we can assume that the sets h(a), a.EA, are a 
basis for X and that if the cardinal of A is m ~ ~o then 
the cardinal of Xis~ 2m. 
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Moreover, given any countable set q of infinite joins 
in A we can assume that h is a (fl, (l)-monomorphisrn of A 
into G(X). 
Proof. The first part is due to J.C.C. McKinsey and 
A. •rarski, the second to H. Ra~iowa ,.nd H. Sikorski. 
By 3. 3.5 we can assurne that A= G(B), where B is a 
tBa such that the cardinal of B < rn. By the lemma of 3.3.7 
we have a 8 = u
8 
a t for s Es. By 3.2.11 there is a t E T8 s v 
topological space X whose cardinal is< 2rn and a topological 
rnonornorphisrn of B into B(X). Moreover we can assume by 
3.2.11 that h(as) = u!C:~ h(as,t) for s ES - Q), 
s 
and that the class of sets h(a), a E A,is an open basis for X. 
Also b = nA b implies b ~ b for each t ET tET t """"t 
implies h(b) < h(bt) for each t ET 
implies h (b) < n! C:~ h (bt) . 
In~ C:~ h (bt) is open so it equals u: ~~ h (as' ) • Since 
us
8 
~xi h (a 8 ' ) = In! ~X~ h (bt), h (as' ) < h (bt) for each t. 
Hence as' < bt for each t. This implies as' < b so that 
h(as') < h(b) for each s. I.e. u:~~ h(as') < h(b). 
Hence int n!';~ h(bt) < h(b) < n!~x~ h(bt) and h(b) open 
implies if b = nA b th h(b) = t ET t en nB (X) h (bt). tET 
In view of the lemma of 3. 3. 7, G) implies 
h (a ) = u0t· C:T) h (a t) for s E S and @ implies 
s s s, 
- @ 
h(b) = 1nG(X) h(b) Then the monomorphism h restricted to t ET t . 
A is a pseudo-Boolean (q, n)-monomorphism of A into G(X) 
by the argument of 3.3.7. 
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3.3.10. Remarks. The next proposition, due to R. Sikorski, 
shows that a countable pBa with a countable set q of 
infinite joins is (q, n)-isomorphic to a sublattice of G(X 0 ), 
where Xo is a set of irrational numbers. In. the next section 
we shall show that intuitionistic logic can be regarded as 
a pBa. We mentioned in Chapter One that the set of 
irrationals was homeomorphic to Baire Space. Thus we have 
a further reason for looking at Baire Space when discussing 
intuitionistic second order arithmetic. 
For this proposition we use the term separable space 
for a space which has a countable open basis (such a space 
is usually said to satisfy the 2nd axiom of countability). 
Also we need the result from topology that for each 
space which has cardinal< 2H 0 , there is a set X0 of 
irrational numbers and. an open continuous function¢ of 
X0 onto X. 
3.3.11. Proposition. For each countable pBa A and for 
every given ennumerable set q of infinite joins in A, there 
is a set X0 of irrational numbers and a pseudo-Boolean (q , n)-
monomorphism of A into G(X 0 ). 
Proof. By 3.3.9 there is a separable space X with cardinal 
< 2Ho and a (q, n)-monomorphism·h of A into G(X). By 3.3.10 
there is a set Xo of irrational numbers and an open continuous 
function ¢ of Xo onto X. 
By 3.2.9 and applying the argument of 3.3.7 about the 
restriction of topological homomorphisms from Ba B into 
Ba B', to G(B), this¢ induces a pseudo-Boolean homomorphism 
of G(X) into G(X 0 ), ~amely h 1 (A) = ¢- 1[A],. A E G(X). 
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Moreover since ¢ is onto, h 1 is 1-1. 
Define h 0 from A into G(X 0 ) by h 0 {a) =af h 1 (h(a)) for 
a EA. Since his a (q, n)-monomorphism, 
B (X) h1 (as) = h 1 (Ut ETs h 0(as,t)) for s ES and 
h ( b) = h ( I n8 ( X) h ( b } ) I ' f o 1 t ET s • n view o.- lemma of 3.3.7 we 
Since joins and meets in G(X) are unions and intersections 
which h 1 preserves,and since by 3.2.9 h 1 is topological, 
G (X) i.e. preserves I, h 0 (a8 ) =UtET hi(h(as t)) for s ES and 
s ' 
h 0 (b) = 1n~C:~ h 1 (h(bt)). In view of the lemma of 3.3.7 
applied to cBas, ho is a pseudo-Boolean (q, n)-monomorphism 
of A into G(X 0 ). 
3.4. INTUITIONISTIC FIRST ORDER FORMALIZED THEORIES. 
3.4.1. Remarks. We firstly give the familiar syntax and 
syntactical rules which enable us to discuss first order 
formalized theories. 
We shall deal with a fixed formalized language 
L = {A,T,F} of the first order. A is the alphabet of the 
first ·Order, namely the ordered system 
. {V,3, · {<Pm}mEN' {Pm}mEN' L1, L2, Q, U} such that each 
member of this system is disjoint, V,2 are infinite, 
Um EN Pm, L 1 UL2 are non empty and Q has two elements. 
Elements in V are free individual variables (lower case 
latin), elements in 2 are bound individual variables 
(early lower case greek), elements in <Pm are m-argument 
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functors with <1> 0 also called individual constants (later 
lower case greek), elements in P are m-argument predicates, m . 
elements in L1 are unary propositional connectives, elements 
in L2 are binary propositional connectives, elements in Q 
are quantifiers, elements in U the auxiliary signs. 
This so far is a general description of the alphabet. 
For our purposes we have L 1 = {,},L 2 = {v,",-+ },Q = {3,v'} 
and for later work in Chapter Four arid Five, P 2 = {=} , 
cI:io = {O}, <'!>1 = {+}, <'!>2 = {+,x},U is{(,)}. 
T is the set of terms: the least set of finite 
sequences of signs formed from signs in A .such that: 
(i) each free individual and each individual constant is 
in T; 
(ii) if Tis am-argument functor with free individual 
variables x 1, ... , xm and if T 1 , ••• , Tm are in T, then the 
result of substituting T1, .•. , Tm for x 1, .... , xm in T, is 
in T. A term of type (i) is called elementary. 
Fis the set of all formulas: the least set of finite 
sequences of signs in A such that: 
(i) if .A is P(x 1, •.. , x) form-argument predicate P and m 
free individual variables x 1 , ••• , xm, T1, ... , Tm are terms, 
then the result of substituting T1, .•. , Tm for x1, ... , xm 
in A, is in F; 
(ii) if A is in F then ,A is in Fj 
(iii) if A and B are in F then Av B, AA B, A -+B are in F; 
(iv) if A(x) is in F then for each bound variable~ which 
does not appear in A(x), 3~A(~), ~~A(~) are in F. A 
formula of type (i) is called elementary. 
In A it is usual to call {V, L1 , L2 , U} the logical 
symbols, and{{~}, {P }, Q} the parameters. Elementary 
m m 
formulas are what are usually called atomic formulas. 
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Although it is not essential that the set of all signs 
in Lis countable (then Lis called conntable) we will 
assume this condition so that we can use 3. 3.11. 
A finite sequence of formulas A1 , ••• ,An is said to be 
a formal proof of a formula A in L from a sets of formulas 
provided that An is A and for each j <neither Aj is one 
of the logical axioms of L, or is a formula ins~ or is an 
immediate consequence of some formulas Aj 
1
, Aj 2, j 1 , j2 < j 
by modus ponens, or one of the following rules of inference. 
(i) A (x) -+B implies ;ll;A ( l;) + B where B contains no 
occurrence of x and l; is free in A(x); 
(ii) A+ B (x) implies A + 'c/ l;B ( l;) where A contains no 
occurrence of x and l; is free in B (x) • 
The logical axioms of L are the set of intuitionistic 
tautalogies 
T1((A+B)-+ ((B+C) + (A+C))) T2(A+ (AvB)) T3{B+ (AVB)) 
T4 ( (A -+ C) + ( (B -+ C) -+ ( (A v B) -+ C))) Ts ((AA B) + A) 
TG((AAB) +B) Td(C+A) +((C+B) +(C+(AAB)))) 
Ta((A+ (B+C))-+ ((AA B) +C)) Tg ( ((A/\ B) -+ C) + (A:+ (B -+ C) ) ) 
T 1 0 ((A" ,A) -+ B) T 1 1 ( (A -+ (AA, A) ) + A) , and the two schemas 
A(Tlx) +3l;A(l;) 'l/l;A(s) +A(Tlx), where A.(Tlx) is the 
substituition of T for x in A(x), so that in view of the 
distinction between bound and free individual variables A(Tlx) 
is the S~(Alx)) of 2.1.5. 
The intuitionistic consequence operation Ci is defined 
as: given a set of logical axiom schemes A. and the rules of 
1 
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inference, for each set of formulas Sin L, Ci (S) is the set 
of all formulas A in L for which there is a formal proof of 
A from Sin L by means of A. and the rules of inference ]. 
(in which case A is said to be derivable in L from S). 
{L, Ci} is called the intuitionistic predicate calculus 
based on L. A formula A is derivable in {L, CJ=df A is in 
Ci(¢). A formalized elementary intuitionistic theory 
, = {L, Ci, A} is a system where A is some set of formulas 
(the set of axioms for theory s). Formulas in Cf A) are 
theorems of theory s· By convention {L, C., ¢} is identified ]. 
with { L, C. } . ]. 
3.4.2. Definition. Given a non-empty set A,an m-argument 
operation in A =df a function o:Am+A. An (abstract) 
algebra =df {A,· {ocp} ¢ E <P}. A generalized operation in 
A = df a function O : V + A, where V is a class of subsets of A. 
The SE V are called admissable sets for generalized 
operation O. A generalized algebra =df 
{A, {ocp} ¢ E <P' · {Ol/J} l/J E \J'}. If V is the power set of A then 
{A, {0¢}, {Ol/J}} is a complete generalized algebra. 
3. 4. 3. Remarks. In view of the definition of F in 3. 4. 1, · 
we see that for any intuitionistic theory s = {L, Ci, A}, 
{F, { v , " , + , , } } is an algebra ( of formulas of language L) • 
Define a relation~ on Fas follows: A ~ B = · both df 
A+ B and B + A are theorems in s. It is easily shown via the 
intuitionistic tautologies that~ is an equivalence relation 
in F and preserves all operations v, ", +,, (i.e. it is a 
congruence relation). Hence we can form the quotient 
algebra F/~::: {{IIAII : A EF}, {v~, "~' +~, , ~}}, where 
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IIAII is the equivalence class of A under~. This is called 
the algebra of the theory z; deno'ted by U( s). This idea is 
due to Lindebaum. 
3.4.4. Propositi~. The algebra U(z:;) of any intuitionistic 
theory r; is a pBa. Moreover IIAII <~ !!Bil .iff (l-1. +B) is a 
theorem of s, IIAII = 'I iff A is a theorem of z:;, IIAII * <p 
iff A is irrefutable in z:;, U(r;) is non-degenerate iff tis 
consistent. Furthermore for each B(x), 
II:} ~B ( i;;) II = u II B ( T) II T ET 
u, n are the infinite join and meet in pBa. 
Proof. Define A< B =af (A +B) is a theorem in z:; •. If 
any instances of To= (A +A) and T 1 are theorems in l; then 
< induces an ordering on F/:=::: given by: IIAII <::::::: IIBII iff 
(A+B) is a theorem in z; (D. 
If To - T 1 are theorems in z; then <~ is a lattice order-
ing, i.e. U ( I';) is a lattice. For example by G) , T 2 , T 3 , 
IIAll<~ll(AvB)II, IIBII ~ll(AvB)II. Suppose IICII in U(z:;) is 
such that IIAII <::::::IICII, IIBII ~ IICII, i.e. (A +C), (B +C) are 
theorems in I:;. By modus ponens on (A+ C) and Tti we have 
( (B + C) + ( (Av B) + C)) is a theorem in z;. By modus ponens 
on ( B + C) and ( ( B + C) + ( ( A v B) + c) ) we have ( ( A v B) + C) is 
a theorem in z;, i.e. II (Av B) II <::::::: II C II , 
i.e. ll(AVB)II = IIAII UIIBII, where U is the join induced by ~-
If T 1 ·- Tg are theorems in z;, then we can show To is 
a theorem in z;, hence by the above if T 1 - T 9 are theorems 
in z; then U ( r;;) is a lattice. Moreover for e'ach A,B, 
IIAll '*IIBII = ll(A+B)II ©where=> denotes the relative pseudo-
complement induced by~- The proof is similar to that used 
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to show LI( r.;) is a lattice. Furthermore if @holds it is 
easy to see that IIA II = 1 i ff A is a theorem in r.:. Hence 
U(r.:) is a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice. 
If T 1 - T 10 are theorems in r.: then U(r.:) is a pBa. 
Th.is follows since T 1 - T 9 imply U( r.:) is a relatively pseudo-
complemented lattice and T 10 implies II (A", A) II is the zero 
of u(r.:). Moreover if T 11 is a theorem of r.: we can show that 
- IIAII = 11,AII, where - is the pseudo:--complement induced by 
<~. The proof is similar to showing U(r.:) is a lattice. 
Furthermore if T 1 - T 9 hold then the lattice U( r.:) has 
an element different from 1 iff there is a formula which is 
not a theorem. Hence U(r.:) is not degenerate iff s.is 
consistent. 
Therefore since. T 1 - T 11 are theorems in any intuition-
istic theory r.: we have U(r.:) is a pBa whereU, n, ,:!;,' 
correspond to v ~, A ~, 
To show the last part we prove the following lemma. 
Lemma. If T0 , T 1 are theorems in r.: and T' is any set of 
terms containing infinitely many free variables then for 
each B(x), 
II 3~B ( C:) II = 1 ub 1 ET, II B ( 1) II 
in the ordered set U(r.;). 
11 '\i~B ( C:) II = g lb 1 ET, II B ( 1) II 
Proof. Firstly we note we have the following derived rule 
of inference: if .3~A ( O + B then A ( 1 Ix) + B. For suppose 
3~A ( ~) + B E r.; and A ( 1 Ix) Er.:, then :3C:A ( ~) Er.: by the axiom 
schema A ( 1 Ix) + 3~A ( ~) and modus ponens. Hence B E s by 
.3C:A(~) +B E r.: and modus ponens. I.e. A(T Ix) +B E r.;. 
82. 
3l;B ( l;) + 3sB ( l;) is of the form T O so is a theorem of l;. 
Applying the above rule of inference gives B ( T) + 3l;B ( l;) is 
a theorem of l;, i.e. IIB(T)II <~ 113l;B(l;)II for each TE T'. 
Suppose there .is an IIAII EU ( l;) with IIB ( T) II < IIAII for 
each T E T'. Since A contains a fin.i te number of free 
variables and T' contains .i.nr.tni tely many free variables, 
then there~ :Lr,, an ind:i vidunl variahl1") x E 'r I such that x does 
not occur free in A. Thus IIB(x) tt < IIAU, i.e. B(x) +A ie a 
theorem. Hence using the rule of inference ( i) in 3. 4. 1, 
3sB(s) +A is a theorem, i.e. 113sB([,:) 11 < IIAII. 
Hence 113/;B(l;)II = lubTET' IIB(T)II. Similarly 
II \1 l;B ( l;) II = g lb T ET' II B ( T) II . 
We have seen that if rr 1 - T 9 are theorems in l; then T 0 
holds and U(l;) is a lattice. Let T' = T, the set of all 
terms, and since UT ET at for each T is unique and equal to 
lubT ET at, etc, we have the desired result. 
3.4.5~ Remark. Hence U(l;) is a generalized algebra 
{{IIAII :AEF}, {U, n, "'*, -}, {U, n}}, the domain of the 
generalized operations being {{IIB(T) ll}TET: B(x) EF}. This 
is called the Q-theory of l;. 
4 • 6 • Remarks. A realization of a formalized language 
L = {A, T, F} in a set J =/= ¢ and in a complete aigebra 
{A, {U, n, =} 
- } ' {U, n}} = a function R defined on , df 
set of functors and on the set of predicates in L such 
(a) R assigns to each m-argument functor <Pin Lan 
m 
m-argumen t function <PR in J, i.e. <PR : J -+ J; 
(b) R assigns to every m-argumen t pre di ca te P in L an 
m-argument function PR : Jm + A. 
the 
that: 
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Every formula A in L can be considered as a function 
AR: JVA -+A, where VA is the finite set of all free individual 
variables occuring in A. For this purpose we interpret: 
(i) all free or bound individual variables occuring in A 
as ranging over J; 
(ii) each functor <P in A as a function ¢R : Jm -+ J; 
(iii) each predicate P in A as a function PR : Jm-+ A; 
(iv) v, A , -+, , as the signs of the corresponding operations 
u, n, tj' - in A; 
(v) the quantifiers as signs. of the corresponding 
operations Ul; E J, nl; E J in A. 
By extension.we can consider each formula A in L 
uniquely determining a function AR : JV-+ A, where V is as 
before the set of free individual variables in L. Indeed 
the inductive definition of AR is as follows: 
Let v be a valuation in J, i.e. v: V -+J. Then 
P(T1,•••1 Tk)R(v) =af PR(T1R(v), ... , TkR(v)), where 
TR(v) is defined inductively by: 
xR(v) =df v(x), ¢(11, •.• , Tm)R(v) =df ¢R(T1R(v), .•• , TmR(v)), 
(Bv C)R(v) =df BR(v) U CR(v), etc . 
.3t;B(xo I() R(v) =af Uj EJ BR(wj), where wj (x) = v(x) iff x ::;c:x0 , 
W j ( X) = j i ff X = Xo I 
etc. 
3.4.7. Remark. From now on we assume that 
{A,· {U, n, *, - } , {U, n}} is a non-degenerate pBa. In view 
of 3.3.7 and the fact that completeness in an algebra and 
completeness in·a lattice are the same, we can drop the 
condition that A is complete: i.e. any realization in J 
and in an incomplete pBa A can be considered as a realization 
in J and the complete pBa A*. However if only elements in 
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A are values of AR (v), and only infinite operations in A are 
used to determine AR (v), then there is no reason to introduce 
the extension A* of A; it is more natural to consider Ras 
a realization in A. 
The idea of in terpret.ing a formula A of intui tionistic 
predicate calculus as a. function AR,where Risa realization 
in a non empty set J and a cpBa, is due to A. Mostowski. 
3. 4. 8. Definitions. Given a fixed formalized language L 
and a fixed realization R of L in a set J =:/= ¢ and a pBa A, 
a function v : V-+ J is a valuation of L in J as remarked 
before. A valuation v satisfias formula A in realization 
R =af AR(v) = 1. Formula A is satisfiable in R =af there 
is a valuation v in R which satisfies A. Formula A is valid 
in R =df each valuation in R satisfies A. In this case we 
say Risa model for A. A set of formulas Sin Lis valid 
in R =df each AES is valid in R. In this case we say R 
is a model of the intuitionistic theory s = {L, Ci, A}; in 
short Risa model for A. 
A realization or model of Lis countable =af J is 
countable. 
Formula A in Lis intuitionistically valid =af A is 
valid in each realization R in each pBa A. 
A topological realization of L = df a realization of L in 
a set J =I=¢ and the pBa G(X) of all open subsets of a 
topological space X. A model of an intuitionistic theory 
s = {L, Ci, A} in a set J =:/=¢and in G(X) is a topological 
model for s. 
A semantic realization of L =df any realization of L 
in a set J =I=¢ and in the two element Ba {O, 1}. A model 
of an intuitionistic th~ory r;; = {L, C., A} in a set J ~ ¢ 
1 
and in the two element Ba { n, 1 } is a semantic model for 
r;;. 
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3.4.9. Remarks. Note that if A is closed then VA is empty 
so AR is the constant function. Hence if A is satisfiable 
in R then. AR (v) = 1 for some v, and so since AR is ·a 
constant function,AR(v) = 1 for each v, i.e. A is valid in 
R. The converse holds, so that for closed formulas satis-
fiability and validity coincide. 
Obviously each realization is a model for 
{ L , Ci, ¢} , i. e. { L, Ci} . 
The idea of semantic realization can be shown to be 
equivalent to the usual idea of structure as in H.B. Enderton 
[ 3]. Hence this idea of realization and the resultant 
definitions of satisfiablity, validity ~nd model, due to 
H. Rasiowa, is more general than the usual idea of structure. 
3.4.10. Remarks. In 3.4.8 the only restriction on J was 
that it had to be non-empty. We now want to show that any 
intui tionisti.c theory r;; has a topological model, so we look 
for a J which will do this. The natural J to take is T, 
the set of terms. 
A canonical realization of terms =df a realization R in 
the set of terms T and a generalized algebra A, such that to 
e.ach m-argument functor ¢, R assigns. the corresponding 
3.4.11. Remark. It has been shown by R. Sikorski in [ 13] 
that if his a Q-homomorphism for U(r;;) into a non-degenerate 
pBa A and R0 is a function defined on the set of all functors 
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in Land on the set of all predicates in L such that: 
(a) R0 restricted to the set of all functors in Lis the 
canonical realization of terms in L; 
(b) for each m-argument predicate Pin L, for each term 
L i :PRO ( T l , ••• , T ) "" h { II p ( T l • • • • T ) II ) i 
m m 
then R0 is the canonical realization for L determined by h. 
~12~- Remarks. For every consistent theory I:; = { L, Ci, A} 
we have defined the G-algebra· Ll(s) which was shown to be a 
pBa. Because the set of formulas in Lis countable and so 
the set of infinite joins and meets corresponding to the 
quantifiers is countable, by 3.3.11 we have a set X0 of 
irrational numbers and a Q-monomorphism h of U(s) into 
G(X 0 ). Hence the canonical realization R 0 for I:; determined 
by h, in the set of terms T and in pBa G(X 0 ), is a 
topological model. 
Moreover since II All = 1 iff A is a theorem of I:;, by 
3.4.4, and h(IIAII) = 1 iff IIAII = 1, because h is a monomer-
phism, and since A is a theorem iff any substitution of A 
is a theorem we have A is a theorem of s iff AR 0 (v) = 1 
for each v, i.e. iff A is valid in R0 • 
3.4.13. Remark. Suppose the intuitionistic theory 
1:; = {L, Ci' A} has the sign of equalitye; that is the 
following axiom schemas are in A. 
e1 t(x,x) x fixed free individual variable. 
e 2 e( X, Y) -+ e.( Y I X) x,y fixed distinct free 
individual variables. 
83 t(x,y)-+ ( e(y,z)-+ t(x,z)) x,y,z fixed distinct free 
individual variables. 
e 4 e< X l , Y l) + ( t ( X 2 , Y 2 ) + ( • • • ( ~( xm , Y m) 
+ e ( <p ( X 1 , • • • , xm) , <p ( Y i , • • • , Y m) ) ) . • • • ) ) 
x1, •.. , y fixed distinct free individual variables, 
m 
¢ m-argument functor. 
es e(x 1,Y 1) + ( e(x2,Y 2) + ( ••• (t(xm' Ym) 
+ (P(x1, •.. , x) +P(y1, .• ., y ))) ••• )) 
·. m m 
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x1, ..• , y fixed free individual variables, Pm-argument 
m 
predicate. 
A model R for 7; in J =I= ¢ and pBa A is an ordinary 
realization of e =af eR(j1, j2) = 1 iff j 1 = j2. 
3.4.14. Proposition. If an intuitionistic theory 7; with 
sign of equality t has a model R in a pBa A and a set J =I= ¢, 
then 7; has an ordinary model R' in A and J/*,where * is· 
defined by: for each j 1, j 2 E J, j 1 * j 2 = df e R ( j 1, j 2) = 1 • 
Proof. By e 1 - e 3 * is an equivalence relation. By 
e 4, e s we have ¢ R, ( I j 1 I *, • • · , I jm I*) = I </JR ( j 1, • • · , jm) I * -© 
PR,(lj1I*, •.. , ljml*) = PR(j1,••.•r jm) -@ 
and these define a realization R' of L. 
Since f : j + I j I* maps J onto J/* and Q) and @ hold, 
it can be shown that AR, ( fv) 
Hence R' is a model for r;. 
V· 
= AR(v) for each v E J. 
By @ and the definition ·Of * ,eR' ( I j 1 I, I j2 I) = iff 
eR ( j 1' j 2) = 1 , i.e. if f I j l I = I j 2 I • 
3.4.15. Remark. In view of 3.4.13, 3.4.14, every consistent 
theory with sign of equality has a topological model R' which. 
is an·ordinary realization of e,and in which A is a theorem of 
r; iff A is valid in R': much more than is used in the next 
chapter. 
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4. A TOPOLOGICAL MODEL OF INTUITIONISTIC 
. SECOND ORDER ARITHJ.l.l!ETIC 
4.0.1. Remark. In the first section of this chapter we 
shall develop the idea of topological models from that of 
direct-power models. In the third section,by choosing our 
power set to be NN and restricting the assignment of number 
variables to constant furictions,we shall give a model 
of intuitionistic second order arithmetic. 
4.1. GENERAL TOPOLOGICAL MODELS. 
4.1.1. Remark. Recall that a structure V for first order 
arithmetic consists of a non empty set D.called the domain, 
an element OED, a function+ from D into D and functions 
+ , x from D x D in to D, i.e. V = ( D, + O I I + I x) • 
The assignments A EA are functions f~om the set of· 
variables of the language into D~ We write A: for the 
assignment B such that B (x) = x, B (y) = A (y) .for each y 
not equal to x. 
We extend assignments to unique functions from the set 
of terms into Din the obvious way, i.e. for each 
A E A, [ o TI = O I [x]A = A(x), + [a]+ [ a ] A = I etc. A A 
For each A E A,satisfadtion I= [ A] is the unique 
predicate on the set of formulas given in the obvious way, 
i.e. I= a = b [ A] iff [a]A = [b]A, I= ,A[A] iff not I= A[ A] I 
I= A I\ B [ A] iff I= A [ A] and I= B [ A] I 
I= Vx A [ A] iff I= A [ A:] for each x E D etc. 
If I= A [ A] for each assignment A, then we say v is a 
model for A. 
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4 .1. 2. Remarks. The structures in 4. 1. 1 are two valued in 
the sense that each formula is either satisfied or not 
satisfied by each assignment. We next introduce direct 
power structures where a formula has a value in a power 
set and that value is not necessarily the whole set or the 
empty set. 
Given a structure V = {D, O, +, +1 x) and a non empty 
I I I + 
set I, the direct power structure V = (D, 0 , 1 , +1 , x1 ) 
is defined as follows. The domain DI is the class of 
functions from I into D. OI is the constant function in D1 
that sends each i EI to O. +r is the function from DI into 
DI defined pointwise by l I (i) = f (i)+ fQr each 
i E I, f E o1 • +1 , x1 are the functions from DI x DI in to 
DI defined pointwise by (f +1 g) (i) = f(i) + g(i), 
I ( f XI g) ( i) = f ( i) x g ( i) , for each i E I' f, g E D • 
The assignments A EA are functions from the set of 
variables into DI. A~ is defined analogously to A:. 
Given A EA we define an assignment A(i) from the set of 
variables onto D by: 
A(i)(x) = A(x)(i) for each i EI, each x. 
For each A E A, []A is the unique function from the 
set of terms into DI given by I [x] = A (x) [O]A = 0 , A 
+ 
for each x , [a+] = [a ]A I for each term 0 , etc. A , 
For each A E A we define the valuation []A, the 
unique function from the set of formulas into P(I) as 
follows: 
[a =b]A = {i EI}: [o]A(i) = [b]A(i) }, [,A]A = -[A]A, 
[ A /\ B TI A = I[ A] An [ 8] A [ v' x A] A = n { [A] A~ : f E DI} , etc. 
If OATIA = I then we say A is satisfied by A. If 
[ADA= I for each A, then we say V1 is a model of A. 
4 .1. 3. Remark. The important result which shows the 
9 0 •. 
connection between satisfaction and valuation i~ for each 
i, each A, each A, i E [A]A iff I== A (A(i}] @ 
Firstly we show by induction on the complexity of 
terms that for each i, each A, each term a, [a]A(i) = [a]A(i)" 
For example, for the induction basis, for each variable x, 
[x]A (i) = A(x) (i) = A(i) (x) = [x]A(i). 
From this result, by induction on the complexity of 
formulas we can show @. For example, for the induction 
basis for a = b, i E [a = b]A iff [a]A(i) = [b]A(i) 
to V. 
iff [a]A(i) = [b]A(i) by above 
if f f a = b [ A ( i ). ] . 
Obviously when I is a singleton set pl is isomorphic 
4 .1. 4. Remarks. The idea of substructure is introduced in 
the obvious way. V' is a substructure of V =df D' CD 
and O' = O, and••,+', ~· are the restrictiorts of 
+ , +, x to D' . 
Given a structure Vanda non-empty set I, a substructure 
L = (LI, Or, •r, +I, XI) is a subdirect power structure =df 
{f(i): f E L1 } = D for each i EI. In a subdirect power 
structure the assignments are from the variables into LI 
so that the valuations [\(xA]A, [3xA]A are.redefined by 
f I I 
allowing the fin Ax to range over L instead of D. 
The largest subdirect power structure of Dis DI 
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itseif, and the smallest is when LI is just the class of 
constant functions, i.e. f(i) = x for some x ED, for each i. 
This is isomorphic to D. 
The condition {f(i): f ELI}= D for each i ensures 
that i E [A]A iff I= A[A(i)] holds for subdirect power 
structures. 
4.1.5. Remarks. We next define continuous subdirect power 
structures. Given a structure V, a non-empty set I with 
topology T, and a subdirect power structure L, Lis 
continuous =df each f E L1 is a continuous function from 
I into D, where D has the discrete topology. 
The importance of this definition is that for each 
assignment A from the variables into LI and for all terms 
a . 
I b , {i E I :[a]A(i) = [b]A(i)} is an open set of (I,T). 
Hence if we define T-valuation T [] A as follows: 
[a = b]T A 
[A~B]i = 
[AvB]! = 
[ 3 x A] A = 
= { i : h ] A ( i) = [ b] A ( i) } , [,A] r. = int (-[Pl r) , 
int( (-[A]i) U[B]r), [A I\ B]i = [Alli n[B]r, 
T T T . T I [ A] A u [ B] A, [ 'v' x A] A = int n {[ A] A f : f E L } , 
x 
U{[A]Af: f ELI}; then the T-valuations are 
x 
always open sets of (I, T). Moreover, since the only 
predicate we are dealing with is equality, we see that the 
continuous subdirect structure assigns to equality what the 
topological realization of Chapter Three assigns, namely 
open subsets of topological spaces. Therefore we shall call 
continuous subdirect structures topological structures, in 
short. 
The largest topological structure for V, topology T, 
is the one for which LI is the set of all continuous 
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functions. 
The set LI is closed under the operations of DI. For 
example for +I, for each 
{i E I . (x . +I y) ( i) = r} 
r EN , 
= {i E I : x ( i) + y ( i) = r} 
= {i E I : x ( i} -· u and y (i) 
and u + v = r} 
= U{ { i E I : x ( i) = u 
and y(i) = v}: u + v = r} 
= U{ { i E I : x ( i) = u} 
= v 
n{i E r : y ( i) = v} : u + v = r}, 
which is open. Hence x +I y is a con'tinuous function from 
I into D. 
4.1.6. Remarks. So far we have only considered first 
order arithmetic. Next we look at second order arithmetic, 
for which we have to introduce a domain of functions to our 
structure to which the function variables are assigned. 
Even though it is well known that choosing the domain of 
functions to be the class of all functions from D into D 
gives rise to incompleteness results and other problems, 
our structures will contain that choice of domain. 
Hence a second order structure is V =(D, DD, O+, +, x), 
where quantifiers over functions are interpreted in the 
obvious way. 
A second order direct power structure is 
VI =(DI, (DD/, QI, +I, +I, xI). The assignments A E A are 
extended to the set of function variables. Given A E A we 
define an assignment A(i) from the set of function variables 
into D by A(i) (f) = A(f) (i), for each i, each f. 
For each A E A, [TIA is the unique function from the 
set of terms in to DI as be fore, with the addition 
I[ f ( a ) TI A ( i ) = a f [ f ] .A ( i ) [ [ a TI A ( i ) ] - @. 
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The valuations are extended by the valuations of the 
quantifiers over functlon variable~; i r th.,, 1,t1vi,:,us way. 
The condition@ tmsures that as before we have 
i E [A]A iff f A[A(i)]. 
For subdirect power structures we make the obvious 
modifications. For continuous subdirect power structures, 
as well as each f ELI being continuous, we require each 
FE (LL)I to be continuous. This means LL must have a 
topology placed on it. The obvious topology is the 
induced product topology on D with the discrete topology, 
and then LL has the induced subspace topology. 
Such a definition ensures that {i EI : [a ]A (i) = [h]A (i)} 
for all terms a, b, are open subsets in (I, T). For 
example, to show {i E I : [a ]A (i) = [b]A (i)} is open we 
w r i te i t as U { { i E I : [ a TI A ( i) = r } n { i E I : [ b ] A ( i ) = r } : r E L } 
and check if { i E I : ITa TI A ( i) = r} ; { i E I : [ b TI A ( i) = r} 
are open. The most difficult case is when a is f ( b) • 
However { i E :t : [ f ( b) TI A ( i) = r} = df 
{iEI :[fTIA(i)[[b]A(i)l = r} 
= U { { i E I : [ b TI A ( i ) = u and [ f TI A ( i ) [ u] = r } : u E L} 
= U{ { i EI : [ b TI A ( i) = u and I[ f TI A ( i) E {h ELL: h ( u) = r}} : u EL} 
=U{{iEI:[h] (i)=u} 
a 
n {iEI: [f]A(i)E {hELL :h(u) = r}}: u EL}. Here 
{i EI: [b]A(i) = u} is open since [b]A is continuous in LI; 
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{i EI: [f]A(i) E {h ELL :h(u) = r}} is open since [f TIA is 
continuous in (LL)I and {h ELL: h(u) = r} is open in LL by 
the induced subspace produ.ct topology. 
Hence the valuations extended to the function variable 
quantifiers are open sets in (I, T), so that [] ~ can again be 
defined. 
4.2. THE SYNTAX OF AN INTUITIONISTIC 
SECOND ORDER ARITHMETIC 
4.2.1. Remark. In this section we shall give the syntax 
of an intuitionistic second order arithmetic which expresses 
formally the ideas, .or slight modifications of them, of 
Chapter Two. It is this theory that is satisfied by the 
model of section three. 
4.2.2. Definition. The formal symbols of the theory are: 
the logical symbols: parentheses ( ,) ; commas , ; propositional 
connectives 1, v , A , -+, -++; number variables x, y, z, ... ; 
function (sequence) variables a, S, y, ... ; 
the parameters: quantifiers 3 , Ir/ ; predicate symbol =; 
function symbols f O , f 1 , f 2 , ••• , where f O 
f 2 is+, f 3 is x; operators (Church's) t..; 
+ is O, f 1 is 
4.2.3. Remark. There are two points to notice. Firstly 
instead of having an 'equality' symbol in the logical 
symbols we have an 'equality' predicate. This will be 
discussed later. Secondly the function syrnbois will be 
specified as needed. They are to be regarded as 'primitive 
recursive' functi9ns of a specified number of variables and 
sequence variables. 
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2.3. Definition. We define functors and the set of 
terms T inductively as follows: The function variables 
are functors; if fi is a 'primitive recursive' function of 
one number variable and no sequence variables then f. is 
I 
a functor; if K is a nmnber variable and r, :i R a term then 
AK(s) is a functor; the number variables are terms; if 
t1 , ••• , tk. 
I 
are terms and u1 , ••• , u I are functors then 1 
f. (t1 , ••• , tk , U1 , ••• , 
I j u 11 ) is a term (hence if i is O , 
O is a term) ; if u is a functor and t is a term then 
( u) ( t ) is a term. 
4.2.4. Definition. We define the set of formulas F 
inductively as follows: If s, t are terms then s = t is 
a formula; if A, B are formulas then 1A, Av B, A AB, A-+ B, 
A++ Bare formulas; if K is a number variable and A is a 
formula then 3 K ( A) , 'Q x ( A) are formulas; if a is a function 
variable and A is a formula then 3a(A), 'qa(A) are formulas. 
4.2.5. Remarks. For simplicity, parentheses are 'omitted 
under the usual conventions. For ease of reading they may 
be changed to braces or brackets. 
Free and bound occurrences of variables in terms, 
functors and formulas are distinguished in the usual way. 
Ho.wever the :\ operator A also binds variables, so that we need 
an analogous definition for when term b is substitutable for 
x in s, where s contains L b Similarly the result Sx(A) of 
substituting term b for number variable x in A is extended 
in the obvious way to substituting functor u for function 
variable a in A. 
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4.2.6. Remark. We now give the axiom schemas for this 
theory of second order arithmetic: 
Axiom schemas for the intuitionistic propositional calculus: 
j us t as in 2 . 1. 
Axiom schemas for the intuitionistic second order predicate 
calculus: 
2 N .\IX Ax + S t ( Ax ) 
x 
1 N I f C + Ax then C + 'tjx Ax 
3 N St ( Ax ) + 3 x Ax 
x 
4 M If Ax + C then ::\ x Ax -+- .c 
where Ax is a formula, C is a formula which does not 
contain x free; 
2F u 'vaAa + S ( Aa) 
a 
1 F If C + ACl then C + 'tjaAa 
3 F S 11 ( Aa) -->- 3aAa 
a, 
4 F If .Aa -->- C then :la A a -->- C 
where Aa is a formula, C is a formula which does not 
contain a free . 
Axiom schemas for the intuitionistic number theory: 
o x+ P I n S x ( Ax ) + ( 1,/x ( .Ax + S x ( Ax ) ) + \;J x Ax ) 
S1 ~)( hx + O) S2 Vx\Jv ( x = v + x + +) = = v· 
S3 'tf><'\:JV ( )( + + = v) =1 'f/x\;jy'tjz ( x = y-+- (x~ z+ v= z)) = v -->- x 
A1 \/>< ( ( x + 0) = x) A2 ~xlqv( < x + v+) = + ( )( + v ) ) 
M1 \/>< ( (xx O) = 0) M2 'v><'vv ( ( x x y+) = ((xxy)+x)) 
Axiom schemas for functions: 
t {>.x.r(x) }(t) = S11 (r(x)) if t is substitutable for>< in 
r ( x ) , for a 11 te r:ms r ( x ) and t 
=F V><'vVVJa(><= y4 a(x)= a(y)) 
AC ~><3aA(x,a)+ 3a~xA(x,>.y.a(?x.3y)), where>< is free for a 
in A( >< , a) • 
Axiom schemas for certain 'primitive recursive' functions: 
These include the 'defining relations', such things as the 
exponential function of AC, 
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i . e • E 1 'l;/x ( x o = 1 ) 
the predecessor function, the finite sum t: < t ( y) , the v s 
finite product IT< t(y), the bounded least(µ) operator y s 
µ , etc., as well as versions of BI and Brouwers principle 
for numbers,namely 
-Bl! {[\7'a3!xR(aX)/\ -vw(Seq(w)+ (!l{w) + (A(w))) I\ 
\fw(Seq(w)+ ('qsA(w*2 8 +1)+ Aw))] + A(1)} 
BC-N! [\ja3!yA(a,y)+]T\ict3Yh(a(y)) > 0 I\ 
'Jx [T(a(x)) > 0 + Y= x] /\A(a,T(a(y)).!.. 1) }) 
4. 2. 7. Remarks. The formation rules provide = as a 
primitive symbol only between terms. When u, v are 
functors, u = v will be an abbreviation for ~x(u(x)= v(x)), 
where x is not free in u, v. 
As we remarked before= is not a logical symbol. 
There are no axiom sche.mas which directly tell us how it is 
to be interpreted. However from the schema =1 we can derive 
the first three schemas of 3.4.13 [qv (9]], namely reflexivity, 
symmetry and transitivity. Moreover, the schemas S2, =F, 
tell us separately how it is to be interpreted on these 
functors+, a. Indeed it can be shown by induction that 
all the 'primitive recursive' functions we introduce 
satisfy the fourth schema of 3.4.13 [qv [91, [ 10]1 
Applying schema A1 to these'primitive recursive' function 
schemas, will then show that all functors sa.tisfy the fourth 
schema of 3.4.13. As we do not have predicates in our 
theory, we need not consider the fifth schema of 3.4.13. 
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4.2.8. Remarks. As we saw in Chapter One and Chapter Two, 
an essential technique for intuitionistic second order 
arithmetic is the assigning of finite sequences to numbers. 
In Chapter One we gave such an assignment. However, 
although this is a simple assignment, when we come to 
interpret our formal expression in. the model, it gives 
rise to a complicated expression in. the model. ;t:nstead 
we choose an equivalent assignment which is based on 
Godel numbering. 
Firstly we define what a prime number is, i.e. 
r pr (a) ++ ( 8 > .1 " ., 3c ( 1 <c < 8 A c I a) ) , and indeed we have 
r,Pr(O), r Pr(2), r Pr(3), r,Pr(4), etc. 
Next we give a recursive equation which enumerates the primes: 
P. + = µh b < p [ P. < b I\ Pr ( b) ] @, where I is the 
I i ! +2 I 
factorial function with recursive equation 
0 ! = 1 , + + a ! = a! x a • From G) it is easy to show that 
r pr (a)# 3i(a=P.) 
I 
[ qv [ 10] ] • Next we give a definition 
of what informally is the power of the ith prime for a 
ko k · number whose prime decomposition is P O x ••• x P. J • J 
( 11 ) i · = df µxx< a 
the two expected 
h 
L(P.) =h, 1- I , 
I 
x x+ 
[ Pi la A "1 Pi la]. From this we can derive 
results,namely, 
L > 0 TI P.(a)j • 18
· ++a= i<a I Now we give the 
length function which informally is the number of factors 
in the prime decomposition of a number. 
I h (a) = df }:;, < I ll + s g ( ( a ) . ) , where s g ( 0) = 0, s g ( a ) = 1 • I . 
We can now define what is informally a sequence number, 
r Seq(a) ++ (a>OA(~i<lh(a))((a.) >O)). I. We can prove 
[ qv [ 10]] 
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i.e. a number is a sequence number iff its decomposition 
J k· into prime factors is of the form p:o x ..• x Pi 1 ,where the 
k; > o. 
1 
8 * b = df 
If we define a concantenation function * as follows, 
( b) i 
a x ni < 1 h ( 8 ) PI h ( 11 ) + i, then we can show [ qv [ 10] ] 
j- a * 1 = a , I- ( S e q . ( a ) I\ S e q ( b ) -+ ( ( I h ( a * ,i } "" ! h { tl ) + I h ( b ) A 
Seq ( a * b)) • Finally we giv€i two :functions which informally 
are functions from sequences into finite sequences. 
a(x) =af IT. p~(i )+1 
I< X I ' 
;( x) =af n. P ~( i ) 
I< X I Indeed 
we can show [qv.[10]] that· j- (lh(a(x))= x /\ Seq(ax)) and 
I- Seq(a) * 3a3x(a =ax), so that - is a function from 
sequences onto finite sequences. 
To relate these ideas to those in Chapter One we give 
this informal account,noting first that our assignment, 
although more convenient to use in the formal language and 
model, is no longer onto, so that we have to add the 
antecedent Seq(u) to the relevant clauses of Bl!, 
BC - NI • Given numbers a O , ••• , at-l which can be regarded 
as the first t values a(O) , .•• ,a(t-1) of a sequence a 
(the remaining values as yet undetermined), the finite 
sequence· {ao, ••• , at_ 1 } is associated with the number 
ao +1 
Po pat-1+l which we know is a sequence number. In 
t-1 
the formal language we abbreviate P: Pf 1 8 t + 1 pt -1 by 
< Bo , a 1 ' ••• ' 8 t-1 > and define [ ao , .•. , 8 t -1] = df 
< II o +1 , •• ·• , 8 t -1 +1 > . Hence informally the finite 
sequence· {a 0 , ••• , at-1} is associated with the number (and 
finite Sequence) [aQf•••f at-1] t Which iS jUSt 0.(X), and 
lh(a(x)) = t. Indeed we see that our previous 
< a 0 , ••• , at_ 1 > is just a(x), and as before lh(a(x)) = t. 
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In the same way we see that the two notions of 
concantenation agree if we restrict them to sequence numbers. 
The fundamental relation between sequence numbers is that 
f umb t th umb * 2s+l . o a sequence n er a o e sequence n er a , 
which represents the sequence <a 0 , ••• , at-l's>, coming 
from <a 0 , ••• , at_ 1> by choosing one more s. 
One function we have not as yet mentioned that does 
appear, is >.t ( ( u) t .:...1) where Seq ( u) • - pll O If U- o •• • 
then >.t((u)t .:...1) is <a 0 .:...1, ••• , at_1 .:...1, O, ••• >. 
Informally it is u * O, where O is the zero sequence. The 
important feature of this function is that for 
4.2.9. Remarks. Although Bl! looks at the one time weaker 
because of!, and stronger because it does not have 
iquv'w((Seq(u)I\ Seq(w)) +(R(u)+ R(u*w))) as a hypothesis, 
it is equivalent to the BI mentioned in Chapter One. For 
W.A. Howard and G. Kreisel in [ 71, show that Bl with the 
second hypothesis lqu (Seq ( u) +(R( u) v , R( u))) is equivalent 
to Bl with the second hypothesis as above. Further 
S.C. Kleene in [10] shows that Bl! is equivalent to Bl 
with second hypothesis "\ju (Seq ( u) + ( R( u) \J , R( u)) ) • 
BC -NI is weaker than BC· - N, but J. R. Moschovakis has 
shown, in her Ph.D. Thesis 'Disjunction, existence and 
>.-definability in formalized intuitionistic analysis', 
that BC-N! is equivalent to BC-F!. Notice also that 
the BC - N! of 4 .-2. 6 has the second ! written out in full. 
' 
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4. 3. A TOPOLOGICAL JIJ!ODEL OF IN'I'UITIONISTIC SECOND 
ORDER ARITHMETIC. 
4 . 3 . 1. Remark . 
. N 
Let N = {O, 1, 2, •.. }, N be Baire Space, 
C(NN) the class of all continuous operators from NN into 
NN, N1 the class of all constant ope:r.,~tor,- Lcom NN into 
N (which under the natural isomorphism can be identified 
with N). 
Let NI= (NI' C(NN), O, +, x, f 4 , ••• ) be the topological 
structure with domains NI, C CNN) • The functions 
0, +, +, x, f 4 , ••• will be defined so that when evaluated 
at points in the Baire Space they are the usual primitive 
recursive functions, i.e. 0((3) = O, xY((3) = x((3)y((3), etc, 
for each (3 E NN. 
As before the assignments A are functiOns from the 
variables into the domains. However, because of our choice 
of domain for the number variables, we cannot extend 
assignments to functions from the set of terms into NI. 
For example the term ax would have to be sent to an element 
in NI' but if we define [ax]A ((3) = [a]A ((3) ([xTIA ((3)) as is 
natural, then because [a]A is not necessarily a constant 
operator, l[a]A ((3) ([x ]A ((3)) is not necessarily a member of 
NI. Hence such a definition would not be well-defined. 
But since for our definition of valuation and for 
the subsequent propositions, we are only concerned with 
what is happening point.wise 
T (e.g. [a = b] = { (3 : [a] A ( (3) = [ b] A (S) } ) , we get round this 
problem by restricting ourselves to what is happening 
point.wise. The idea is that if we are interested in 
T (3 E [Ax] A, we take an .A ( x ) ( f3) that makes things work, and 
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then define an assignment A' by A' (x) (y) = A(x) (B) for 
each y. 
Therefore we make this modification to the ideas of 
4.1. Instead of the unique function from Tinto NI, and 
the unique function from the functors into C (NN) (al though 
there is no problem here in defining 'globally'~ we define 
the unique function [DA,S from Tinto N and the unique 
function [DA,S from the functors into ~N by: For the 
functors: [aD.A,S =af A(a) (S), [f i DA,S =af f 1 CS), where L I 
is a function of one number variable and no sequence 
variables; [ AX .s ]A O =df A[X ]Ax S • [s ]Ax S where s is a 
,t-> x' . x' 
term. For the terms: [fi (t1 , ... , tki, U1 , .•. ul i )DA,S =af 
fi(S)([t1DA,S'"···,.[u1iDA,S),wheret 1 , ••• , tki are terms, 
u 1 , ... , u1 • are functors. 
I 
E • g. [ as ] A, S = d f [ a] A, S ([ s ] A, r) 
[u(a)DA,S =df [u]A,S([a]A,S),where u is a functor, 11 is a 
term. 
For each assignment A we define T-valuations by: 
[ s = t ] T = df { S E ~: [ s ] A, S = [ t ] A, S} for each term s , t ©, 
[AI\ B] T = df [ A] T n [ B] T, etc, as in 4. 1. 5. 
By the above remarks we see that © is the same 
definition as in 4.1.5, so that the definition here also 
gives rise to open sets of NN. 
4.3.2. Remarks. In the presence of a wider class of 
functors, the usual induction on the complexity of formulas 
takes on a different form. 
Let A(s), B(u) be predicates of terms s and functors u. 
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If A ( 0) and A (x) , for each variable x , B (f i ) , for each f i 
a function of one number and no function variables, and 
B(a), for each variable a, A(s) implies B(Ax.s ), for each 
variable x and terms, A(s) and B(u) imply A(u(s)), for 
·each terms and functor u, A(t 1 ), ••• , A(t k·), · B(u 1 ), ••• , 
ff 
B(u,.) imply A(f.(t1,···, tk 1 111,a•oy I.Ill)) for each 
I I i i 
termt 1 , ••• , tk.,functor 1.1 1 , ••• , u1.,then A(s) and B(u) 
I I 
for each terms and functor u. A double induction. 
On the other hand propositions u = v introduce no new 
features at all, since u = v is an abbreviation of 
'qx ( u ( xJ = v ( x) ) and u ( x) = v ( x) and ivx are covered as 
before. I.e. given a predicate Con formulas, if C(s = t) 
for each term s , t , 
C (A) implies C (1A) , C ( ~x A) , C ( 'qa A) , .•. for all variables 
x , a, 
C(A) and C(B) imply C(Av B), C(AA B) , ••• for each A, B, 
then C(A) for each formula A. 
4.3.3. Remark. To show that the intuitionistic propositional 
calculus axiom schemas are valid in N1 is straightforward, 
T N T N 
e.g. for modus ponens for each A, [ A] A = N , [ A -+ B] A = N 
imply [A]r = NN and ( (int-[A]r) U[B]i) = NN 
imply - [A]i = qi and ( (int-[A]i) U[B]_i) = NN 
imply 
imply 
int-[ A] T = 
A 
[ B] T = NN; 
A . 
i. e. if A and A -+ B th en B is v a 1 id . in NI • 
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4.3.4. Remarks. To show that the intuitionistic predicate 
calculus axiom schemas are valid in NT we need to prove the 
following lemmas. 
Because A binds variables we have to be careful that 
when we substitute b for x in a term or functor which 
contains A,We do not go from a valid to an invalid result, 
e.g. {Ay.x}(a) =xis valid, butSY({).y.x}(a) =x) is 
x 
{Ay.y}(a) = y or a =~which in general is invalid.· Hence 
we introduce the notion of substitutability analogous to 
that for the case of 3,~ for formulas. Term b is substi-
tutable for x in terms or functor u =df x does not occur 
free within the scope of an occurrence of AY for any y 
which occurs in b. Then s!(s) is the term obtained from 
s by replacing each free occurrence of x by an occurrence 
of b, if b is substitutable for x in u. 
4.3.5. Lemma. For each assignment A, for each variable x, 
terms 11 , b, functor u, 
b . 
[Sx(a) ]A,S = [11 ]~y.[b]A,S ,S ,if b is substitutable 
for x in a, 
b [Sx(u) ]A,S = [u]~y·[b]A,S ,S ,if bis substitutable 
for x in u, 
For each assignment A, for each variable x, term b, 
formula A, SE [S!(A) ]I iff SE [A]I Ay. [b]A S' if b is 
x , 
substitutable for x in A. 
Proof. By an induction on the complexity of terms and 
formulas. In the 'induction basis' for the statement about 
terms and functors: 
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for each A, for the variable x, if bis substitutable for 
x in x then s!(x) is b and [S:(x) ]A, 8 = [b]A, 8 
= [ Ay.[b]A,B] (8) 
= A; y • [ b ] A ,8 ( x ) ( 8 ) 
.. [x]A~y '[b]A 8 
. x · , ,8; 
for the variable Y, if b is substitutable for x in y 
then s!(v) is v and [S!(v) ]A,B = [y]A,B 
= A (Y ) ( 8) 
=· AAy.[b]A,8 (y) (8) 
x 
Similar for O. 
For the functor+ if bis substitutable for x in+ 
is+ [+] B A, 
= + ( 8) 
For the functor a, if b is substitutable for x in a 
then s!(a) is a and IIS!(a) ]A,B = lfa]A, 8 
= A(a) (8) 
= A:y.[b]A,B (a) (8) 
Similarly for the other fi functions of one number 
variable and no sequence variable. In the 'induction step' 
for the statement about terms and functors: 
For each A, for each terms, for the variable x, for the 
functor AXS, if bis substitutable for x ins implies 
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b [Sx(s)DA,B = [sDAAy.[b]A,8 B then bis substitutable for x 
x , 
in AU impliesS!(Axs) is AXS and 
b [ s x ( AXS ) ] A' B = [ AX s DA' B 
= A[X]Ax B. [s ]Ax f3 
J< I X I 
[ since 
For the variable y, for the functor Ays, if b is substitu-
table for x ins implies rrs!<s)DA,B = [s]A~y.[b]A,B,B 
then b is substitutable for x in AYS impli~s b is 
substitutable for x in s and Sxb ( AV s) is AV Sb ( s) x . 
and [ S ! ( A y s ) DA, f3 = [ A Y S ! ( s ) DA, B 
b 
= A[VDAr,B [Sx(s) D~,B 
b 
= A [ y D [ A; y • [ b ] A I f3] ~ I f3 • [ s x ( s ) ] ~ , (:3 
[ since rr v ] ~ ' B = [ y ] [ A; y • IT b ] A ' B ] ~ I f3 ] 
[ since b is substitutable for x in s 
and hypothesis applied to.11 
= A [ y D [ ~ y • [ b ] A , f3] ~ , B • [ s ] [ ~] ; y • [.~ ] A, f3 , f3 
[since bis substitutable for x in 
AYS implies y does not occur in b so 
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r since v is not )( l 
For each A, for each terms, each functor u r for the term 
u(s), ifb 
b [Sx(u) ]A,B 
is substitutable for x in s implies 
== [u]A11y.[b]A B r; i.f bis substitutable for 
)( , , µ 
x in u(s) implies b is substitutable for x ins and b is 
substitutable for x in u and. 
Sb ( u ( s) ) is Sb ( u) Sb ( s) and 
x x x 
b b b [Sx(u(s))]A,B = [Sx(u)Sx(s)]A,B 
b b 
= [Sx(u) ]A,B ([Sx(s) ]A,B) 
= [u]A11y.[b]A B B ([s]A11y. [b]A B 10 ) x , , x , µ 
[since b is substitutable for x ins and u 
and by hypothesis]. 
For each A, for all terms s , t, for the term s + t , if b is 
substitutable for>< ins implies l[S:(s) ]A= 
and b is substitutable for x in t implies 
U,!(t) ]A= [t]A11y.[b]A B B ,then b is substitutable for x 
x , ' 
in s + t implies b is substitutable for x in s and b is 
substitutable for x int and 
S ! ( s + t ) is S: ( s ) + S ! ( t ) and 
[s!(s +t)]A,!3 = [s!(s) +s!(t)]A,B 
b b 
= [Sx(s)]A,B+[Sx(t)]A,B 
, B' 
108. 
[ since b is substitutable for x in s and t 
and by hypothesis] 
= [s + t ]AAy.[b]A (3 . 
x ' ' s 
For each A, for each term s , for each functor u , for the 
termu(s), if b is substitutable fot x in s implies 
[S:( s) ]A,B = [s ]A;y.[b]A,S ,S ,and b is substitutable for 
x in u imp~ies [S:(u) ]A,S = [u]A;y.[b]A.,(3 ,(3 then b is 
substitutable for x in u( s) implies b is snbsti tutable for 
x in u and b is substitutable for x in s and 
is s b ( rr. P ~ ( i ) + 1) · 
X I< S I lS P.
s!(u(i)+1) i's 
Jij < S ! ( S ) I 
b P.s~(u(i))+ 1 is sbx(u)(S~ts)) 
Sx(s) 1 " 
and b(- ~· b [Sx u(s))]A,(3 = [Sx(u)U\(s))]A,(3 
b b . 
= [Sx(u)]A,(3 ([Sx(s)]A,(3) 
= [ u TI A; y • [ b TI A, S , S ([ 11 TI A; y • [ b ] A , 8 , 8 ) 
[since bis substitutable for x ins 
and u and by hypothesis] 
= [u(s)]A;y.[b]A,(3 ,(3· 
Similarly for the other 'primitive recursive' functions. 
In the 'induction basis' for the statement about formulas, 
for each A, for a = c, if.bis substitutable for x in a = c 
then b is substitutable for x in a and b is substitutable 
for x in c and so S ! ( 11 = c ) is S ! ( a ) = S ! ( c ) • Then 
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II s b ( a = c) TIT . h b T B E iff B E II S ( a) "'Sx(c) ]A x A x 
{ B . E NN : [ S ! ( a ) ] A , f3 b iff B E = IISx(c) TIA,(3} 
iff b U~\(a) ]A,(3 b = [Sx(c)]A,B 
[since bis substitutable for x in a and c 
and by first part of lemma] 
N iff B E {B EN : [a ]A>..y.[b]A B 
x , ,(3 
In the 'induction. step' for the statement about formulas, 
for each A, for the variable x, for \jx, if b is substitutable 
for x in A implies B E us!( A) ]I iff f3 E [A]A>,y [b]A,f3 ,then 
x 
b is substitutable for x in 'f/xA implies 
s!(~xA) is ~xA and 
f3 E l[S!( \jxA) ]i iff (3 E [ 'vxA]I 
iff (3 E int n 
iff f3 E int n 
{[A]Ax:xENI} 
x 
T { [ A] [ A; y • [ b ] A , (3] : : x E NI } 
[ since [ A; y . [ b ] A , f3] : is A: ] 
For the variable y, for \jY, if b is substitutable for x in 
A implies f3 E [S!(A)ll~ iff f3 E [A]A>..y.[b]A f3 ,then bis 
)( , 
substitutable for x in ~yA implies b is substitutable for x 
in A and s!(~yA) is ~vs!(A) and 
a E [S:(~yA)]! iff a E [ ~ys:(A) TI! 
iff SE int n {[S:(A) ]~y: y ENI} 
v 
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iff S E int n{[A]-[A~] ;\y.[b 0~, S : y E N 1 } 
[since bis substitutable for x in A and 
using hypothesis applied to A~ ] 
T if f (3 E int n {[ A TI f A~] ;\ y. [ b TI A, (3 : y E NI} 
[since bis substitutable for x in ~yA 
implies y does not occur in b so that 
[b]Ay a y , fJ = [b]A S ] ' , 
T . 
iff (3 E int n {[A][A;y.[b]A,Sl~: y ENI} 
[since y is not x] 
Similar and sometimes easier arguments hold for the 
other quantifiers and logical connections. 
4. 3.6. Lemma. For each assignment A, for each .variable a, 
term a , functor u , v : · 
[ 11 ] A;\ y. [ u ] A O a ,y ,..., 
[v]A:\y.[u]A a 
a ,y ,..., 
where Su ( 11) is the term 
a 
obtained from a by replacing 
each (free) occurrence of a 
by an occurrence of u: 
where Su(v) is a functor 
a 
obtained from v by replacing 
each (free) occurrence of a 
by an occurrence of u. 
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For each assignment A, for each variable a, functor u, 
b T formula A, llSx(A) DA T = [AUAAy.[uTIA if u is substitutable 
('t ' , y 
for a in A. 
4.3 .. Remarks. The proof of 4.3.6 is by an induction on the 
complexity of terms and formulas. It is very similar to 
4.3.5. Note, however, that on the RHS the assignment is 
AAy.[u]A y not AAy.[u]A,f3. This is because the domain 
-a ' ' a 
to which the sequence variables are sent is C(NN), not the 
constant functions on NN. If our domain to which the number 
variables are sent was the continuous functions from NN 
into N (rather than the constant functions) then we could 
b T T 
strengthen 4.3.5 to [Sx(A) ]A= [A]AAy~[b]A Y in the 
x , 
manner of 4.3.6. It is to ensure that we are assigning 
constant functions from NN into N to our number variables 
that we have to weaken 4.3.5. 
4.3.8. Proposition. If A is an intuitionistic predicate 
calculus axiom schema then A is valid in NI. 
Eroof. Using 4.3.5, 4.3.6, e.g. 2N, 
for each A, f3 E [\fxAx]r implies f3 Eint n {[Ax]rx :xE NI} 
l( 
implies f3 E n {[ Ax ] r x : x E NI } 
x 
implies f3 E [Ax] Ix for each x ENI 
x 
implies f3 .E T [ Ax ] A A y • [ b ] f3 and 
x A, 
f3 E [Ax] r 
implies (3 E [ S ! ( Ax) ] i if b is 
substitutable for x in A, and f3 E [Ax] i 
112 .• 
implies BE [Sb(Ax) TIT 
x A 
[ since if b is not substitutable 
for x in Ax then s!( Ax) is Ax], 
i.e. ["qid\x -1-S!( Ax) ]r = int (-[igxAx]r) U [S:( Ax) Di= NN. 
4.3.9. Remark. Note that if a formula A contains no 
sequence variables then,because of the assignment of 
number variables to constant functions from NN into N, 
[A]i is either NN or <j). Thus this assignment of number 
variables ensures that the axiom schemas for intuitionistic 
number theory are valid in NI" 
The axiom schema Pin does not seem to hold in any 
topological structure larger than the smallest one, which 
is why we have NI instead of the continuous functions from 
NN into N as a domain to which the number variables. are 
assigned. 
The other axiom schema are trivially valid by our 
choice of + 1 +, x, f4, ••• • Pin is shown to be valid using 
4.3.5, and the isomorphism between NI and N, and informal 
induction. 
4.3.10. Remark. \1 and =Fare trivially valid in NI 
because of the inductive definition of []A,B. For example, 
[L\xs)(t)]A,B = (\[x]Ax .[s]Ax )([t]A,B) 
x,B x,B 
[ since [ t ] A , B = ( \ y • [ t ] A , B ) ( 8 ) ] 
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t 
= llSx(s) IIA,B if t is substitutable for x ins, 
so that [ ( A><S) ( t) = s! ( s) Di = NN · if t is substitutable for 
x in s, for each A. 
3.11 Lemma Suppose A(a) is . N any formula, ¢, ~ E C(N). 
Suppose B E {y : <I> (y) = ~ (y) }, then 8 E[Jl(a)Dr¢ iff 8 E[A(a) Dr~ 
a a 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A(a), for 'the 
induction basis' when A( a) is a ( a) = b( a) for terms a ,b, we 
[ a ( a) DA¢ B = [ a ( a) DA~ (3 
a ' a ' ' 
need to show 
[ b ( a) DA¢ B = 
a , 
[b(a) DA~ B if B E {y: ¢(y) 
Cl , 
=~(y)}. 
This is just a lengthy proof of the type in 4.3.5. 
In view of this we shall not give the proof of this lemma. 
4.3.12. Proposition. The axiom schema AC is valid in NI. 
Proof. Let A be any assignment. Let BENN. 
If BE [~x3ciA(x,a) Dr then there is a neighbourhood Vo of 
B such that V0 ~ [VJ( 3aA(x ,a) Di, 
i.e. V0 2:int ri {[ ]aA(x ,a) Dix: xENI} ~n{[:3aA(x ,a) Dix: x ENI}. 
M X 
Hence for each x ENI, V0 ~U{[A(x ,a) Dix,¢: ¢ E C(NN) }. 
x ,a 
Since for each x E N1,U{[A(x,a) ]Ax,¢:¢ E C(NN)} is open, 
x,a 
it is the countable union of disjoint clopen neighbourhoods, 
by 1.1.7 for Baire Space. 
Therefore for each x E NI, the clopen set VO can be 
partitioned into countably many disjoint clopen neighbour-
hoods vf, v;, ... , namely the intersection of V0 and members 
of the countable union of disjoint clopen neighbourhoods of 
U{[ A( x ,a) ~rx, <!> : <l> E C(NN)}, such that for each y E Vo, 
l( I (X 
y EV~ for exactly one j. Moreover, since for each 
J 
· T N 
x ENI, V0 ~U{[A(x,a)]Ax,<I>: <I> E C(N )}, for each x ENI' 
x,a 
for each y, y E v~ implies there is some <I> E C (NN) such 
J 
that y E [ A( x, a)] Ix, <I> . S.ince there is no <I> . E x in y vj we 
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--x 'a 
have, for each x .E N1 , for each y, there is·some <I> E C(NN) 
·x · T 
such that y Ev. implies y E [A(x,a) ]Ax,<I>. By the axiom 
J x,a 
of choice we have,for each x ENI' there is some <I>j E C(NN) 
v~ implies y E [ A( x ,a)] !x, <I>xJ. , @ such that for each y, y E 
J x,a 
For each y E NN, each n EN, define o/ as follows, 
= O otherwise. df 
Because each <I>~ E C(NN) and V0 is clopen, this defines a J 
continuous functional, i.e. o/ E C(NN). Moreover on 
Vo, Ay.[ o/(y)] (2x. 3Y) = <I>j(y), where j is given by y E Vj. 
But since x, y EN are identified with the constant 
functions from NN +N defined by x(B) = x, y(B) = y, for 
each B, we have on VO, 
Ay.Ay(y).[o/(y)](2x(y).3y(y)) = <I>~ 
J 
or = <I>j [by definition of 
our •primitive recursive' functions]. Hence in view of (!) , 
by 4.3.6 lemma we have, for each x ENI' for each y, 
y EV implies y E Vj' where j is· given by y E Vj 
implies y E [A(x,a)]!x,Ay.Ay(y)[o/(y)] (2x.3y) (y) - (:a) 
x,a 
implies y E [A(x,a)][!x,Ayo/(y)] Ay.Ay(y)[o/(y)] (2x.3y)(y) 
x, a a 
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imp 1 i e s y E ~ A ( x , a) 11 [ Ax , A y ljl ( y ) ] " y . II A y ~ ( 2 x 3 y ) II Ax , A y ljl ( y ) , y 
x,a a x,a 
[since y(y) =[y]Ax,y,\y1(y) ,'l'(y) =[a]Ax,y,\y1(y) , 
x,v,a ,y x,y,a ,y 
of [ \x s ] A ] 
,y 
implies y E [S"ya( 2 >< 3Y)(A(x,a)) ]Arx,\y.1(y) 
a x . 
,a 
[by 4.3.6, since x is free for a in A(x,a) implies 
\ya( 2>< 3 y) is subs ti tu table for a in A( x, a)] 
x y T implies y E [A(x,\y.a(2 3 ))]Ax,\y'i'(y) 
x,a 
- (b) 
Therefore since int Vo~ Vo, 
Vo~ [\;lx~(x,\y.a(2x3y))]!\y'l'(y). 
a 
Therefore Vo~ [3a 'qxA(x,\ya(2x3y)) ]r. 
x y T N Therefore [\/x3aA(x,a) -+3a\7'xA(x, \ya(2 3 ))]A= N 
if x is free for a in A(x,a) . 
. 3.13. Remark. To show Bl! is valid in NI we need the 
following two lemmas. 
4.3.14. Lemma. Let A(x) be any formula, let A be any 
assignment. T Then [3lxAx]A is a disjoint union of sets 
[Ax]!x which are clopen in [3!.xAx]!. 
x 
Proof. For each y E NN, y E [3!Ax]! 
implies y E [3x (Ax" '(Jy ( Ay -+x = y) l] i where y does not 
occur in Ax 
implies y E [ Ax /\ "fjy ( Ay -+ x = Y) ] 1 x for some x E NI 
x 
implies y E[Ax]Ax and y E [v' y ( Ay -+ x = y) ] lx for some 
x x 
x E NI 
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T T implies y E If Ax] Ax and y EI[ Ay ~x = y] Ax,y for each 
x x,y 
y ENI, _for some x E N1 
[sinde int X C X for each X CNN] 
T · · T implies y E [ Ax ] Ax and [ not y E [ Ay ] Ax, y 
X l( I Y 
or y E[x=y]:x,y] 
l( , y 
for each y E NI, for· s<?rne x E NI 
T implies y E [Ax] Ax and for each y E NI, if x =f=. y then 
x 
YSl[Ay];x,y for some x ENI 
-1<,y 
T implies y E [Ax] Ax and for each y E NI, if x * y then 
·X 
T 
y ~ [Ay]~ for some x ENI 
[since x does not occur free in Ay] 
T implies y E [Ax] Ax and for each y E NI' if x -::/=. y then 
x 
T y ~ [Ax]Ay for some x ENI 
x 
[ since y does not occur in Ax] . 
Therefore [:I! Ax] i is a disjoint union of open sets 
T T For each [Ax]l\, the complement of [Ax]l\ in 
[:]!xAx]A is U{[Ax]~: y=f::x}, which is the union of open 
sets and so is open, and open in [·31 x Ax] i 
4.3.15. Lemma. Suppose SE [Va3!xR(aX)A ~w(Seq(w) ~ 
(Rw~Aw))/\ 'vw(Seq(w) ~(\fsA(w*2 8 +1 )~ Aw))]i, 
then for each w ENI, S f [Seq(w) ~ Aw]iw 
w 
and Sf [('3z ~lh(w))(Seq(w)~ R(:X..t(w)t.!..1(z)))]iw 
w 
implies· for some·. u E NI, 
S f [ ( 3 z ~ I h ( W* u ) ) (( Se q ( w) /\ Se q ( u ) ) 
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--j- · n ( >. t 1 w) t .t.. f ( ·z ) ) ) II~ 
and B En{[(Seq(w) /\ Seq(u)-+A(W*U*2s+ 1 ) ]:w,u,s: s ENI} 
--w,u ,s 
and B $int n{[(Seq(w) A Seq(u))-+A(w*u*2 5 +1 ) ]rx,u,s: s ENI} 
. x u s 
Proof. The proof is by contradiction, We assume the 
opposite of the lemma, as follows: 
Suppose B E ['Q'a 3! x R( ax) I\ 'Vw( Seq ( w) -+ ( Rw-+ Aw) ) /\ 
\"jw(Seq(w)-+ (\"JsA(w*2s+ 1 ) ~ Aw))]r 
and for some w ENI, Bf [Seq(w)-+ Aw]rw 
w - Q) 
and B f [ (3 z < I h ( w) ) ( Se q ( w) --j- R ( At ( w) · ~ 1 ( s ) ) ) ] T w 
t Aw 
and for each u E NI, 
[ B f [ (3:z <I h ( W* u ) ) ( ( Se q ( w) A Se q ( u ) ) 
--j- R ( "t .( W*", t ~ 1 ( z ) ) ) ] r w, u 
. w ,u 
- 6) 
s + 1 T 
and f3 Ell{[(Seq(w) I\ Seq(w) )-+A(W*U*2 ) ]Aw,u,s: s ENI}] 
w, u , s 
implies BE int n{[(Seq(w)A Seq(u)) 
s+1 T 
-+ A(w*u*2 )]Aw,u,s: s E N1 L 
W f U IS 
Suppose for some w ENI satisfying the assumption, 
- © 
Since 1 = >,.y.[1]Aw B = Ay.[1]Aw,
8
s 18 is in NI, and since 1 w' --w, 
is a closed term and so substitutable for u in each formula 
A , using 4 • 3. 5 G) imp 1 i es 
[ B Ej: I[ S ! ( ( 3 z < I h ( W* u ) ) ( ( Se q ( w) I\ Se q ( u ) ) 
--+ R ( " t , W* " ) t ~ 1 ( z ) ) ) ) ] r w , u 
w ,u 
and (3 En{[ S 1 ( ( Seq ( w) I\ Seq ( u) ) 
u 
s +1 T 
-+ A(W~U*2 . ) ) ]Aw,u,s: s ENI}] 
. --w,u ,s 
implies SE int n{[s 1 ((Seq(u) I\ Seq(u) 
u . 
s+1 T 
.-+ A(W*U*2 ) ) ]Aw,u,s: s ENI}. 
--w,u ,s 
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T N Since [Seq ( 1) ] A = N for each A and W* 1 = w, we have Q) implies 
[ (3 Ef= [ ( 3 z ~ I h ( w) ) ( Se q ( w) -+ R ( At ( w} t :... 1 ( z ) ) ] ~:: 
s+1 T 
and (3 E n{[Seq(w)-+ A(w*2 ) ]Aw,s: s ENI}] 
w ,s 
· s +1 T implies (3 E inth{[Seq(w)-+ A(w*2 ) ]Aw,s: s ENI}. 
w,s 
[The reduction to A!': is possible, since 1 is substitutable 
, 
for u in each of .the formulas Band then S~(B) does not 
contain u.] 
But the antecedents of this are the part @ of our 
initial assumption and our assumption G) . Hence we have 
(3 E int n { ~ Se q ( w) -+ A ( W* 2 s + 1 ) ] !: : : : s E NI } , 
s+1 T i . e • (3 E [ Ir;} s ( Se q ( w) -+ A ( W* 2 ) ) ] Aw • 
w 
Since s does not appear in Seq(w) we have 
(3 E [ Se q ( w) -+ \fs A ( W* 2 s + 1 ) ] r w , 
w 
which together with (3 E [\lw(Seq(w)-+ (lr;jsA(W*2 5 +1 )-+ Aw))]r 
implies (3 E [Seq(w) -+Aw]!w for this, assumed w ENI° 
w 
But this contradicts part G) of our initial assumption. 
Hence for this assumed w E NI, 
(3 f n{[Seq(w)-+ A(w*2 5 +1) D!w,s: s ENI}, i.e. for this 
w,s 
w ENI, there is an s 1 E N1 such that 
(3 EJ: [Seq(w)...:+- A(w-11-2 51 +1 ) D!w,s 1 • 
W ,s 1 
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using B E [\f w( Seq ( w)-+ ( Rw-+ Aw) ) ] r and the definition 
T 
of [A-+ B]A , we have for this w E NI. that there is an 
a: s 1 +1) T s 1 E NI such th.at B 1 [ Se Q ( w) -+ R ( W* 2 ] Aw, s 1 • 
· W ,s 1 
I. e. for this w ENI, there is an s 1 E N1 such that 
B f [ Se q ( w) -+ R ( ;\ t ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 ) t .!.. 1 ( I h ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 ) ) ) ] ~ w, s 1 • 
W I S 1 
Since I h(w*2 81 +1) is substitutable for z in 
Seq(w)-+ R(;\t(w*2 51 +1)
1 
.!..1(z)), using 4.3.5 and 
s1+l [. ( s1+1) lh (W*2 ) = ;\ y. I h W* 2 · ] Aw, s 1 , B , we have for this 
W ,s 1 
w E N1 that there is an s 1 ENI such that 
Bf [Seq(w)-+ R(;\t(w*2 81 +1) 1 .!..1(z))]~w,lh(w*2s 1+l) 
--w, z 
Using the easily established result 
-® 
Bf [(3z< I h(w)) B(w,z) ]l: iff, for each z < lh(w), 
T Bf [B(w,t) ]Aw,z [ where z < lh(w) is an abbreviation of 
w ,z 
"for some x, for each y, x (y} + z (y) = lh (w (y} )" where +, lh 
are the primitive recursive functions on N] the part @ 
of the initial assumption becomes for each z < lh(w), 
B f [Se q ( w) -+ R ( ;\ t ( w) t .!..1 ( z) ) ] i w, z 
w ,z 
Since for z < lh(w), ;\t(w)
1 
.!..1(z) = ;\t(w*2 81 +1)
1 
.!..1(z), 
we have for each z < lh (w} 
B f [Se q ( w) -+ R ( ;\ t. ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 ) t .!.. 1 ( z ) ) ] Aw, z, s 1 • 
--w,z ,s 1 
The extension to Aw' z' s 1 is allowed since s1, does not w,z ,s 1 
occur in Seq(w)-+ R( ;\t(w)
1 
.!..1(z))]. 
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Combining this with @ we have, for each z ~lh (w*2s 1 +l), 
· s +1 · T Bf [Seq(w)-+ R(At(w*2 1 )t .:...1(z))OAw,z,s1 
w,z ,s 1 
Le. B El= [ ( 3 z:;;;;; I h ( W* 2 81 + 1 ) ) ( s e q ( w)-+ R ( At ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 ) t :...1 ( z ) ) ) ] r w, s l. 
. w ,s 1 
+1 T N 2s1+l 
Since [Seq ( 28 1 ) ]A = N for each A and As 1 = A , we 
S1 2s1+1 
have for this w E NI, there is an s 1 E 'NI such that 
s +1 · . s +1 Bf[(3z<lh(w*2 1 )((Seq(w)Aleq(21 )) 
-+ R ( At ( W* 1. s 1 + 1 ) t .!.. 1 ( z ) ) )~] Tw ' 2 s 1 + 1 
2s 1 + 1 w, . 
® 
If we suppose 
then this and ® are the antecedents of ® applied to 
s1+l u = 2 , so that using the argument above applied to. this 
case we get a contradiction. Hence for this w E N , 
I 
there are s 1 , s 2 ENI such that 
S f [ ( S e q ( w) " S e q ( 2 s 1 + 1 ) ) -+ A ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 * 2 s 1 + 1 ) ] f w , s 1 , s2 • 
w,s 1 ,s 2 
Hence using the argument above applied to this case,we get 
Sf [(Seq(w)-+ R(w*2 51 +1*2 52 +1)]iw,s 2 ,s 21 
w,s 1 ,s 2 
and so deduce as before 
that for this w ENI, there are s 1 , s 2 ENI such that 
s El= [ ( 3 z :;;;;; I h ( W* 2 s l + 1 * 2 s 2 + 1 ) ) 
1 1 T s 1+1 s 2 +1 ( Se q ( w) -+ R ( At ( W* 2 s 1 + * 2 s 2 + ) ~ .:...1 ( z ) ) ) ] w' 2 , 2 , 
Aw,2s1 +1, 2s2 +1 
etc. 
So in general we have: for this w ENI' there 
are s1, s2, •.• ENI such that for each x ENI' 
3 Ef: [ Se q ( w) -+ R ( >.. t ( W* 2 s 1 + 1 * 
... 
*., s 1 + ( t .!.. I h ( w) ) + 1 ) t T 
t:. .!.. 1 ( W) ) ] AW, S 1 , S 2 , •• , X 
= s[1+(t ..:..1 h(w))]Aw,x,t ,y , 
w, x, t 
i.e. s(l+(t..:..lh(w))) (y). 
--w,s 1 ,s2 , •• , .x 
s + 1 s 1 + ( t .!.. I h. ( w) ) + 1 ) 
. Since >..t(w*2 1 *· ··* 2 t ..:..1 is 
substitutable for e1. in Seq ( w)-+ Rax, using 4. 3. 6 and 
[ At ( w 2 s 1 + 1 * .... * 2 s 1 + ( t .!.. I h ( w) ) + 1 ) t .=.. 1 ] T 
. * AW,S1,S2,•• X y 
w,s 1 , s 2 •• ,x' 
= >..t(y}.((w*2si+l* ••• *2s 1+(t.!..lh(w))+l)t ..!.. l)(y), 
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S1+l S • +l 
= >.. t ( y) • ( w ( y) * 2 * ••• * 2 ( l + ( t- lh ( w) ) ) ( y ) ) t ( y) .!.. l 
we have, for this w E NI, these s 1 , s 2 ,. • • E NI, for 
each x E NI, 
i:t: ) :... T s1+l S, [Seq(w-+ R(e1.x)]Aw,s 1 , •. ,x, >..t(y) (w(y)*2 * 
w,s1 , •• ,x,a 
. . . * 2 s ( 1 + ( t ..!.. lh ( w ) ) + l ) t ( y ) ..!.. l (j) 
Now if we define <Po : NN -+NN by, for each y ENN, t EN, 
<P 0 (y) (t) = (w(y)) t ..!.. l t < lh(W(y)) I 
= s(Ay.l+(>..y.t.!..lh(w)) (y) (y), t ~ lh(w(y)), 
which is constant wrt y since w,s(>..y.l+(>..y.t-=-lh(w})) (y) 
constant wrt y. Then <Po E C(NN) and (j) imply for this 
w ENI' there are s 1 , s 2 , ••• ENI, for some <Po E C(NN), 
for each x ENI' such that 
are 
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~ - T B 1 [Seq(w)--+ R(a><)TIAw,s1,,.,x,¢> 0 , 
w,11 1 , •• ,><,rt 
[ since w, s 1 , • • • . do not appear in R( ct)() and by definition 
of [ A --+ B li L 
. - T This contradicts B E f[\Ja31 >< R( a><)] A, since this implies 
for each 4> E C (NN),. there is some x E NI such that 
. - T [ R { ax ) ] Ax , cI> • 
x 'a 
f3 E 
4. 3. 16. Remark. 4. 3. 15 could be weakened by changing 
3 z ~ I h ( w) to 3 z < I h ( w) • However, since 
f3 E [\fw( Seq ( w)-+- ( Rw -+Aw))]i and (3 f [Seq ( w)-+ Aw]r: 
imply f3 f [Seq(w)-+ Rw]iw ,andw = ;>..t(w)t-=-1(1h(w)), we 
w 
see that the lemma with the weakened ]z< I h(w) is 
equivalent to 4.3.15, but needs some extra steps in the 
proof. Thus it is for convenience that we chose the 
stronger condition :)z ~ I h ( w). 
4.3.17~ Pro12osition. The Axiom schema Bl! is valid in NI. 
Proof. By contradiction. For some A,suppose So E NN and 
V0 is a neighbourhoo~ of (3 0 with 
V0 ~[\la]lxR(ax) A lqw(Seq(w)-+ (Rw-+Aw)) A\fw(Seq(w) 
-+ (VsA(w*2s+ 1)-+ Aw))]i and 8 0 f [A(1)]i • 
Since 1 is substitutable for win Aw and [Seq(1)]r = NN 
for each A, 4.3.5 implies 
So f [Seq(w)-+ Aw]i 1 , 
w 
-© 
Using (3 o E [\iw( Seq ( w)-+ ( Rw-+ Aw)) ] r (D implies 
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T So Ef: IISeq(w)-+- Rw[IA 1 , i.e. using 4.3.5, 
w 
Bo Ef: [Seq(1)~ R(1)]r Using the equivalence 
@ Bo f [(3z <I h(w)) B(w,z) ]I: iff, for each z < lh(w), 
Bo f l[B(w,t)]Iw,z, and 1 = :\t(1)t.!..1(z) for each z, we have 
--w ,z 
for each z ,..;;; 0 I BO El= [ Se 11 ( w) ~ R( :\t ( w) t .!.. 1 ( z))] r w' z i 
w ,z 
i.e. Bo f [(~z< lh(w))(Seq(w)~ R(H(w)t.!...1(z)))]il,z 
-® 
. w, z 
G) and @ are the hypotheses of 4. 3.15 restricted to 
w = 1, so that by 4.3.15, using 4.3.5 on wand the equivalence 
@ we have, there is some u 1 E N1 such that 
B O f [ ( 3 z ~ I h ( u 1 ) ) ( Se q ( u 1 ) ~ R ( :\ t • ( u 1 ) t .!...1 ) ( z ) ) ] i u 1 
U1 
,,.... s +1 T 
and B O E 1 1 { [ Se q ( u 1 ) ~ A ( u 1 * 2 ) ] Au 1 , s : s E N 1 } 
u l , s 
and B O f int ri {[ Se q ( u 1 ) :.+ A ( u 1 * 2 s + 1 ) ] ~ u 1 , s : s E NI }. 
U l I S 
Since Vo ~ ["Va3! x R( ax) ] r by assumption, we have 
Vo~ [3!xR(:\t(u1)t.!...1(x))]ru1. 
U1 
So by 4.3.14,for each z E N1, [R(:\t(ui)t.!.. 1(z))]iu 1 ,z 
U l I Z 
- ® 
is clopen in V0 • So restricting ourselves to the-z < lh(u 1), 
using the equivalence @, [Seq ( u1 ) ] Au 1 is clopen, and 4. 3. 5, 
U1 
we have 
[(3z< lh(u 1 ))(Seq(u 1 )~ R(:\t(u 1 )t.!..1(t)))]iu1 
U1 
is clopen in Vo. 
Therefore there is a neighbourhood V 1 of B0, namely 
VO n - [ ( 3 z < I h ( u 1 ) )( Se q ( u 1 ) ~ R ( :\ t ( u 1 ) t .!... 1 ( z ) ) ) ] i u, such that 
u 
V 1 n [ ( 3 z < I h ( u 1 )) ( Se q ( u 1 ) ~ R ( :\ t ( u 1 ) t .!..1 ( z ) ) ) ] ~/ = ¢ • 
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Suppose for each SE V1 r 
B E s + 1 T rl{IISeq(u 1 )-+ A(u 1 *2 ) DAu 1 ,s 
u l , s 
: s 
Then since int V1 = V1 this implies 
( s+1 T 13 E int 1{[S1H1(1n 1 )-+ A(u 1 *2 ) ]Au 1 ,s 
II\ , !: 
This contra.diets Bo E V 1 and 
. ,,..,. ( ) s+1 T B O f int , , { [ Se q u 1 -+ A ( u 1 * 2 ) ] Au 1 , s : s E NI } 
u l 's 
by Q). 
Therefore since Bo Erl{[Seq(u 1 )-+A(u 1 *2 5 +1 ) ]Iu 1 ,s: s ENI}, 
U 1, S 
there exist 8 1 * Bo E NN, s 1 EN such that 
(a i) B 1 E V1 C Vo (by definition of V1 ) , 
(bi} B 1 Ep s 1 + 1 T (by above), [Seq(u 1 )-+ A(u 1 *2 ) ]Au 1 ,s1 
"1 , S 1 
( C1 ) S 1 ( 1) = so (1) . 
Using VO ~ [\lw( Seq ( w)-+ ( Rw-+ Aw) ) ] r and the equivalence @ 
(a 1 ) and (b 1 ) imply 
B 1 f [ ( 3 z < I h ( u * 2 s 1 + 1 ) )( Se q ( u 1 ) .:... R ( >. t • ( u 1 * 2 s 1 + 1 ) .!..1 ( z ) ) ) ] ~ u 1 , s 1 
-111 'S1 
This and (b 1 ) are the hypotheses of 4.3.15 restricted to 
4. 3.15· again. 
In general we show by 4.3.15 and the above argument 
that there is a nbd Vn+l ~ vn ~ ••• c V0 of Sn, such that 
( ( S1+1 v n+ 1 n [ 3 z < I h u 1 * 2 * ••• * u n + 1 ) ) 
((Seq(u 1 )/\ ••• ASeq(un+ 1 ))-+ 
R(>.t(ll1*?. 81 +1 * ••• *Un+1)t.:...1(z)))]ru1 ••• I 
U1 
so that there is a Bn+l * Bn E NN, sn+l E NI,such that 
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(bn+l) Sn+l Ej: l[(Seq(u 1 )/\··· "Sec1(un+ 1 ))-+ 
S1 +1 * s . + 1 T 
A(u 1 *2 *···*"n+ 1 2 n+1 )]A u 1 ,s1, •. ,un+l'sn+l' 
u i , s. i ' • • , u n + 1 , s n + 1 
(c +l) 8 +l (n+l) = 8 (n+l). n __ n n 
As before (an+l) and (bn+l) imply 
s +1 s +1 [(;:p:~lh(u 1 *2 1 *···*n+ 1 *2 n+1 )) 
( ( Seq( ui) I\ ••• " Seq( un+ 1 )) -+ 
R ( >.. t ( u 1 * 2 s 1 + 1 * .. * u n + 1 * 2 s n + 
1 ) t .:'....1 ( z ) ) ) ] ~ u i , s 1 
u 1 , s 1 
The conditions (c) imply So, S1 , ..• converge to some n 
SENN. Since Vo is clopen the conditions (an) imply 
S E Vo• 
Hence S E ['\f a3! x R( ax) ] i - @ 
Consl'der ffi E NN + NN gi'ven by 'y 'n(y) (w ) ·1· (y) 
\!' I\ o/\ . • (n+l) (y) n(y)- ' 
. s 1+1 s 1 +1 where wn+l is u 1 *2 * ... *un+l *2 n+ <I> is constant 
wrt y so is an element of C (NN). Moreover 
<I>= >..y.[>..11.(wn+ 1 )n .:'....1]A u 1 ,s 1 , ..• ,un+l'sn+l ,Y, 
t\ U 1 ,S 1 1• ••I "11+1 ,S 11+1 
Since \n.(w11 +1 )n .:'....1 is substitutable for a in ]lxR(ax) by 
4.3.6 and @, 
S E [.3 I x R ( >.. 11 • ( wn + 1 ) 11 .:'....1 ( x ) ) TI AT u 1 , s 1 , ••• , un + 1 , s n + 1 
n1 ,s1 , ••• ,un+1 'sn+1 
Therefore for some t E N1 and neighbourhood U, 
s E u c [ R ( >.. n ( w n + 1 ) 11 .:'.... 1 ( x ) ) ] AT u 1 , s 1 , • ·• • , un + 1 , s n + 1 , t • 
"1 ,s 1 '· • • ,un+1 ,s n+1 'x 
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that t is a closed term and so substitutable for x in 
R( ;\n { w
11
+ 1 ) 11 -:::::T( x) ), we have 
. T. 
8 EU~ [R(;\n(w11 +1 )re.::.. Ht))] A U1,s 1 , •• .,un+l'sn+i· 
1\ u 1 ,s 1, ••• ,un+1 ,s n+1 
So that by the definition of [A~ B] r we have 
BEU C [(Seq(u 1 ) I\ ••• f\ Seq(un+ 1 )) ~ 
R ( ;\ n ( w n + 1 ) n .!.. 1 ( t ) ) ffA u 1 , s 1 , • • • , un + 1 , s n + 1 . 
U1 ,s1 , ••• '"n+1 'sn+1 
Therefore for some k, for each m ~ k, 
B E U C [(Seq ( u 1 ) A ••• A. Seq ( u + 1 ) ) ~ m - n 
R ( ;\ n ( w n + 1 ) n .!.. 1 ( t ) ) ] TA u 1 , s 1 , • • • , un + 1 , s n + 1 · 
U1 ,s1 , ••• ,un+1 'sn+1 
Choose m > k and m > t,where 
;\ y . t = ;\ y • [ t ] A u 1 , s 1 , • • • , un + 1 , s n + 1 
'B ; U1 ,s l, ••• ,un+1 ,s n+1 
* * 2 s t + 2+1 u * ., s m+1 then wm = wt+ 1 u t + 2 *. . m ' 
and so >.n ( wm) n .!.. 1 ( t ) = ;\n ( wn + 1 ) n .!.. 1 ( t ) • 
Hence Bm E [ (Seq ( u 1 ) A ••• A Seq (um) ) ~ 
. T 
R ( ;\n ( wm) n .!..1 ( t ) ) ] A u 1 , s 1 , ••• , um, sm 
U1,s1,•••,um,sm 
[we are able to detach the Seq(um+ 1 ) , ••• ,Seq(un+ 1 ) by the 
definition of [A ~e11!1. 
Since ;\y.t ,< lh(wn), using the equivalence@on © for 
n + 1 = m, we obtain a contradiction. 
4.3.18. Remark. To show BC-NI is valid in N1 we need the 
following lemma. 
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4.3.19. Lemma. Suppose A(a,x) is a formula such that for 
each A, for each B, 8 E NN, there exist z, b E ~ such that 
for each y E NN, each <I> E C(NN), if 
T 
yz = Bz and 
E [ ( Aa, x) ] A <I>, A y. b • 
a,x 
[<I>(y)] (z) = 8z then y 
Then there exists a 'l' E C (NN) such that 
T 
["l;/a)y(·r(ay)> OA\fx(-r(ax> 0-+x =y) /\A(a,·r(ay) .:..1))]A'l' = NN. 
T 
Proof. Define B(B,n,y) by: 
B(l3,n,y) =df Seq(n) & (y ENN) (<I> EC (NN)) 
- - ~- T [ y ( lhn) = B ( lhn) & [ <I> ( y) ] ( lhn) = n ~ y E [ A ( ct , x ) ] A <I> , A y • y ] . 
a,x 
Define 'l' by: for each BENN, n EN, 
'l' ( B) ( n) = b+ 1 if f B ( B , n , b) & ( y < b) - B ( B , n , y) & 
=O 
< . (n) . (z lhn) (y)- B (B ,rri <zpi i, y), 
iff (y) - B(B,n,y) or (Ey <b)B(B,n,y) or 
(Ez <lhn) (Ey)B(B,ITi <zP{n)i, y); 
i.e. \J'(B) (n) =b+l iff B(B,n,b), where bis the least y such 
Hence 'l' is a function. 
Moreover 'l' E C(NN) for 
that B(B,n,y) and n is the least 
seq(m) such that B(B,m,b). 
given a, given n a sequence, 
'l'(a)E'{n} implies 'l'a(lhn) =n 
implies 'l' (a) ( i) = (n) i for each i < lhn, where 
(n). >o. ]. 
Let j = max' {lhi}, then a E'{aj} and for each B, BE {aj} 
i<lhn 
implies for each i < lhn, ~(lhi) = S(lhi) 
12 8. 
implies for each i < Um, B (a, i, ( (n) ": )- ) J .. = B(G,i, ( (n)~1)-) 
[by definition of B(B,n,y)] 
implies for each i < lhn, 'I' (a) ( i) = (n)j iff 'V{f3) (i) -- {n )-, l 
[ by definition of ljl] 
implies for each i. < lhn, 'I' ( B) (i) = h1,-). 
( sine\' for each i < lhn, 
implies ifS(lhn) = n 
implies 1!'13 E {n}. 
Since Seq(8z), by assumption (B) (cS) (Ez) (Eb)B(B,8z,b), 
so that (B)(<I>(B))(Ey(B))(Eb)B(B, [ <I>(B)]y(S),b). 
Now for each B,¢(8) we can choose the least band y(B) 
such that B(S,[¢(S)]y'(B) ,b). 
Hence for this b and y (S), I!' (B) ([ ¢(S)] y (B)) = b + 1 =I= O 
and so U { { B : 'l' ( B) ( [ ¢ ( B ) ] y ( B ) ) =I= 0 } : y E NI } = NN • 
- T N f,\ Hence U{[T(ay) >O]A¢,'l',y : y ENI} = N • - 0 
a,T,Y 
For each y ENI, since [x = v]1,x,y = NN iff x =y, and 
x , y 
if x =I= y such that y(B) is the least n with B(B,<I>(B)n,b) 
( - T then [Tax)> O]A¢,'l',x = ~ 
a,T,X 
() { [ T ( ax ) > 0 -+ x = y ] i ¢ , I!' , y , x : x E NI } = NN • 
a,T,y,x 
Hence n ['tfx{ T(ax) >O -+x = y) ]~¢,'l',y : y ENI} = NN 
a,T,Y 
- @ 
For each BE NN,each ¢(8), there is some y ENI such that 
B ( B, [ ¢ ( B)] y ( B) , '¥ ( B )[ 4>TBTJ y ( B).:... 1 ) by our choice of'¥. 
Hence BE [A(a x)]l~¢,>..y.'l'(B)[¢f/ff]y(B).'.'....l by definition of 
a I )( 
B(B,n,y), 
since [ ¢ ( B ) ] ,1h [ <Ii ( B ) ] y {B ) ) = [ ~) y ( B ) • 
Therefore for each¢, each B, there is some y E N1 
such that 
(3 E [A(a,x)]r<I>,Ay.~T(ay) ..:..1]A<l>,'¥,y 
a, x a, T, V , B ' 
so that using 4.3.5, 
- T (3 E [A(a,·day) ..:..1)]A<I>,'¥,y 
a,T,V 
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Hence U{[A(a,T(av) ..:..1)]l<Ii,'¥,y · y ENI}= NN . - Q) 
a,T,V 
u), (?),@ imply U{[T(aV) >O]l<ll,'¥,y n 
a,T,V 
[ iq X ( T ( aX ) > 0 -+ X : V ) ] r <Ji 1 '¥ 1 Y n 
a,T,V 
[ A ( a , T ( a V ) ..:.. 1 ) ] i <Ii , '¥ , y y E NI} = NN . 
a, T ,V 
Since G) , @ , G) hold for each <Ii we have 
['va]y( T( av) >O) I\ "rJx( T( aX) >O -+x = V) A 
A( a IT( av) ..:..1) ) ] r '¥ = NN.. 
T 
4. 3.20. Proposition. The Axiom schema BC - N! is valid in NI° 
Proof. Suppose Bo E NN and Va is a neighbourhood of Bo 
such that Va~ [VaJ!vA(a,v)]r. Using 4.3.14 we have, for 
each 
is clopen relative to V0 • 
the sets [A(a,v) ]r<ll,AYY n 
a I y 
VO for y = 0 , 1, • • • form a partition 
of Vo, evaluating the quantifiers 'Va and 31 V · so that these 
sets are disjoint. 
Let <Ii E C(NN), suppose y EV and <Ii(y) = a. Define <Ii 
a 
by: for each o, <Iia(o) = a. Clearly <Ila E C(NN) and 
y E { B : <Ii a ( B) = <Ii ( B ) }_. T Hence by 4. 3.11, y E [ A( a,y) ]A <Ila, Ay.y • 
a ,Y 
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Define F : NN x NN ·r N by 
T F(y,a) = y iff y E Vo and y E [A( a,y) ]A<I>a,>..y.y df 
a ,Y 
--df 0 .iff y Ep Vo· 
Sinco V0 is clopen, if F io continuous on V0 xNN then it is 
continuous on NN x NN" Suppos,2 F ls not continuous on 
V0 xNN. Then there exist distinct points y*, Y1, Yz, ..• E Vo 
and distinct points u*, (X 1 , a 2 , ••• E NN such that {yn} -+y*·, 
{ex } -+a*, and by choosing a suitable subsequence if necessary, 
n 
F(yn, a
0
) ¢ F(y*, a*). Note that N as usual has the discrete 
topology. 
Choose some 'l' E C(NN) such that 'l'(Yn) = an for each n, 
and 'l' (Y *) :::: a*. Let y* ""' F (y *, a*) , then by 4.3.11, 
y* E r for n sufficiently large, [ A( a, V) ] A 'l', >. y. y* . Hence 
a,y 
Yn E [A(a,y)]r'l',>.y.y* . 
a,v 
T However y
11 
E [A(a,y)]A'l',>.y.yn for each n, where 
a,v 
y = F (y , a ) . 
n n n 
T [ A ( a , y ) Ji A 'l' , >. y • y n 
a,v 
A contradiction, 
F continuous 
By 4 • 3 • 11, s in ce a 
Since Yn * y * for each n, 
T 
n [A(a,y)]A'l',>.y.b n v 0 = ¢. 
a,y 
hence Fis continuous. 
implies for each y, p- 1 [ y] 
implies for each y, p-1 [ y] 
implies for each y, 
is open 
N n Vo x N · is open 
{(y,a):yEV 0 T &y E[A(a,y) DA<I>a,>.y.y} 
. a ,Y 
:::: <I> a (y) 
implies 
is open. 
= <I> ( y) , this 
for each y, 
{ ( y, <I> ( y) ) : y EV O & y E [ A( a, y) ] ~<I>, >.. y. y} 
a ,Y 
is open. 
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By definition of product topology this 
implies for each y, there exist nf' iqhbour-
CD -
hoods {m}, {n} such that 
(y EV 0 ) (<Ii) (y E {m} & <I>(y) E.{n} => 
T y E [A(a,v)]A<Ji,Ay.y). 
a,v 
Given 8 E Vo, for each I!', there is exactly one Yq, EN 
such that 
T 8 E [A(a,y)]A'l',;\y.yq,, as shown in the first paragraph. 
a,y 
By @ there are neighbourhoods {mil'}, {nq,} of f3 and <Ii ( f3) 
such that 
Given cS E VO, take any I!' 0 E C (NN) with I!' 0 ( 8) = 6, and 
take z=max(lhmq,
0
, lhnq,
0
) andy=yq,
0
• Then we have 
( y E Vo ) (<I>) ( y z = S z & [ <P ( y) ] z = cS z => y E [ A( a, Y) ] r <P, A y. y ) , 
a,v 
which is the hypothesis of 4.3.19 restricted to V0 • 
Thus by 4.3.19 we have 
Vo c I[ :h'va3Y ( T( av) >O" ")( ( T( ax)> o ~)( = v)" 
- . T A(a,T(ay) :.-1))]A, 
and SO ['\/a'3!yA(a,y)~ 3T\Ja3y(T(ay)> 01\ "}><(T(ax)> 0 ~>< = y) 
A A( a,T( ay) :.-1)) ]r ~NN 
as required. 
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5. FORCING VIA TOPOLOGICAL MODELS 
5.0.1. Remark. As we pointed out in Chapter Two, the 
Intuitionistic interpretation of logic, arithmetic, etc, 
has to do with some abstract notion of 'proof'. Dana Scott 
in [ 14] says that the topo.logica 1 interpretation of 
H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski (which we gave in Chapter Three 
and extended in Chapter Four) is not unrelated to this 
formalization of the notion of 'proof'. 
In fact he says we may view a neighbourhood of a 
topological space as a kind of 'proof' in the following 
way. Let X and Y be open subsets of a topological space 
T; let t ET be a point and let u be an open neighbourhood 
oft, i.e. t EU CT. Then U is a 'proof' that 
t E (X ny) iff u c (X n Y), i.e. u is a 'proof' that 
t EX and that t E Y. Similarly U is a 'proof' that 
t E (X UY) iff U contains a neighbourhood U' oft which is 
either a 'proof' that t EX or a 'proof' that t E Y. And 
so on. These closely fit the ideas of 2.1.3. 
M.C. Fitting in [ 5] shows the connection between the 
Intuitionistic concept of 'proof' and the concept of forcing 
as developed by Cohen and others. In view of these two 
linkups, namely 'proof'-forcing and 'proof'-topqlogical 
interpretation, we might expect a third linkup, namely 
forcing-topological interpretation. 
In the first section of this chapter we shall give a 
brief description of forcing, and in the second section we 
shall show that, for a given topology, the topological 
valuations give rise to a type of forcing. 
5.1. FINITE FORCING AND FINITE FORCING BY 
STRUCTURES. 
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5.1.1. Remarks. This brief description of how to develop 
forcing and its major result is due to J. Hirschfeld and 
W.H. Wheeler in [ 6]. 
Given a language Land a structure M for L, a technique 
that has wide uses in Model Theory is the creation of a new 
language L(M), which is obtained from L by adding names 
for each element of M to L. We may then extend the structure 
M to a structure MA of L(M), where each new constant m of 
L(M) is assigned the element m of M. 
1. 2. Definition The (basic) diagram of a structure M, 
Diag (M), is the set of all atomic and negated atomic 
sentences (which collectively are called basic sentences) 
in L(M) which are true in M. 
5.1.3. Remark. The usefulness of the idea of diagram is 
seen in the following proposition, the proof of which may 
be found in c.c. Chang and H.J. Keisler [ 2]. Let M,N 
be models for L, then Mis isomorphically embedded in N 
iff N can be expanded to a model of the diagram of M. 
5. 1. 4. Definition. A theory t; in L is a set of consistent 
sentences of L. A model of theory t; is a model for Lin 
which the set of consistent sentences which is theory t; 
hold. The class of models for theory t; is denoted by M(t;). 
5. 1. 5. Definition. Formula A is a \I -formula = df in prenex 
normal form A has no quantifier or one~ quantifier. 
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The set of all \j-formulas deducible from a theory r. 
is denoted bys~· 
5.1.6. Remark. J. Hirschfeld and W.H. Wheeler in [6] show 
that a structure is contained in a model of a theory s 
iff it is a model of s'f/, from which we deduce that M(s~) 
consists of all substructures of models of s· 
5.1.7. Definition. Let A be a set of constant symbols, 
none of which occur in L. L(A) denotes the expanded 
language with the function and predicate symbols of Land 
constant symbols of Land A. L(A) is a normal expansion 
of L =df A is an infinte set. 
Lets be a theory in Land let L(A) be a normal 
expansion of L. A condition in L(A) relative to sis a 
finite set P of basic sentences of L( A) such that s u P 
is a consistent set of sentences in L(A). 
A condition P in L(A) relative to s forces a sentence 
Bin L(A), written P~s,AB, =df 
if B is atomic then PII- s, AB = B E P, df 
if B is ,c then PII- s, A, C = df ( n :::> P ) "' ( 0 . II- AC ) 
- s, ' 
if B is C " D then PII- z;;, AC " D = Pll-1:.: ,Ac or PII- AD, df s' 
if B is 3 x Bx then Pll- s , A3x Bx =df for some closed term t 
in L( A) PII- ABt l; , 
5.1.8. Remark. It should be noted that for classical 
theories, since BA C =df 1 (, B" ., C) and \fx Bx =af 13x ·1 Bx , we 
can extend this definition of forcing to the cases C /\ _D, 'v x Bx. 
In the former we get Pll- s, A C " D if f 
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(0. :> P) (ER :> Q) (P 11- AC and Plf- AD), using the fact, which 
- - i:;;' . I:;;, 
is easily proved by induction on the complexity of formulas, 
if Q C P and Pll-i:;;,AB then Olri:;;,AB. 
However some authors, including J. Hirschfeld and 
W.H. Wheeler, and M.C. Fitting define 
Pll--i:;;,Ac" D =af Plrz;;,AC and Pll-i:;;,AD, i.e. as the simple forcing 
condition, and this is what we shall take. Given this 
simple forcing condition, the v-operator can no longer be 
interpreted as the classical operator. The converse 
situation will occur in section two. 
5.1.9. Remark. Given this definition of forcing, 
J. Hirschfeld and W.H. Wheeler in [6] proceed to prove the 
following lemma, which indicates why we consider i:;;~. 
5.1.10. Lemma. P is a condition relative to i:;; iff it is 
a condition relative to Moreover given a sentence B 
in i( A) , 
5.1.11. Remarks. We now give the connection between i(A) 
andL(M). Letl:;;beatheoryinL. LetMEM(i:;;V). LetA 
be an infinte set of new constants such that 
card(A) ~ card(M). We assign constants from A to a set of 
generators of M, so that each member of Mis represented by 
a closed term of L(A). The closed terms are the names 
used in Diag (M). 
Using the fact that Mis a substructure of a model of 
1';; iff each of its finite subsets is consistent with i:;;, i.e. 
is a condition for s, and 5.1.6, we can show that ME M(l:;;V) 
is equivalent to the assertion that each finite subset of 
Diag(M) is a condition in L(A) relative to i:;;. 
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This equivalence gives rise to the following idea of 
finite forcing by structures. 
5.1.12. Definition. The structure ME M(t~) finitely 
forces a sentence B · in L( A) , written Mii- B, = df there is 
a finite subset P of Diag(M) such tha.t P II- AB. SI 
A structure ME M(tV) is finitely generic for theory 
s =af for each sentence B in L( A), MF 8 iff Mii- B, where f 
is the usual satisfaction predicate. 
5.1.13. Remarks. We shall see in section two that we 
consider structures with diagrams consistent with~ and this 
gives rise to finite forcing by structures. 
This next propos'ition, which is proved by J. Hirschfeld 
and W.H. Wheeler in [6), gives the connection. between finite 
forcing and finite forcing by structures. 
5.1.14. Proposition. Given a theory tin a countable 
language L, L(A) the normal expansion of L, with A countable, 
and given any condition Pin L(A) relative tot, then there 
is a finitely generic M fort with names from L(A) such that 
Pis contained in Diag(M). 
5.1.1 . Remark. We shall give an analogue of this result 
in section two. However we shall not be using the idea of 
strong forcing. Rather we shall use weak forcing. A 
condition P weakly forces sentence B =af P~t,A ,,e. This 
definition gives rise to the foilowing inductive definition 
of weak forcing: 
if Bis atomic, 
if Bis ,c, 
PI~ AB s, =df (O~P) (ER ~Q) (BER); 
= df ( 0. ~ P) - {QI~, AC) ; 
if B is CAO, PII~ AC/\ ll r, , 
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if B :Ls tjx Bx, P II~ A';Jx Bx 
s' 
w 
=df for each closed term t, P111,ABt. 
5. 1.16. Remarks. For the cases B atomic, B is ,c, this 
definition follows immediately from the definition of weakly 
forces. 'l'he case B is C: A D follmui from: eyen Intuition-
istically ·11 (CI\ 0) is 1('1 C v 1D) , and the definition of 
weakly forces. 
The case ~xBx needs the following lemma, which is 
proved by contradiction, for each B, P II~ A,B iff P II- ~B, and 
SI· SI~ 
then we apply the definition of weakly forces. 
We extend our inductive definition of weak forcing to 
the cases B is .C v D, B is :\x Bx, by defining v, 3 as the 
classical operators, C v D = df , h CI\, D), 3x Bx = df, If} x 1 Bx. 
5.2. FORCING VIA TOPOLOGICAL VALUATIONS. 
5.2.1. Remarks. Given a second order language L such as 
in 4.2.2, H.B. Enderton in [ 3] shows that Lowenheim-Skolem 
Theorem holds for secondary (in Henkin's terminology) 
second order structures. In view of this we can restrict 
attention to structures which have a countable set 
M = {m 0 , m1 , ••• } and a countable set F = {¢ 0 , ¢ 1 , ••• } 
of functions on elements on M. 
Given such a structure M, with countable domains 
M,F, add individual constants m0 , m1 , ••• and function 
constants ¢0 , <!> 1 , ••• to L. Call this extended language 
L( M) • 
Consider the following set of atomic sen.tences, 
Struct L( M) = df 
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+ {0 = mr , ••• ; mr = + m s = mt , ••• ; m x m f II = mt ' ••• ; 
5.2.2. Remarks. Given a set D, the Cantor Space topology 
on 2° (the set of all functions from D into {0,1}) is the 
product topology where {O,l} has the discrete topology~ 
So the basic open subsets of 2° are 
{iE{D+{O,l}}.:i(d) =O},.{iE{D+{O,l}} :i(d) = 1}, 
for each d E D. 
Like the Baire Space, the cantor Space js a totally 
disconnected complete metric space and hence has the Baire 
Property. Indeed in some of the proofs, showing that the 
structure of Chapter Four was indeed a model of Intuitionistic 
second order arithmetic, where we used the total 
tlsconnectedness of the Baire Space and the Baire Property, 
we could have used the Cantor Space as the inde.x set of our 
topological structure and carried out the same argument. It 
is, as mentioned before, the naturalness of Baire Space in 
interpreting our function domain that led to us using the 
Baire Space. For this development of forcing, however, we 
find that the Cantor Space is now the more natural space. 
5.2.3. Definition. The subspace I of 2L(M) is defined as 
follows: i E I iff i- 1 [ l] U {,A: A E i- 1 [ O]} is consistent. 
5.2.4. Remark. The idea of considering this subspace and 
using the Baire Property to develop forcing is due to 
K.A. Bowen in [l], though he states that G. Takeuti in an 
unpublished paper 'Topological spaces and forcing' 
developed this idea first. A. Mostowski in Constructive 
Sets with Applications, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1969, 
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Studies in logic and foundations of mathematics, says that 
C. Ryll-Nardzewski also developed th.is idea independently 
of Takeuti. 
Remark It is easy to show that our subspace I is 
equivalent to the subspace J defined by: 
i E J iff i (0 = m ) = r 1 for exactly one r , 
and . ( + = m ) = 1 1 m r s for exactly one s, for each r, 
and . (m +m = mt). = 1 for exactly one t, for each. r,s, 1 r s 
and i(m x m = m ) = 1 for exactly one t, for each r,s, r s t 
. . . . . . . 
and i ( <I>, ( m
5 
) = m ) = 1 for exactly one t, for each r,s, t 
. . . . . . . 
5. 2. 6. Remark. We can relate this idea of Struct L( M) to 
the true model theoretic idea of structure in the following 
way. The first equations O = m, , give conditions 
on the elements of the domain M, and in fact define the 
primitive recursive functions in that domain. The second 
equations <l>r ( m
5
) "' mt , •• ·• give conditions on the functions 
on elements in domain M. 
Thus for each i EI we define a structure Mi as follows: 
M. has domains M,F. The assignment A from individual 
1 
variables into Mand function variables into Fare left 
unspecified. Define a function[]. from closed terms of 1 . 
L ( M) in to Mi by : 
[m ] . ::::: 
I' J. df mr, 
[O]. = df m iff i (0 = mr ) = 1, 1 r 
h+]. iff [II] • ·+ 1, = df m = m and i (m = m ) = 1 s 1 r · r s 
. . . . . . . 
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II <l>t ( 11) TI i =af ms iff II a O i = mr and i ( <l>t (mt) =ms) = 1, 
Because closed terms have no variables appearing in 
them, they are independent of any assignment of variables, 
i.e. [a+]. is sent to the same element of M for each 
1 
assignment of variables. 
function [ ]A . from the 
, J. 
[a+]A . = [a]A"' . , etc. 
,1 ,1 
Thus we can extend[]. to a 
1 
terms into M, F, where [ x ]A . = A (x), 
,1 
This is what we did in Chapter 
Four. The reason we now look only at the restricted 
function []., is that for forcing we want only to look at 
1 
sentences and they contain no free variables. 
5.2. 7. Definition. 
of L(M) by: 
Define a predicate M. I= on sentences 
. 1 
Mi I= a = b = df [a ] i = [ b] i for all closed terms 11 , b , 
Mi I= ,A ~df ·not Mi. I= A, 
Mi I= A /\ B = df Mi I= A and Mi I= B , 
Mi I= 'v x Ax = df Mi I= 
Mi I= 'cjaAa - df Mi I= 
s;r (Ax) 
S <Pr ( Aa) 
a 
for each r EN, 
for each r E N, 
5.2.8. Remark. The predicate Ml= is the usual satisfaction 
predicate restricted to sentences. In view of 5.2.6, since 
each i EI gives rise to structure M., we can define a 
1 
predicate i I= by: i I= A iff Mi I= A • 
5.2.9. Remark. We are able to define the direct power 
structure MI as follows: 
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The domains are MI, FI. The assignments A from variables 
into these domains are unspecified. Define a function 
from closed terms of L(M) into MI by: 
for each i. EI, for each closed term a, [ II ] (i ) = df [ a ] i 
Again we use the 'closedness' of the terms a to extend 
I this function to a function from the terms into M , where 
[x]A(i) = A(X) (i) etc. Again we look only at the restricted 
function because we are interested in sentences. 
5.2.10. Definition. Define a function[] from sentences 
in to P ( I) by : 
[a = b] = c:lf { i EI . : [ a ] (i) = [ b] (i) } for .all closed terms 11 , b, 
[iA] = -[A] df 
[AA B] = df [A] n [B] 
. . . . .. . . . . . . . 
[\ix Ax] = n [ S mr (Ax) ] df r x 
[\1aAa] = df nr [ S !r ( Aa) ] 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
5.2.11. Proposition. i E [A] iff ii= A 
Proof. By induction on complexity of terms. Similar to 
that in 4. 1. 3. 
§.2 .• 12. Proposition. If M has the discrete topology, then 
for each closed term a , h] is continuous in MI (with the 
induced product topology). 
Proof. By induction on.complexity of terms. Similar to 
that in 4 . 1. 6 • 
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5.2.13. Remark. In view of 5.2.12 and 
{i EI: [a](i) = [b](i)} = 
U{{i EI :[a](i) = m} n {i EI :[b](i) = m} :r EN}, 
r r 
[ 11 = b] is open. This together with the property of the 
interior operator ensures this next definition is well-
defined. 
5.2.14. Definition. Define a function []T from sentences 
into the set of open sets of I by: 
[a= b]T =df {iEI: [a](i) = [b](i)} for all closed terms a,b, 
int (-[ A] T) 
o • o e • o o o o o 
[\fxAx]r =df 
·r ['vaAa] = df 
int 
int 
n [ S mr ( Ax ) ] T 
r x 
n [ S <l>r ( Aa) ] T 
r a 
· · · · · · for all sentences A,B, etc. 
5.2.15. Definition. We use P, q, r for finite subsets of 
members of Struct L( M) , and negations of members of Struct 
L ( M) • These are called conditions. We use {p}, {q}, {r} 
for the corresponding neighbourhoods of 2struct L( M) or I• 
So if A E p then i E {p} iff i(A) = 1, if 1A E p 
then i E {p} iff i (A) = o. 
5.2.16. Definition. Define predicates ill..: on sentences.by: 
ill- A =df i E [A]T for each i EI, each sentence A. 
Define predicates p 11- on sentences by: 
·r· {p} C [A] for each P, each sentence A. 
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5.2.17. Remarks. Of course we see that ill- with respect 
to topological valuation is the analogue of i I= with respect 
to valuations. 
We shall now show that p If- satisfies the inductive 
definition of weak forcing. However since our conditions 
include only some atomic sentences (indeed only those with 
which we can define a structure), we must find an alternative 
to the clause for A atomic,' p II- A iff (q _:?p) (Er _:?q) (A Er). 
The following result gives a condition which is 
equivalent to this one in the usual context, but is also 
appropriate in our· context. 
5.2.18. Proposition. Given a condition P in L(A) relative 
to l; and an atomic sentence B, P 11-:w AB iff I- (/\P)-+ B, where 
l; ' 
AP is the conjunction of members of P. 
Proof. ~ we prove the contrapositive 
not 1-(/\P)-+B implies not 1-,((f\P)/\ (18)) 
implies Pu· {18} is consistent 
implies PU {18} is a condition n such that 
0...:? P and (R 2 0) not (BER): 
[otherwise such an R would be incon-
sis tent] 
implies (ECl..:?P) (R ..:? (1) not (B E R) 
implies not (Q _2 P) (ER ::) Q) ( B E R) 
implies w not P 11-z:;, AB . 
*" If r (/\P) + B then: for some 0. C P, 0. U'{B} is inconsistent 
implies I- (/\ P) ·+ B and !-1 (( I\ fi) A B) 
implies I- (/\P)-+ B and I- (AO.)-+ (,B) 
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implies I- (f\P) -+ B and I- ( 1\0) -+ (, B) 
and I- (/\Cl) -+ ( /\ P ) 
[ since O ~ Pl 
implies I- ( I\ ll) -+ B and I- ( /\ 0.) -+ (, B) 
[ using modus ponens] 
implies ~-;)( !\ Q) 
[using !-(B-+A) -+((B-+(1A)) -+(,B)) 
and modus ponens]. 
This contradicts Q being consistent. 
,• 
Therefore I- (/\P) -+B implies (0. ::JP) (Q U {B}) is consistent 
implies (Cl~ P) (ER ~Q) (BER) 
[ taking R to be 0. U { B} 1 
implies P 11-w AB. 
r;; , 
5.2.19. Proposition. Using the equivalence of 5.2.18, ptt-
satisfies the inductive definition of weak forcing. 
Proof. If A is atomic then 
1- (,\ p) -+ A iff for each countable structure M, MI= (/\p) -+ A 
[in view of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem] 
iff for each countable structure M, if Ml=/\P 
then MI= A 
iff for each i E I, if i l~AP then i I= A 
[By 5.2.6 each i EI gives rise to a countable 
structure Mi; other countable structures differ from these 
M. only in their domains, and we can find 1-1 onto functions 
1 
between these domains.] 
iff [/\p] C [A] 
[ by 5. 2 .11] 
iff.{p} s_ [A]T 
[ since [A] T = [ A] for A atomic and 
II/\ p n = n {If B 11 : B E P } = n { ij B Or : B E p } = ll J\P fl T = { p} l • 
I f A is 1 B, p II- , B i ff { p } c [ , B 11 T 
iff {p} c int -[B]r 
iff {p} C -[B]T 
·[since· {p} is open,<=) holds]. 
{p} c -[ B] T implies not {p} ~ [ B ]l T 
implies ( {q} C {p}) (not· {q} ~ [ B] T). 
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If ({q} c {p}) (not {q} ~ [B]r): not· {p} 5:_ -[B]r 
implies· {p} n, [ B] T is a non-empty open. set 
implies there is a neighbourhood· {q} ~with 
{q} 5:_ {p} n [B]T 
implies there is a neighbourhood {q} with 
{q} 5:_ {p} and {q} 5:_ [B]r. 
This contradicts ( {q} ~ {p}) (not· {q} c [ B] r). 
Therefore' {p} c -[B] iff ({q} ~· {p}) (not {q} 5:_ [B]T) 
. i ff ( q > p ) "' ( q II- B ) 
[where> is set inclusion]. 
If .A is B A C then 
p II- B " C iff {p} C[B/\C]T 
iff {p} c [B]rn[C]T 
iff {p} T . } c · [ B.] and {p . c [C] T 
iff ,pll- B and P II- C. 
If A is VxAx then 
p 11-\jxAx iff {p} ~[\jxAx] T 
iff {p} 
iff {p} 
c int n [Smr(Ax) ]r 
- r x 
c n II S mr ( Ax ) ] T 
- r x 
[since· {p} is open, *') ho1ds] 
iff.{p} C [Smr(Ax)]T for each r 
x 
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m 
iff (closed term m in L( M)) (P II- S r (Ax)) 
r . x 
if.f ( closed term mr in L( M) ) (p II- Amr ) • 
Similarly for A is \;/aAa • 
• 2. 20 Remarks. Because we can not show {p} ~ [ B v C] T 
implies ({q} ~ {p.}) (E{r} f. {q}) ({r} C [B]T or {r} ~ [C]T), 
nor the converse, we are forced to define v as the 
classical operator, that is B v C = df ·1 ( 18 "1C) • Then as in 
5 .1.17 we can show that P II- satisfies the inductive 
definition of weak forcing. Similarly for 3><, 3a. 
5. 2 .19 establishes the connection between P II- and 
P 11-;, A, for the case when z;; is empty and A is· 
{mo, m1, •.• ¢0, ¢·1, ••• }. The fact that is not obvious is 
that our conditions Pare consistent subsets of basic 
sentences. However for the predicate P II- we only consider 
those P whose {p} C P(I). If Pis inconsistent then for 
some A, I- (l\p) -+A and I- (f\p) -+ ( ,A) • But as we saw in the 
proof of 5.2.19, this implies [AP]~ [A] and 
[l\p] C [,A]= -[A], a contradiction. 
We can easily extend this connection between P II- and 
w P 11-z;; ,A for z;; not empty, by considering the subspace J of I 
given by: i E Jiff z;; U i- 1[1] U {A: A E i- 1[0]} is 
consistent; and defining conditions P and predicates P !!-
relative to z;; by: pll-A ..;df {p} ~ [A]T n J. 
Our next task is to eE:1tablish :the connection between i II-:-. 
and Mii- • Recall that i 11- is really Mi II- • 
5.2.21. Proposition. For each i E I, A EL( M), ill- A 
iff for some p with i E {p}, p II- A. 
147. 
Proof. ill-A iff i E [A]T 
iff for some {p}, i E {p} and {p} ~ llA]T 
[since [A]T is open and the neighbourhoods 
of I are {p} for some p] 
iff for some p with i E {p}, p II- A • 
5.2.22. Remark. 5.2.21 says Mill-A iff (EP) (i E {p} and pll-A}. 
Now: i E {p} iff {A: AEp} C'.{A: i(A} =l} and 
. {,A : 1 A E p } ~ {i A : i ( A} = O} 
iff { A : A E p } U {, A : ·1 A E p } ~ 
{A : i ( A} = l}U{',A:i(A} = o} 
[ since {A : A E p } , {lA : ,A E p }, 
{ A : i (A} = l}, {, A : i (A) = O } are 
disjoint] 
iff p C {A:i(A) = l}U{lA:i(A) = O}. 
Now since A E Struct L( M) , by the definition in 5. 2. 6, 
i E[A] iff i(A) = 1, and soi E[;A] iff i(A) = 0. 
Therefore i E {p}iff PC {A: A E Struct L(M) and i E[A]} U 
{iA: A E Struct L(M) and i E[1A]} 
iff p C {A :A is atomic and M.j=A} U 
. l. 
{,A: A is atomic and Mi !=1A} 
iff pCoiag(M.). 
. - l. 
Hence 5.2.23 says M.11-A iff (EP) (p C Diag(M.} and p II-A), 
l. - l. 
establishing the connection between M. II- and M II- of section 
l. 
one. 
Notice this connection depends on our using [TIT 
rather than[]. 
5.2.23. Definition. i E I is generic -df ill-A iff i p A 
for ~ach sentence A. 
14 8. 
5.2.24. ProEosition. i is generic iff i E (If Allr Ull1AIIT) 
for each sentence A. 
Proof. =>) For each sentence A either i f A or not if A 
implies either i f A or i fl A 
implies either ill- A or ilr1A 
[ since i is generic] 
implies eitqer i E [A]r or i E [1A]T 
implies i E ([A]TU[1A]r). 
~) Firstly, using the properties of our interior operator, 
ffA]T and [1A]T are disjoint, so that 
.i E ([A]T U [1A]T) implies i E [A]T iff not i E [1A]T.@ 
Then we show~) by assµming that for each formula A, 
i E ([A]T U [,A]T ), and proving that ill-A iff il=A by 
induction on the complexity of A. 
For a= b we have ill-a= b ·iff ij=a = b by definition. 
Now supposing that i II- A iff i I= A, 
for 1 A, i 11- , A iff not ill- A 
[by@] 
iff not i I= A 
[ by hypothesis] 
iff il=1A. 
For A I\ B , i II- A A B iff ill- A and ill..: B 
iff i I= A and i I= B 
[by hypothesis] 
iff il=AAB. 
For V x Ax , i II- \}x Ax iff for each r, i II- S mr ( Ax ) 
. x 
mr iff for each r, i I= S x ( Ax ) 
[ by hypothesis] 
iff i I= \jX Ax 
1 4 {) • 
Similarly for ~aAa, etc. 
5.2.25. Remark. T T For any sentence A, [A] , [,A] are open 
sets so that the complement of their union is closed. 
Hence int cl - ([A] T U[,A] T) = int - ([A]T U[1A] T) 
= -cl([A]TU[1A]T) 
= - ( cl [ A] T U cl [, A] T) 
T· T 
= - ( cl [ A] U cl int -[ A] ) 
= - ( cll[A]T U- int cl [A]T) 
[ and since int cl [ A] T C cl [ A] T ] = -I = ¢. 
Thus for each sentence A, -([A]T U [1A]T) is a nowhere 
dense set. Therefore () {([ A] T u [ ,A] T) : A E_ L( M)} is a 
co-meagre set and therefore a co-boundary set in I. (This 
depends on the fact that any subspace of a space having 
the Baire Property has the Baire Property, and also.that 
L(M) is a countable language.) 
Therefore in view of 5.2.24, the set of generic points 
is a co-boundary set, and so generic points do exist. 
5 .. 26. Remark. In the same manner as in 5.2.20,we can 
extend the connection between i II- and Mii- to models of 
theories s which are non-empty, by considering the subspace 
J of I given by: i E Jiffs U i- 1[1] U {,A ;A E i- 1[0]} 
is consistent. Again we use the fact that a subspace of a 
space having the Baire Property has the Baire Property to 
set up the definition,and facts about generic i E J. 
We are now able to give the analogue of 5.1.14, 
provided that we associate a condition p relative to a 
theory s with the non-empty neighbourhood {p} n J of .J 
defined above. For if p is a condition relative to s then 
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i:;; U P is consistent, and so has a counta.ble model by the 
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem for second order logic. · · Such a 
model is isomorphic to Mi for some i EI, and here 
i E {p} n J. 
5.2.27. Pro12..<?sition. Given a. theory i:;; in L(M) and given 
a condition p relative to i:;;, then there is a generic Mi for 
i:;; such that p ~ Diag(Mi). 
Proof. Given a condition p relative to i:;;, since the set 
of generic points in J is dense, the set of generic points 
in J intersects with the neighbourhood {p} non-emptily. 
Therefore there is a generic i EI such that i E. {p}. 
We saw in 5.2.22 that i E {p} iff pc Diag(Mi) 
Therefore there is a generic M. for z;; (since i E J) 
1 
such that p C Diag(M.). 
- 1 
5.2.2. Remark. The model Mi associated with the generic 
point i E. {p} satisfies z;; and each formula forced by i:;;. 
We have seen the power of using topology: using the 
Baire Property we have shown that generic points (or 
structures) exist and that an analogue of 5.1.14 holds. 
The usual proofs of these are considerably lonqer. 
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